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This research has studied Palmerston North as a case study to measure community responses to
the Vietnam War and has established that the Palmerston North community responses are a fair
representation of the wider community of New Zealand. This research conducted original interviews
with soldiers, protesters and civilians of Palmerston North to compare and contrast their responses.
Historiography has previously focused on soldier and protester narratives. This research in exploring
the civilian narrative as well as the soldier and protester narrative has provided a balanced and
evaluative history. This research suggests that collective memories have developed from the individual
experiences from all three groups. As such the collective memory of soldiers’ is one of betrayal, the
protesters’ collective memory has been validated by the withdrawal of New Zealand’s military
contribution in Vietnam, whereas the civilians were not directly impacted by the Vietnam War and
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Introduction and Literature Review
The Vietnam War was a protracted and contentious conflict that served as a catalyst for wider societal
upheaval. The United States’ (U.S.) justification for the war that it was necessary to prevent the spread
of communism, became increasingly contested on the home front as people saw first-hand the
tragedy of war in their living rooms.1 There was increasing disillusionment over not only why the U.S.
was involved in what was largely seen as a civil war, but whether such a war could be won. As an ally
of the U.S., New Zealand supported the foreign policy – widely known as the ‘Domino Theory’ – that
was then in place, and committed a limited number of troops. The unpopularity of the war was not a
uniquely American experience, with New Zealand also experiencing anti-war protests. These protests
coincided with a shifting demographic as the ‘Vietnam Generation’2 challenged accepted societal
norms and values and utilized the Vietnam War as an argument for youth counterculture. The
questionable nature of the conflict meant that communities were divided and at times were opposed
to each other. New Zealand’s response to the war tended to reflect the scale of New Zealand’s troop
contribution.3 This thesis will study Palmerston North’s community responses to the Vietnam War and
will consider whether it was indicative of New Zealand society and more broadly.
New Zealand’s historiography on the Vietnam War is rather selective as it tends to either focus on
New Zealand’s military involvement and subsequent political decision making, or on the anti-war
movement and the accompanying youth counterculture. My thesis, therefore, aims to provide a more
balanced narrative to the literature on the Vietnam War by looking at not only soldiers and protesters
who were involved, but also civilian perspectives. With this approach my thesis expands the focus of
the current literature and investigates whether the Vietnam War was significant in the minds of
everyday people, who up until this point have been neglected by historians. Palmerston North is
unique as a case study and was chosen for its proximity to Massey University and Linton Military Camp.
As a provincial city with a strong commercial orientation as an agricultural service centre, Palmerston
North also had a predominantly conservative civilian populace. With its close proximity to Wellington
1 Andrew Hoskins, “From Vietnam to the Gulf – Re-visions of war,” in Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq
(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005), p. 13.
2 Also referred to as the ‘Vietnam generation’, see Colin James, The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and
Transition in Contemporary New Zealand (Wellington: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1986), p. 68.
3 New Zealand did not have conscription and therefore elicited a different response to the war in regard to the
Australian and the American response which was more significant domestically. This is further explored in the
discussion chapter.
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– the centre of government decision making, Palmerston North provides an insightful case study into
how a community responded to the Vietnam War.
In examining Palmerston North as a case study, this thesis aims to evaluate whether the
experiences of the Palmerston North community were reflective of wider national and international
responses to the Vietnam war. In order to examine these questions this thesis draws on both
interviews and documentary material. In utilizing oral sources, this thesis engages with the issue of
memory and will analyse how an individual narrative fits into collective memories of the Vietnam War.
Lastly, this thesis will examine the intergenerational shift that occurred during the Vietnam War and
how that affected civilians, soldiers and protesters and their response.
For this thesis, original interviews were conducted with Palmerston North residents who could
either be classified as soldiers, protesters or civilians during the Vietnam War. Residents were
contacted through ‘word of mouth’, usually through personal connections and through their own
community networks, which are still present strongly today. These residents are not considered as
‘great people’ of history but are rather everyday people. This thesis utilises fourteen original
interviews, and an interview by Suzy Hawes conducted in 1994. Of these combined fifteen interviews,
five interviews were used for each grouping of soldiers, protesters and civilians. This thesis closely
followed the ethics guidelines laid out by Massey University and considered the participant at all
stages. Participants were given the opportunity to review the content of their transcripts prior to
publication and also had the option to be identified or not. Regarding this, all but one participant
wished to be named, with the unnamed participant referred to as participant 1 in this thesis. Alongside
these interviews, primary sources such as newspapers and manuscripts were also perused, ranging
from the student magazine Chaff to the newspaper The Evening Standard. These sources were
consulted in a range of archives including the National Army Museum, Te Manawa Museum of Art,
Science and Heritage, Massey University archives and the Ian Matheson City Archives in Palmerston
North. These provided a plethora of primary material, mostly in relation to soldiers and protesters.
This ranged from photographs of soldiers in Vietnam, to protest posters and leaflets. Also consulted
were interview transcripts by Deborah Challinor, Susan Hallis, Brenton Beach and Suzy Hawes, who
each interviewed participant’s that were directly involved in the Vietnam War, which in this regard
were mainly soldiers. Other primary material came directly from the participants who were eager to
showcase their experiences through books, newspaper clippings and photographs. With participants
sharing their experiences, there were times when a participant shared uncomfortable truths that they
wanted expressed. In this instance some of the soldiers I interviewed spoke of the long-term effects
of Agent Orange and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Due to the focus and limitations of this
3
thesis, I cannot expand on these issues but wish to acknowledge the ongoing impact the participants
experience to this day.
Oral History Literature
When it comes to oral history, historians have a moral and ethical responsibility when interviewing
participants. It is important to be critical and aware of any implications not only regarding the conduct
of the interview but in representing the memory of a participant. Thomson et al 4 have critically
evaluated not only what oral history means and its value to history but the implications of memory.
“Remembering A Vietnam War Firefight: Changing Perspectives Over Time” by Fred H. Allison5 is an
important study for oral history. Focusing on Vietnam, this chapter questions how memory shifts over
time as the participant has reworked his memory of combat in order to make sense of it.  The
participant who was interviewed twice - during combat in 1968 and later in 2002 - justifies his personal
narrative by adding context and reiterates his belief system of loyalty among soldiers. Allison’s
research suggests that over time a participant naturally reworks memory to make sense of trauma
and therefore although rare and far between, oral interviews as a primary source are more valuable
if there are two – one during and after an event. Anther work of importance in interpreting and
understanding the interviews that were conducted in this thesis is Alistair Thomson’s, “ANZAC
Memories: Putting popular memory theory into practice in Australia”.6 Thomson critically evaluates
memory, arguing that participants ‘compose’ themselves with their own private memories with that
of public memories. It is a participant’s way of safeguarding themselves but inadvertently
mythologizes such memories. Both studies are essential in understanding the participants interviewed
in this thesis, but most importantly the soldier’s narratives.7
Alistair Thomson’s literature is consequential to this thesis and the understanding of how memory
can be constructed. In studying Australian First World War veterans, Thomson offers up the
explanation that Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) commemoration has been shaped
by memory and has in ways become a part of Australian nationalism – a celebration rather than a
mourning.8 Thomson also provides a guide on the theories and approaches when handling oral
4 Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, ed., The Oral History Reader, 2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 2006).
5 Fred H. Allison, “Remembering A Vietnam War Firefight: Changing Perspectives Over Time”, in Robert Perks
and Alistair Thomson, eds., The Oral History Reader, 2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 2006)., pp. 221-229.
6 Alistair Thomson, “ANZAC Memories: Putting popular memory theory into practice in Australia”, in Robert
Perks and Alistair Thomson, eds., The Oral History Reader, 2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 2006)., pp. 244-254.
7 This is explored further in the discussion chapter.
8 Alistair Thomson, “Postscript: ANZAC Post-memory” in Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, new ed,
(Clayton: Monash University Press, 2013), pp. 314-323.
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interviews and how to interpret and take ‘care’ of them.9 In studying personal testimonies, it becomes
clear that historical narrative is often tied to a person’s identity. James H Liu provides an interesting
analysis of New Zealand’s social identity and what it means for an individual to place themselves in a
wider collective community even if it is “imagined”.10 Liu in basing his work on the concept that a state
produces a communal narrative its citizens believe in, argues that New Zealand has produced two
basic narratives – bicultural and liberal democratic.11 Both narratives centre on the Treaty of Waitangi
and the consequences of colonialism.  In utilizing the liberal democratic narrative, Liu acknowledges
that protest by Māori as seen by the occupation of Bastion Point, civil rights during the Vietnam War
era and the Springbok tour of 1981 are examples of Māori struggling against the legacy of colonialism,
in an attempt to establish their identity on an individual and collective basis.12 Therefore, it could be
that Māori were more aware of Vietnam’s colonial history and American imperialist aims than Pākehā
were, and this may have influenced their own narrative of the Vietnam War.
Samuel Hynes provides insight into analysing personal narratives and collective commemoration.13
Hynes suggests that personal narratives transform into stories based on reflection from the
participant. Reflection is used to make sense of memories, such as those of war, and the
understanding of a memory can take time. Participants are not victims; they are agents of their own
narrative and as such soldiers are not necessarily anti-war. A person’s memory and therefore narrative
cannot be collectively commemorated as people cannot remember an event that they did not partake
in. Instead Hynes offers an explanation by suggesting that collective commemoration is instead
sharing a collective myth; evoking a social construction within each individual. Jeff Doyle also expands
on myth making when it comes to memory and war narratives.14 In exploring the Australian experience
in Vietnam, there are parallels that can be drawn to explain the New Zealand experience. Doyle
stipulates that the Australian military commemorations through ANZAC myth making have been
9 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, new ed, (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2013),
see Appendix 1, Oral History and Popular Memory.
10 James H Liu, “History and Identity: A System of Checks and Balances for Aotearoa/New Zealand” in New
Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations, ed, James H. Liu et al., (Wellington: Victoria University Press,
2005), p. 69. Also see Benedict Anderson, who coined the term “imagined communities” and provides a
definition for what a community is, see pp., 6 and 7 in particular. Anderson argues that a nation is imagined as
a community because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” and therefore it is
made possible that people would die for such an imagination, p. 7., Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7.
11 James H Liu, “History and Identity, p. 80.
12 Ibid. p. 74.
13 Samuel Hynes, “Personal Narratives and Commemoration”, in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth
Century, ed, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 205-220.
14 Jeff Doyle, “Bringing Whose War Home? Vietnam and American myths in Australian Popular Culture”, in
Vietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam, ed, Peter Pierce, Jeff Doyle and Jeffrey Grey., (Victoria:
Penguin Books Australia, 1991), pp. 97-141.
5
restructured to incorporate Vietnam. This is unlike the U.S. where ‘reconciliation and rehabilitation’
was made and built upon by Hollywood, which created a reimagining of the Vietnam experience with
a “forgive or forget mentality.”15 Doyle critiques that the Australian commemorative experience for
Vietnam has been a combination of ANZAC tradition and U.S. military and media imagery. Doyle’s
analysis can be drawn upon for the New Zealand experience. Collective memories, the ANZAC
mythology and how this relates to my participants with their individual memories, are explored in the
discussion chapter.
United States Literature on Vietnam
In the West the Vietnam War was largely an American experience with New Zealand having
minimal military involvement. To therefore understand the large-scale dynamics that New Zealand
was involved in, literature on the Vietnam War from the U.S. perspective was examined. There is a
large body of literature on the Vietnam War which solely focusses on the U.S. political and military
decision making. George C. Herring offers a comprehensive and balanced look at the Vietnam War.16
In America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, Herring gives an overview of
the decisions that led to the U.S. becoming involved in an unwinnable conflict. Herring notes that the
U.S.’ escalation of the war was built upon a containment policy that never questioned the assumption
of communism as a threat to national security. Herring utilizes the Pentagon Papers as well as a wealth
of archival material. Herring in his chapter The Vietnam Syndrome also highlights how conservative
revisionism has seemingly tried to explain Vietnam as a self-inflicted defeat, one whose fate was
sealed by misguided anti-war protesters and a hostile media.17 Walter LaFeber’s America, Russia and
the Cold War 1945-1996, provides a contextual overview of the geopolitical situation during the
Vietnam War era.18 In The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election, LaFeber examines the
15 Ibid, p. 98 and 105. See Doyle’s footnote on reconciliation and rehabilitation for authors reference to this
point.
16 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1979). Also see Herring’s other works such as, George C. Herring, “America’s Path to Vietnam: A
Historiographical Analysis,” in Vietnam: War, Myth and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on Australia’s War
in Vietnam, ed., Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 31-57., George C. Herring,
“Fighting Without Allies: The International Dimensions of America’s Failure in Vietnam”, in Why the North Won
the Vietnam War, ed., Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002)., pp. 77-95., George C. Herring, LBJ and
Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994).
17 George C. Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, ed., David L.
Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)., p. 413. Chapter on a whole discusses Vietnam’s legacy
in light of recent of recent threats such as terrorism and the Iraq/Iran war and how the Vietnam War is still
instrumental to American values. Also refer to Christian Appy’s article which refers to such revisionism.
Christian Appy, “Why Don’t Americans Know What Really Happened in Vietnam?”, February 9, 2015,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-dont-americans-know-what-really-happened-vietnam/
18 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1996, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997).
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American narrative with particular focus on key political figures and their actions during the Vietnam
War. 19 In doing this, LaFeber looks at what shaped the U.S. foreign policy especially with the impact
of domestic reforms and how they influenced the Vietnam War without overemphasizing the protest
side of events. Charles E. Neu approaches the topic of Vietnam with a widespread consideration of
American history and cultural outlook.20 He concludes that the Vietnam conflict is difficult to
understand as it has never ended. To clarify, Neu suggests that the Vietnam War has not found a
settled place in history due to its largely contentious nature. The Vietnam War has thus left a lasting
legacy that still permeates today’s outlook, namely that it disrupts the American story of Manifest
Destiny, the notion that American expansionism was both historically inevitable and morally justified,
and has not been reconciled. How this affects the New Zealand narrative is important to consider as
New Zealand’s foreign policy was based on the U.S. decision making. Arguably, New Zealand’s Vietnam
war legacy is also unsettled.
Literature on New Zealand and Vietnam
New Zealand has not published an official history on the Vietnam War.21 However, Roberto Rabel
and Ian McGibbon were commissioned by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage to each produce a
book that would, collectively act as an ‘official history’ of New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam
War. Rabel’s book New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy, examines the political
and diplomatic decision making of sending troops to Vietnam and the subsequent consequences.22
Rabel successfully provides a comprehensive examination of Vietnam that can be considered an
authoritative contextual source for this thesis. McGibbon was requested to complement Rabel’s work
with his more in depth look into the troop commitment to Vietnam in his book New Zealand’s Vietnam
War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy.23 In focussing more on New Zealanders’
activities during their military engagement, McGibbon gives an insight into the complexities of the
Vietnam War and the role of New Zealanders’ in such a conflict. This thesis is more concerned with
the domestic response of New Zealanders’ to the Vietnam War rather than the activities undertaken
19 Walter LaFeber, The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2005)., see in particular LaFeber’s chapters on Robert Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Nguyen Van
Thieu to understand domestic dynamics and how they fed into the Vietnam War decision making.
20 Charles E. Neu, “The Vietnam War and the Transformation of America,” in After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost
War, ed., Charles E. Neu (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2000), pp. 1-23.
21 See https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/state-funded-history for an overview of New Zealand’s state
funded history.
22 Roberto Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Auckland University
Press, 2005).
23 Ian McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy (Auckland:
Exisle Publishing Ltd, 2010).
7
in Vietnam. However, to understand the soldier’s narrative, McGibbon presents an ‘official history’ on
which to base such analysis and his chapter “Adjusting to Peace” provides a compelling backdrop for
this thesis.24
Elsie Locke’s Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand, gives an insight into the
protest activities during the Vietnam War.25 Locke’s overview details and justifies protesters and the
anti-war movement. Locke provides a compelling account, recognising that at the time media
coverage of protesters was largely unfavourable and therefore newspaper articles at times did not
cover the extent of the protest movement. Locke herself was involved in the Vietnam War protests
and was a firm critic of American aims and foreign policy, these opinions are reflected in her writing.
Claire Hall’s No Front Line: Inside Stories of New Zealand’s Vietnam War, is an oral history project that
explores the narratives of those involved in the Vietnam War; from soldiers and their wives to civilian
medical workers.26 Although Hall explores a wide range of narratives of those involved in the Vietnam
War, it is still a Vietnam experience. Hall only focusses on people who are connected to the Vietnam
War and does not address the wider civilian or protest perspectives.27 Claire Loftus Nelson and Laurie
Barber explore the Vietnam War more generally than Locke and Hall.28 Long Time Passing: New
Zealand Memories of the Vietnam War does not contain more than a broad overview of New Zealand’s
involvement in the Vietnam War. Nelson and Barber utilise oral interviews and showcase excerpts to
contextualize points made, but those points have not been explored further.
Literature based on New Zealand Society
James Belich is a notable revisionist historian of New Zealand history. Belich in Paradise Reforged
explores New Zealand society and how it developed from the 1880s to the 2000s.29 Belich presents
the theory that New Zealand society was closely linked economically, culturally and politically with
Britain between the 1880s and the 1960s when New Zealand’s identity was solidified as its own nation-
state. Belich claims that from the 1880s until the 1960s, New Zealand experienced a period of
‘recolonization’ where New Zealand looked towards Britain for structure. He argues that it was not
24 See McGibbon, “Adjusting to Peace,” pp. 519-535.
25 Elsie Locke, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 1992).,
see chapters 31 through to 38 for Vietnam War coverage.
26 Claire Hall, No Front Line: Inside Stories of New Zealand’s Vietnam War (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2014).
27 Hall briefly explores the protester narrative in her chapter “Homecoming: Vietnam’s Legacy”. However, this
is only three pages in total with the remaining body of work predominantly focussed on the soldiers’ narrative.
28 Claire Loftus Nelson and Laurie Barber, Long Time Passing, New Zealand Memories of the Vietnam War
(Wellington: National Radio, 1990).
29 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000
(Auckland: Penguin Books, 2001).
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until after the 1960s, that New Zealand ‘decolonized’ and separated from Britain in a number of ways
including culturally, socially and economically. Belich’s work provides a framework for New Zealand
society that is both chronological and thematic. The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand 2nd
edition is a collection of chapters by notable historians that discuss key themes of New Zealand’s
evolving society.30 More nuanced than Belich, the Oxford Illustrated is an essential backdrop to this
thesis by contextualising New Zealand society and offering an explanation as to how New Zealand
evolved independently from Britain and followed the U.S.’ leadership. Specifically, Barry Gustafson’s
chapter “The National Governments and Social Change 1949-1972,” sheds light on New Zealand’s
social and political development leading up to Keith Holyoake’s decision-making during the Vietnam
War. Gustafson a political scientist and historian has also written a biography on Keith Holyoake,31
showcasing the complexities of the Prime Minister and how reluctant Holyoake was to commit troops
to Vietnam. Chris Brickell presents an account of youth and the rise of counterculture in the shifting
environment of conservative society.32 Brickell claims that the 1950s and 1960s introduced a
generation of youth that experienced a divide with older generations. Teenagers exhibited the
hallmarks of freedom from a constricting conservative society and expressed such rebellion through
music, fashion, social and cultural experimentation, of which many ideas were borrowed from
Western nations such as Britain and the U.S. The Vietnam War featured as an aspect of newly
discovered political intrigue for New Zealand youth. Brickell presents a comprehensive account of the
development of youth culture in New Zealand.
Literature on Palmerston North in Connection to Vietnam
There is limited literature on Palmerston North and by extension Massey University that sheds light
on the Vietnam War era. M. W. Hancock has compiled a general history of past political events that
occurred, in his research on politics in Palmerston North he mentions the importance of the Vietnam
War in terms of the 1966 general election and the 1967 by-election.33 Hancock’s book The First Sixteen
Members of Parliament for Palmerston North, is a general history of Palmerston North’s parliamentary
representatives. Hancock himself is a reliable source having been born and raised in Palmerston North
and having had a lengthy career in social work that included holding positions at Massey University
and serving on the Palmerston North City Council (PNCC). Michael Belgrave a Professor of History at
30 Keith Sinclair, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand (Auckland: University Press, 1993).
31 Barry Gustafson, Kiwi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007).
32 Chris Brickell, Teenagers: The Rise of Youth Culture in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press,
2017).
33 M. W. Hancock, The First Sixteen Members of Parliament for Palmerston North 1871-2005, in association
with W.E.A Manawatu (2005).
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Massey University with a focus on social policy and Māori history, has written a history of Massey
University that is “deliberately top-down and big-picture, focusing on the institution as a whole”,
rather than a comprehensive or decisive history that focusses on key elements.34 Belgrave in tracing
Massey University’s development from an agricultural college to an internationally recognised
university, provides a brief overview of youth culture and how this played into the Vietnam War,
without overemphasizing the protest narrative.35 Rather, Belgrave positions his history in the wider
context of societal growth. Helen Dollery’s Honours Research Exercise is focused on the relationship
of Massey University with the city of Palmerston North during the period between 1963 and 1973.36
Within Dollery’s thesis are observations of capping stunts between residents of Palmerston North,
students of Massey University and also student relations with Linton Military Camp. Some of her
observations are relevant to this thesis. Capping parades during this period did become politicised as
evidenced by floats which took on international political themes, some of which deviated from the
usual humour to more shocking pronouncements.37 Dollery’s research exercise showcases the
importance of the ‘town-gown’ relationship between students and residents and the wider societal
shift that was taking place during this period. However, the overall focus of the thesis is on student
behaviour in general rather than their attitudes towards the Vietnam War. This thesis will use Dollery’s
Honours Research Exercise as evidence to establish that there was a relationship between students of
Massey University and the wider community.
This thesis, in examining the response of the Palmerston North community to the Vietnam War,
has conducted original interviews with residents of Palmerston North who were either soldiers serving
in Vietnam, protesters during the Vietnam War or civilians who lived through the Vietnam War period.
The thesis is comprised of five substantive chapters. It commences with a background chapter giving
the international, national and local context within which interviewees experiences of the Vietnam
War took place. There follows three chapters, based on the experiences and perceptions of soldiers,
protesters and civilians respectively. Each of these chapters focuses on five interviews where the
interviewees discuss their memories, participation and views of the Vietnam War. Each participant
was asked the same questions regardless of their grouping, with the questions holding a particular
focus on Palmerston North and the response they may have had. Regarding this thesis, the groups of
34 Michael Belgrave, From Empire’s Servant to Global Citizen: A History of Massey University (Auckland: Massey
University Press, 2016), p. 15.
35 Ibid., see chapter 7 Becoming Dangerous, where Belgrave discusses youth culture and its impact on Massey
University through capping parades and most notably the controversial student magazine Masskerade.
36 Helen Dollery, “Fools Abroad: The Town-Gown Relationship Between Massey University Students and
Palmerston North at Capping Time 1963-1973: A Research Degree in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History at Massey University” (Massey University, 2003).
37 “Clever Hoaxes and Criminal Escapades; Stunts 1960-1973,” in Dollery, “Fools Abroad,” see p. 37 for a more
detailed examination from Dollery, who mentions the float that protested the Vietnam War.
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soldiers, protesters and civilians are regarded as having their own inclusive community. Soldiers
themselves, emphasize that they were a military community, protesters liken themselves as a distinct
group separate from the wider community and civilians are indicated as being the wider community.
Each chapter will explore these three communities and reflect on the responses they had to the
Vietnam War. Lastly, the discussion chapter will compare and contrast the chapter findings and
evaluate to what extent the Palmerston North community responses to the Vietnam War were




The Vietnam War was a divisive, complex and tragic war that left lasting repercussions for the nations
involved. New Zealand’s engagement in Vietnam was reluctant, with the government following the
U.S. leadership and foreign policy in combating the threat of communism.38 Although, New Zealand
provided only minimal support with limited military troops committed, the Vietnam War was a
contentious issue that sparked protests worldwide, including in New Zealand. This chapter will
contextualise and examine the Vietnam War generally and how New Zealand became immersed in
such an unpopular conflict. The chapter will discuss: the significance of the Cold War and its impact
on foreign policy and alliance systems, the influence of overseas intergenerational youth
counterculture, New Zealand’s political developments and reluctant involvement in Vietnam, the
growing counterculture in New Zealand and the protest culture against the Vietnam War that was
developed by international experiences, and lastly, what Palmerston North as a case study can tell us
about New Zealand society.
The end of World War II (WWII) ushered in a period of political uncertainty and began an intense
rivalry between the Soviet Union and the U.S. commonly known as the Cold War. The alliance uniting
the political rivalries during WWII was at an end and the post-war era showcased ideological
differences that emanated a fear of nuclear war.39 The U.S. emergence as the main state actor of the
new political stage created the inevitability of confrontation between the two world powers. The post-
war relationship between the two powers was strained by the possession of the atomic bomb, the
post-war settlements in Europe and the fundamental power structures of the two nations.40 Policy
and ideological differences also stemmed from the personalities of the two political leaders.41 Harry
Truman (President 1945-53) advocated battling communism through a containment policy, by
38 Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War., Rabel explains in his chapter “New Zealand and the First
Indochina War, 1945-54”, that to understand New Zealand’s reluctance in involving itself in Vietnam, is to
explore the post-war years of WWII. This chapter and the chapter “From Geneva to the Tonkin Gulf: A Decade
of Decisions Deferred, 1954-64” helps the reader to understand New Zealand’s decision-making leading up to
involvement in Vietnam.
39 Richard Goff et al., The Twentieth Century and Beyond: A Brief Global History, 7th ed., (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2008)., p. 307.
40 Refer to Goff et al., “Postwar Settlements, Europe, and the Early Cold War Years” in The Twentieth Century
and Beyond., for an overview of the events leading up to the Cold War., pp. 304-325.
41 Ibid., p. 308. The issue of personality when it came to decision-making is something that Larry Berman also
touches upon; “the reader should know that this history is viewed primarily as a projection of how decision-
makers themselves viewed the world and American politics in 1965” in Planning a Tragedy: The
Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1984), preface xiii.
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providing economic and military aid to smaller nations threatened by communist expansion.42 This
policy was dominant throughout the Cold War period and continued as the main strategy in the
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Regional alliances were formed such as NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation) and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) as part of the containment
strategy. Joseph Stalin was seen by the West to be threatening the ‘free’ world with his totalitarian
rule of Eastern Europe.43 It was the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61) that coined the
Domino Theory as the precursor for the spread of communism and what would be the strategic
forefront when it came to the Vietnam War. 44 John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev would lead both
the U.S. and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) to the brink of nuclear war with the
positioning of nuclear weapons by the USSR in Cuba. Although nuclear confrontation was avoided the
Cold War did have its military encounters in the form of ‘hot spots’, the most notable being the
Vietnam War.
Vietnam War and its Significance in U.S. Foreign Policy
The Vietnam War is considered to have been a ‘hot spot’ for the wider geopolitical confrontation
between the USSR and the U.S. South East Asia became central to the U.S. in its war on containing the
spread of communism. The U.S. government operated on the assumption that should Vietnam fall to
communism; it would threaten not only the national security of the U.S. but also the Western free
world.45 In the face of this, U.S. leaders expanded the containment policy by providing military and
economic aid to anti-communist governments. After having ‘lost’ China to communism and not
‘winning’ in Korea, the U.S. was concerned that there was a grand scheme at play by Stalin to spread
communism.46 Communist-led insurgencies were gaining ground in newly independent states in Asia
where nationalism was on the rise. In this sense, the U.S. tended to support democratic governments
42 Ibid., pp. 309 and 366., also refer to Herring, America’s Longest War., pp. 6-7. Herring suggests that Truman
had scrapped Roosevelt’s decolonisation efforts for Vietnam.
43 Ibid., p. 309., Goff refers to Winston Churchill’s speech at Fulton Missouri, where he speaks of an ‘iron
curtain’ dividing the East and West in Europe. To see a transcript of this speech, look at “The Sinews of Peace
(‘Iron Curtain Speech’),” The International Churchill Society, accessed June 24, 2020,
https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/
44 John Thomson, Warrior Nation: New Zealanders at the Front 1900-2000 (Christchurch, NZ Hazard Press,
2000), p. 326. See also Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War, p. 21., to understand New Zealand’s
perspective.
45 LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, pp. 230 & 231., LaFeber discusses how the Kennedy
administration never questioned the validity of the Domino Theory or the assumptions surrounding the Cold
War and Vietnam.
46  Goff et al., The Twentieth Century and Beyond, p. 366. Also refer to Berman, Planning a Tragedy, who
provides a good overview of the lead up to U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the chapter “The Road to July
1965”, and in particular discusses the dialogue surrounding ‘losing’ Vietnam to communism, pp. 9-11.
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that were corrupt and opposed to reform.47 Vietnam was an issue for the U.S. due to North Vietnam
getting support from both the USSR and China. Eisenhower feared that Vietnam would fall to
communism and that South East Asia would soon disintegrate with each nation falling like a series of
dominoes having a profound effect on the region. Following this “Domino Theory”, Kennedy expanded
on the aid given to South Vietnam hoping to look strong in the face of communism after the Bay of
Pigs fiasco, whereupon the Cold War had been on the brink of nuclear warfare.48 It was Lyndon
Johnson who escalated the Vietnam War by ordering the use of American ground forces and large-
scale bombing by expressing through the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to combat any aggression with any
means. The superpowers turned local and civil wars into an arena of international conflict.49
Key Alliances which had an Impact on the Vietnam War
To combat Chinese aggression in South East Asia, the U.S. implemented regional alliance pacts such
as ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) and SEATO with anti-communist
governments.50 Previously, Great Britain held the role of maintaining collective security in the region.
This required intervention in Malaya between 1948 and 1960 to maintain independence from
communist forces. Britain’s interest and therefore influence in South East Asia was waning and was
readily replaced with the U.S. as the main power. With Korea divided and Vietnam in negotiations
between nationalist forces and the French, the U.S. began an engagement with South East Asia that
would put pressure on the Soviet Union and its spread of communism. The U.S. sought to set up
SEATO, an alliance between the nation states of Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, U.S., France, Great
Britain, Australia and New Zealand.51 The U.S. was now deeply committed to the welfare of South East
Asia. The U.S. also formed the ANZUS alliance between Australia and New Zealand in 1951. ANZUS
superseded the traditional Anglo-Saxon roots that had been relied upon during both World War One
47 Goff, The Twentieth Century and Beyond, p. 366.
48 Inheriting an Eisenhower program, Kennedy authorised the invasion of Cuba in what was an attempt to
overthrow the presumed Soviet backed Castro regime, in order to establish a democratic ally. U.S. support for
the Bay of Pigs invasion was to be covert with the plausible excuse of deniability. These plans fell through, and
the populace of Cuba did not rise up against the regime. The deterioration of relations between Cuba and the
U.S. led to significant escalations in the Cold War. See Goff et al., The Twentieth Century and Beyond, p. 322.,
for a brief overview.
49 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorised President Johnson to use any measures necessary to maintain
peace and stability in South East Asia. This was passed by Congress on August 7, 1964., see “U.S. Involvement
in the Vietnam War: the Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964,” Office of the Historian: Foreign Service Institute,
accessed June 28, 2020 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/gulf-of-tonkin
50 Goff et al., The Twentieth Century and Beyond, p. 367
51 Berman, Planning a Tragedy, pp. 12 & 13. To see New Zealand’s perspective on signing SEATO and ANZUS
look at Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War, pp. 32-34.
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(WWI) and World War Two. With Britain wanting to focus on defence at home rather than abroad,
the U.S. assumed the role of protectorate of the region. It was in the U.S. best interest to maintain
these regional alliances as the implications of the Domino Theory fed into foreign policy.
Decolonisation in Relation to the Vietnam War
WWII not only ended Japanese imperialism but most other colonial empires in Asia.52 The rise of
Asian nationalism led to a wave of decolonisation that threatened the old-world power structure. The
First Indochina War (1945-54) essentially forced France out of Vietnam and its influence out of wider
Asia. During WWII, China had given sanctuary to Indochinese nationalists as France had yielded control
of Vietnam to Japanese imperialist forces.53 With the dissolution of the Japanese empire, communist
Vietnamese under Ho Chi Minh’s control returned to Hanoi to continue their nationalist struggle
against France. In the battle in Dien Bien Phu, France trapped by Vietnamese nationalist forces
implored the U.S. to intervene, but after being involved in Korea, Eisenhower declined to provide
military aid.54 Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, creating a communist North and a democratic
South. Britain, the U.S. main ally, also left South East Asia, demonstrating a collapse of colonialism in
the region. New Zealand and Australia helped maintain Malayan independence with Britain’s exit, by
providing aid and military support. The U.S. took the brunt of maintaining regional stability in the face
of decolonisation, by also providing economic and military aid. The U.S. in the aftermath of WWII
understood the implications of having the Pacific as their backyard and demonstrated that they
regarded the region as high risk in the face of communism. The Domino Theory guided the U.S.
strategic approach to the region and from their perspective justified their intervention in Vietnam.
52 The aftermath of WWII led to a period of decolonisation that saw an end to Western imperialist control.
WWII had strained the West financially and militarily, resulting in former colonies resisting imperialist control
and attaining independence.
53 Goff et al., The Twentieth Century and Beyond, pp. 359 & 360.
54 For a comprehensive account of France’s defeat in Vietnam and the beginning of involvement for the U.S.,
see Herring’s chapter “A Dead-End Alley: The United States, France, and the First Indochina War, 1950 – 1954”
in America’s Longest War, pp. 1-42.
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Vietnam War as a Rallying Point for Protesters
After WWII the U.S. emphasised its divine sense of Manifest Destiny by championing the
democratic values it was founded upon as a nation.55 Regarding Vietnam, American policies
endeavoured to keep South Vietnam free of communist interference as Vietnam was seen as the
cornerstone of a battle between political liberty and communist tyranny. Civilians’ questioned
whether communism was indeed a threat to the everyday livelihoods of Americans, and whether this
distant and overt threat was worth the lives of tens of thousands of young men and women.  The
Vietnam War was exacerbated by the domestic issues on the home front. Due to the draft, the
Vietnam War was seen as targeting those who belonged to the working class.56 Middle class Americans
could avoid the war as they could obtain deferments because they attended college or graduate
school.57  African Americans and white blue-collar workers could not afford or were not interested in
college and were instead drafted into Vietnam. With the civil rights movement becoming the subject
of violent confrontation, many young Americans did not understand why the U.S. would be involved
in a distant war against communism, when the U.S. should be focused on fixing the injustices at
home.58 The Vietnam War was considered the first media war with the public seeing extensive
coverage of the war being delivered to their living rooms.59 In being able to see the realities of war, it
brought into question the rationale for being involved in Vietnam. It is debatable whether the media
undermined support for the Vietnam War, as the domestic issues that ultimately played a part in
America’s downfall in Vietnam were already in place. However, it is undeniable that media coverage
did ignite discussion around the merits of being involved in Vietnam and inevitably fed into the anti-
war movement.
Opposition to the Draft
Opposition to the draft played an important factor in the anti-war movement as it had pronounced
effects on the debate surrounding the Vietnam War. To supply the large number of troops being sent
55 See LaFeber, The Deadly Bet, pp. 170 & 171., who notes that Great Britain warned the U.S. that its policies in
Vietnam were wrong but due to America’s belief in its own exceptionalism, ignored such advice.
56 Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam, (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1993).
57 LaFeber, The Deadly Bet., p. 16.
58 Ibid., p. 10.
59 Further discussion on the Vietnam War and the impact of media, can be found in Hoskins, “From Vietnam to
the Gulf – Re-visions of war”, in Televising War, p. 13-44., and in Laura Roselle, Media and the Politics of
Failure: Great Powers, Communication Strategies, and Military Defeats, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),
particularly the chapters “Political Communication and Policy Legitimacy: Explaining Failure” and “War Waging
and Reassessment: Vietnam”.
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to Vietnam, Johnson until mid-1967 had been relying on the selective service system and the draft.60
Johnson in a bid to make the system fairer, created a lottery that encompassed all social classes and
also ended graduate deferment. Protest grew to a frenzy and many potential draftees fled America to
avoid a commitment to the war. Two important African American figures, Muhammad Ali and Martin
Luther King, were openly opposed to the war with Ali refusing to be drafted.61 Both figures played an
important role in the changing discourse surrounding Vietnam, as their beliefs inevitably shaped
young African Americans thinking, whom were being drafted at high rates. By 1967, King started to
shape his arguments towards class-based policies rather than race-based policies, concluding that
nothing would help poor blacks and whites until the Vietnam War ended.62 Fearing being drafted,
student activism was strongly connected with draft resistance. Burning their draft cards was a symbol
of defiance against the government and by 1972 there were more conscientious objectors then there
were actual draftees. Support for the war declined in 1967 in large part due to the statistics emerging
from Vietnam. Draft calls exceeded 30,000 per month with 13,000 Americans dying, and by August
Johnson had announced a 10 percent tax to cover the rising costs of the war.63 But it was by 1968,
after the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive – a series of campaigns in
South Vietnam which contradicted previous assurances the U.S. was winning the conflict - that the
American public were becoming exceedingly disillusioned by the improbability of winning the war and
a credibility gap emerged. The American public from this point forth despite political affiliations, were
increasingly doubting American involvement in Vietnam.
Wider Social Concerns of Youth Counterculture
With the assassination of King, and the subsequent resignation of a defeated Johnson, Vietnam by
1968 was becoming a highly explosive and interrelated issue that affected all Americans. The
insecurity of Vietnam correlated with large scale riots at home that largely stemmed from the black
civil rights movement. Law and order thus, far surpassed the issue of American involvement in
Vietnam, especially in light of upcoming elections. Richard Nixon up and coming presidential nominee,
drew upon the fear of white middle-class Americans by promising to end the bloodshed in Vietnam
that had spread onto American streets.64 Many white, middle-class Americans were unreceptive to
paying more taxes for the Vietnam War or to helping black Americans reach their counterparts in
60 LaFeber, The Deadly Bet, p. 16.
61 Ibid, “Martin Luther King: The Dream,” pp. 65-79
62 Ibid, p. 70.
63 Herring, America’s Longest War, p. 173.
64 LaFeber, “Richard Nixon: The Candidate From Squaresville?,” The Deadly Bet, pp. 99-113.
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having the ‘American dream’. Anti-war protesters were thrown into the mix and were often seen as
countercultural hippies who went against American traditions by being sympathetic to communism,
drug users and peace loving and therefore unpatriotic.65 Due to the widespread anti-war sentiment,
some Americans supported the Vietnam war to directly contradict protesters.66 But as draftees were
now nominated from all classes, the middle-class American became concerned over their children
being sent to die in a war that was seen as pointless. Women became involved in anti-war protests in
large part due to being exposed to student activism on college campuses. The feminist movement
took up the chant for peace, with Jeanette Rankin the first ever women being elected into congress
and renowned for her anti-war activism, leading a protest march to Washington D.C.67 The public
mood in the U.S. was one filled with tension. In questioning the Vietnam War, protesters were
challenging the government on broader domestic issues.68 The Vietnam War was not just a turning
point for protesters, but marked a profound crisis for American society.69
Perception of 1968 as a ‘turning point’ in Inter-generational Protest
By 1968 it had become clear to many American people that something was fundamentally wrong
with their society. The division between supporters of Johnson and those who protested the war was
sharpened with the violence that spread from Vietnam to American streets at home. This was in part
due to the civil rights movement and the reactions to it but also because of the dangerous belief that
Americans believed that they were exceptional. Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy believed that
America could not fix itself and achieve equality, equal opportunities, and justice until the Vietnam
War had ended.70 What was telling about the 1968 election, was not Nixon winning but rather that
four of the conservative candidates received 56 percent of the vote.71 In the height of the
counterculture movement, this statistic suggested that when Americans are confronted with difficult
choices, are in the midst of a rapidly shifting society, they resort to their traditional beliefs in a bid to
make sense of all the chaos. Anti-war protesters were made up of many different strands of the
counterculture movement that became a collective and cohesive unit to protest against the war.
Although arguably, these strands differed in how to achieve withdrawal from Vietnam, the pressure
65 Ibid., p. 104.
66 Ibid.
67 Melvin Small and William D. Hoover 1st ed., Give Peace A Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement:
Essays From Charles DeBenedetti Memorial Conference (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1992)., pp. 175-
177.
68 LaFeber, The Deadly Bet, p. 17.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid, p. 168.
71 Ibid, p. 171.
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placed on policymakers did make withdrawal from an increasingly unpopular war probable. The anti-
war demonstrators were not solely responsible for American withdrawal, but it was rather the
conditions on the home front overall that made American involvement in Vietnam precarious. The
credibility gap emerged with the public mistrusting the government on what it said to what it actually
did. The mood of America was one of frustration, anger and mistrust, with the administration fearing
this as a more serious threat than the anti-war movement.72 It seemed that America was determined
to rip itself apart at the seams of society itself. The Vietnam War took a toll on the American public
and created a new age of isolationism in foreign policy. Protest culture continued to develop its
strands but did not captivate the people quite like the Vietnam War. Lessons were to be learned
namely that a President did not have the power to commit the American people to a lengthy war that
they did not understand nor could attainably win, while maintaining order and stability at home.73
Transition of New Zealand’s foreign policy alliances
Emerging from World War II the environment was one of great power politics. Fighting communism
became the West’s political agenda but decolonization was a champion of the U.S. ideals of peace and
freedom. New Zealand became quite aware during the Pacific War that the U.S., and not Britain were
the leading power in the region. By this stage New Zealand was fully autonomous from Britain having
officially adopted the Statute of Westminster, passing the legislation on November 1947.74 The statute
granted New Zealand full sovereign status, which initially New Zealand was reluctant to accept as it
meant cutting ties to Britain.75 New Zealand began to look towards the U.S. as the protector of the
Pacific. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 precipitated this change, as the fight against
communism took a collective approach. The U.S. wanted a security arrangement to justify its
resources and presence in the Pacific. In the defence of South Korea and the ideals that the U.S. fought
for, the issue of the Korean War was taken up by the United Nations, which New Zealand supported.76
New Zealand made a significant contribution to the Korean War, New Zealand’s troops per capita were
second only to the U.S. contribution.77 The security arrangement came in the form of the ANZUS
72 Herring, America’s Longest War, p. 174.
73 LaFeber, The Deadly Bet, p. 179.
74 'Statute of Westminster enacted ', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/statute-of-westminster-passed-confirming-
nz-autonomy, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 11-Dec-2019., New Zealand became a Dominion in
1907, but still had strong ties to mainland Britain.
75 Ibid.
76 Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War, p. 5.
77 W. B. Harland, ‘’New Zealand, the United States and Asia: The Background to the ANZUS Treaty’, in F. L. W
Wood, J. C. Beaglehole, and Peter Munz, The Feel of Truth: Essays in New Zealand and Pacific History,
(Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed for the Victoria University of Wellington, 1969), p. 191.
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treaty, signed in San Francisco on September 1, 1951. The ANZUS treaty did not mean an immediate
split from the motherland Britain or from New Zealand’s traditional commitments. It did mean that
New Zealand troops should be sent to South-East Asia rather than the Middle East in consultation with
Britain and Australia if war broke out.78 The significance lay rather with the fact that this was a security
arrangement without Britain. In accepting the U.S. protection, it meant accepting collective
responsibility for the defence of the West and for the Pacific region.
During the 1950s, the U.S. experienced near mass hysteria over the threat of communism, known
by the popular term “McCarthyism”, in which Senator Joseph McCarthy produced investigations
during the late 1940s and 1950s in order to subvert communists.79 On the domestic front, New Zealand
was also echoing Cold War disputes, most notably during the 1951 Waterfront Dispute.80 For the West,
the Korean War established the focus of resisting communism. New Zealand’s collective security policy
was based on forward defence, to counter any direct threat to New Zealand at its point of origin.81
New Zealand’s foreign policy made it inevitable for New Zealand to be militarily involved in South East
Asia. The West by 1950, began to view Indochina as a focus of fighting Cold War communism, and as
a junior partner of the Anglo-American military partnership, New Zealand adopted this view also. The
Korean War had temporarily diverted attention from Vietnam and the First Indochina War between
France and the Vietminh. Facing defeat and criticism, the French agreed to peace talks that would
include France’s withdrawal, the drawing up of the three newly independent states of Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos, and the temporary partition of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel.82 National
elections were to be held in 1956 to unify Vietnam.83 This did not occur. New Zealand accepted the
U.S. position by also recognising the Bao Dai regime, which signals the beginning of New Zealand’s
foreign policy to Vietnam.84 In acknowledging the Bao Dai regime and aligning with the U.S., New
78 Ibid, p. 193.
79 This period was known as the ‘Second Red Scare’, see Paul J. Achter, “McCarthyism: American History,”
accessed June 23, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/McCarthyism., also Miller Centre: University of
Virginia, “McCarthyism and the Red Scare,” accessed June 23, 2020, https://millercenter.org/the-
presidency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-red-scare
80 The Waterfront Dispute was a culmination of decades of tension that resulted in ‘wharfies’ protesting their
working conditions, see Mark Derby, 'Strikes and labour disputes - The 1951 waterfront dispute', Te Ara - the
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/strikes-and-labour-disputes/page-7 (accessed 23
June 2020), also 'The 1951 waterfront dispute', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/the-1951-waterfront-
dispute, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 17-May-2017.
81 Refer to Ian McGibbon, “Forward Defence: the SouthEast Asian Commitment”, in New Zealand in World
Affairs: 1957-1972, vol 2, ed., Malcolm McKinnon, (Wellington: New Zealand Insititute of International Affairs,
1991)., pp. 9-39.
82 Richard Kennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy: 1951-1971, (Wellington: Hicks Smith & Sons Ltd, 1972), p.
70.
83  Kennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy, p. 71.
84 W.D. McIntyre “From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free in the OHNZ, vol 2, pp. 520-538. For further
explanation on New Zealand’s recognition of Bao Dai, see Roberto Rabel, “A Forgotten First Step on the Road
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Zealand was repudiating its ideals on decolonisation in order to intervene in the growing threat of
communism.
New Zealand’s security arrangement was tested with the outbreak of insurgency in Malaya in 1948.
Having cultural and traditional ties to Britain and military and political ties to the U.S. made it difficult
for New Zealand to balance between the need for forward defence in Malaysia or in Indochina. The
first New Zealanders’ to be sent to South East Asia were Flight No 41 (Transport) Squadron who were
based in Singapore and performed supply drops over the Malayan jungle.85 New Zealand troops were
on the ground in 1955 with the Regular Army Unit 1 New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron,
attached to the 22 British SAS Regiment.86 The Malayan Emergency ended in 1960, with New Zealand
committing an infantry battalion in the new Malaysia until 1969 when the battalion moved to
Singapore.87 The ‘confrontation’ (konfrontasi) period saw New Zealand troops being drawn into a
series of clandestine cross border (Claret) operations with Indonesian infiltrators in Malaysia. From
1963 - 1964, New Zealand infantry troops were deployed to Borneo to counter the Indonesian
incursions. New Zealand’s commitment to the Malaya emergency was to contribute to the
commonwealth effort to push back against the communist forces present in South East Asia. However,
New Zealand’s experience gained from serving in the emergency and confrontation, enabled New
Zealand’s armed forces to militarily prepare for a potential SEATO deployment in Thailand, Laos or
Vietnam.88
New Zealand was reluctantly involved in the Vietnam War. The perceived threat of communism
was growing, and New Zealand was committed to aiding both Great Britain and the U.S. for its own
security self-interests. Due to New Zealand’s military support in Malaya and Borneo, New Zealand felt
obliged to send a civilian medical team in 1963 and engineer support in 1964, to showcase politically
that New Zealand was united in the cause of rooting out communism in Vietnam.89 This was followed
by a small token force in 1965 of a small four-gun artillery battery of 121 men (161 Battery), and the
to Vietnam: New Zealand and the Recognition of the Bao Dai Regime, 1950”, New Zealand Journal of Asian
Studies 2 (June 2000): 65-77.
85 For further information of New Zealand’s Air Force commitment in Malaya refer to Christopher Pugsley,
From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-66 (Victoria:
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 10-22.
86 Kennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy, p. 52.
87 Thomson, Warrior Nation, p. 327.
88 Christopher Pugsley et al., Kiwis in Conflict: 200 Years of New Zealanders at War (Auckland: David Bateman
in association with Auckland Museum, 2008), p. 263.
89 Refer to the chapters “Medical Assistance and “Sappers Enter the Fray” in McGibbon, New Zealand’s
Vietnam War, pp. 36-50 and pp. 50-61.
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removal of the engineer unit (NEWZAD).90 In 1966, 161 Battery was attached from U.S. operational
control to that of the Australian Task Force (1ATF). In 1967, the New Zealand Services medical team
was based in Vietnam. New Zealand in following its ANZUS partner Australia, sent infantry troops from
the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1RNZIR) based in Malaysia to provide combat
support. These troops subsequently made up the six-month rotations of the Victor and Whiskey
companies. These infantry companies in 1968, were thus integrated into the 2nd Battalion, the Royal
Australian Regiment (2RAR) to become the 2ARA/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion which was a part of the larger
1ATF.91 In 1969, the New Zealand SAS troop was attached to the Australian SAS Regiment Squadron
and was withdrawn in 1971. The First New Zealand Army Training Team Vietnam (1NZATTV) was
deployed during 1971. At this time, 161 Battery, the New Zealand Services medical team and V6
company of 1RNZIR was withdrawn from Vietnam. By 1972, the Second New Zealand Army Training
Team Vietnam (2NZATTV) was based in Vietnam but was later withdrawn that year alongside
1NZATTV. The end of New Zealand’s involvement came in 1975 when the New Zealand civilian surgical
team left, and 41 Squadron had its last flight evacuating the New Zealand Ambassador out of Vietnam.
There were just over 3200 New Zealanders’ involved in Vietnam. Around 200 of this number were
non-combatant aid workers. There were 37 casualties and 187 New Zealanders’ were wounded.92
Protest Movements More Visible in New Zealand
During the 1960s and 1970s New Zealand was faced with a changing collective identity. The
Vietnam War protest movement was a precursor to future protest movements such as the abortion
issue, environmental protests, Māori activism and the anti-nuclear issue.93 The most contentious issue
to follow in the wake of anti-Vietnam War protests were the protests over sporting contact with South
Africa. Traditionalists were being threatened by the newly emerging middle-class liberals, who were
demographically a wide variety of social groups such as: university students, young people and women
and men who were challenging long accepted norms.94 New Zealand’s anti-nuclear group was first
established in 1959 and gathered strength during the 1960s when France began to test nuclear
weapons in the Pacific.95 This small left-wing group grew to prominence during the 1970s and 1980s
with the movement mixing nationalist sentiment with environmental concerns and anti-war notions.96
90 Refer to the chapter “A Combat Contribution” in McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, pp. 74-85.
91 Refer to the chapter “A New Framework” in McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, pp. 132-144.
92 Thomson, Warrior Nation, p. 332
93 Belich, Paradise Reforged, p. 516.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., p. 435-436.
96 Ibid.
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Second wave feminism emerged in the 1960s, with radical groups prominent in the 1970s and 1980s.97
The face of New Zealand was changing, with New Zealand’s middle-class becoming more liberal and
educated. The 1960s showcased issues that New Zealanders’ were becoming ever increasingly
concerned with; with the Labour party taking advantage of middle-class votes rather than its usual
constituency, the working class. Overall, the 1960s were a tumultuous time, where young people were
more exposed to political agendas than their predecessors and through experimentation, took
advantage of a changing society to advocate their views.
New Zealand’s Anti-war Movement
New Zealand’s anti-war protest movement followed in the footsteps of American and Australian
protests. The first New Zealand troops to Vietnam were sent in 1964, and coincided with resolutions
from trade organisations, churches and peace movements that opposed the war.98 The Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) marched in 1965 in retaliation to Henry Cabot Lodge’s (United States
Ambassador to Vietnam) visit.99 The Committee on Vietnam (COV) coordinated national events with
regional centres throughout New Zealand. President Johnson paid a visit to drum up support for his
war and was met with protest in Palmerston North and Wellington in 1966. In 1967 Air Marshall Ky,
Prime Minister of South Vietnam, visited New Zealand and was also demonstrated against. The Peace,
Power and Politics conference was warmly welcomed by university students in 1968 and was held at
the same time as a SEATO meeting. Nationwide mobilisations occurred on 1st May and 17th July 1970,
30th April and 30th July 1971 and 14th July 1972, with the July 1970 march in response to the Kent State
University shooting in America.100 The protest movement reflected a time of change in New Zealand,
with many distinct groups coming together for a collective cause. The Progressive Youth Movement
(PYM), churches, Quakers, academics, communists, trade unionists and pacifists were mobilised in
trying to change public opinion on the war and achieve troop withdrawal. However, although the anti-
war movement coincided with the Australian and American anti-war movements, each country
97 Ibid., p. 496. Feminism during the 1960s was a part of a movement called the Women’s Liberation
Movement, which sought to free oppressed women. Arguing that ‘personal is political’ and influenced by U.S.
counterparts, the Women’s Liberation Movement worked to change women’s positioning in society., Megan
Cook, 'Women’s movement - The women’s liberation movement', Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand,
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/womens-movement/page-6 (accessed 26 June 2020).
98 Nelson and Barber, Long Time Passing, p. 42.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., p. 44. The Kent State University shooting occurred on May 4 1970. It involved national guardsmen
who in response to demonstrators, fired onto a crowd, killing four students. The shooting sparked protests
throughout the country, nearly four hundred universities and colleges shut down and demonstrators marched
on Washington., Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam At War (New
York: The Viking Press, 1983)., pp. 611 & 612.
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yielded unique responses. The Vietnam War was massively unpopular in the U.S. due to domestic
issues that were not present in New Zealand, and most of all New Zealand did not have a draft in place,
like the U.S. and Australia. New Zealand’s troop commitment was limited and comprised of already
serving personnel. Due to this it can be suggested that New Zealand’s anti-war movement was not
received by the public or government in the same way that the U.S. and Australian anti-war
movements were received by their governments and the wider community in those countries.

New Zealand Protests on Race Relations
New Zealand was exposed to American race relations with the civil rights movement and gained
an awareness of the injustices to Māori. There was an accepted belief in that Māori would be
assimilated into the European population and become New Zealanders’.101 The Hunn Report of 1961
reasoned the inevitability of such an incident and noted that education would provide an easy
integration for both races.102 This view was formally adopted and implemented by the National
Government. However, many Māori felt alienated by such an attitude and through education helped
fight back against such an integrationist view. Rural Māori communities in particular and tribal
authorities refused to adapt to such a view, with Māori creating groups such as the Māori Women’s
Welfare League founded in 1951, to discuss such issues. The New Zealand Māori council was created
in 1962 by the Māori Welfare Act and became the National governments main source of advice on
Maori policy at the time.103 There were strong protests surrounding the Māori Affairs Amendment Act
of 1967, with Māori accusing the law as a ‘last land grab’.104 The law in line with the proposed
assimilation of Māori with European values, was designed to do away with the Māori land title system
and instead make ‘Māori’ land owned by less than four owners into European land.105 Many Māori felt
that they were being further alienated and after much protest, in 1974 the law was modified with a
new Act being drawn up. In 1968 the Māori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) developed a
newsletter to highlight the injustices dealt with by the Treaty of Waitangi. Nga Tamatoa (The Young
Warriors) was formed in 1970 as a radical group to call upon the awareness of the public to Māori
issues. Waitangi Day which had previously only been a holiday in Northland was made a public national
101 Keith Sinclair, The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1990)., p. 289.
102 Ibid.
103 'Treaty events since 1950', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty/treaty-timeline/treaty-events-
1950, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 26-Aug-2019
104 “Treaty Events”, NZ History, accessed 7/08/2019, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty/treaty-
timeline/treaty-events-1950
105 “Māori Affairs Amendment Act”, Victoria University, accessed 7/08/2019,
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-HilMaor-t1-body-d7-d4.html
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holiday in 1974, with Queen Elizabeth visiting for the ceremony. But it was not until 1975 with the
Land March led by Whina Cooper, that a Waitangi Tribunal was created to look into contemporary
Māori grievances against the Crown and it was not until 1985 that the Waitangi Tribunal was
authorised to inquire into historical grievances.
The most notable protest movement in New Zealand was to do with sporting contacts with South
Africa.106 In opposing apartheid, protesters sought to change South Africa’s racist policies by isolating
and putting pressure on their rugby team, the Springboks. In continuing a sporting relationship with
South Africa, it implied that New Zealand supported South Africa’s segregationist policies. In 1960, as
in 1928 and 1949, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) selected a touring team to South
Africa that excluded Māori. This resulted in widespread protest. Before New Zealand sent the All
Blacks to tour in South Africa in 1960, protesters called for a cancellation of the tour stating ‘No-
Maoris, No Tour’.107 The Citizens All Back Tour Association (CABTA) was formed and started a petition
opposing the tour.108 This petition garnered 150,000 signatures, but failed in stopping the tour.109 The
anti-racist organisation, Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), was created in 1964 to counter
the Springbok Tour of 1965.110 By 1966 public opinion had won out, with Prime Minister Keith
Holyoake rejecting that a team excluding Māori should tour South Africa in 1967. In 1970 a tour was
agreed upon with Māori being considered as ‘honorary whites’. At this stage increasing anti-apartheid
sentiment among the New Zealand public was becoming evident. The Halt All Racist Tours (HART) was
formed in 1969 to combat the apartheid system. New Zealand was well aware of its own racial issues
and by 1971 passed the Race Relations Act which prohibited any racial discrimination.111 But New
Zealand as a rugby-crazed nation, was satisfied with the South African’s accepting of the inclusion of
Māori players. Most New Zealanders’ were looking forward to the 1973 Springbok tour and were very
disappointed when it was cancelled.112 Throughout the 1970s, rugby tours between New Zealand and
South Africa went ahead but growing public sentiment against the tours was spreading. The collective
identity of New Zealand was changing with its shifting demographics.
106 'Stopping the 1973 tour', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour/1973-springbok-tour,
(Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 4-Feb-2020
107 'Politics and sport', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour/politics-and-sport, (Ministry
for Culture and Heritage), updated 4-Feb-2020
108 ''No Maoris - No Tour' poster, 1959', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/no-maoris-no-tour-
poster, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 4-Feb-2020
109 'Politics and sport', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour/politics-and-sport, (Ministry
for Culture and Heritage), updated 4-Feb-2020
110 Robert Consedine, 'Anti-racism and Treaty of Waitangi activism', Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand,
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/anti-racism-and-treaty-of-waitangi-activism/print (accessed 26 June 2020).
111 Sinclair., p. 290.




The advent of television (TV) in New Zealand began in 1960, and initially consisted of overseas film
and news.113 Evening news was New Zealand’s first foray into television, mostly consisting of overseas
reporting, the news bulletin NZBC reports (1963-69) was the main news show.114 During this period,
experimentation with news reporting developed the shows Compass (1964-69) and Gallery (1968-74),
which aimed to interview public and political members.115 A significant advancement in national
television reporting in 1969, enabled all viewers to watch the same news at the same time.116 Up until
this point, viewers were having to watch regional channels that would show news - particulary
international affairs -  to audiences on different days.117 In allowing television to be networked, it
permitted audiences to have the same response, important in terms of viewing the Vietnam War.
Televisions became a popular household item, with ownership of televisions becoming substantial
enough to warrant an addition to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 1966.118 The average price of a
television in 1966 was £131 pounds which equates roughly to $4,500 today, making it unaffordable
for the average household, resulting in many families renting television sets.119 Television was at first
viewed in black and white and was state controlled due to only having a single national channel.120 It
was not until 1973 that broadcasting was in colour and the 1990s that television was opened up to
allow more competition and more interesting content for viewership.121
Palmerston North as a City
113 For a timeline of New Zealand’s early evening news, see 'Early evening news on TV', URL:
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/tv-history/news, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 21-May-2014
114 Trisha Dunleavy, 'Television - News and current affairs', Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand,
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Palmerston North is located on a wider block of land once bestowed with the name Te Ahu-a-
Turanga by the Rangitaane tribe who are the tangata whenua of the Manawatu.122 By 1864, the people
of Rangitaane sold parts of their land to the Government which then developed a township and
proclaimed the settlement as ‘Palmerston’.123 Henry John Temple, the third Viscount Palmerston
inspired the name of this new settlement. Unfortunately, the Wellington Provincial Council was
unaware that there was also a settlement in the South Island named Palmerston and due to the
confusion, the North Island Palmerston settlement adopted North to its name which was officially
proclaimed by 1877.124 The town square was soon developed and the Māori community gifted the
name Te Marae-o-Hine (The Courtyard of the Daughter of Peace) in the hopes that people from all
cultures in Palmerston North would live together in harmony.125 As was the culture of the time, this
name was not widely known outside of the Māori community, as European settlers were uninterested
in cultural integration with Māori.126 A Māori cultural resurgence during the 1970s and 1980s sought
to establish an awareness of the history of Te Marae-o-Hine and its significance on the bicultural
community between Pākehā and Māori in Palmerston North. Palmerston North was proclaimed as a
city during the 1930s and was quickly established as an important regional center along with the
formation of the Massey Agricultural College which laid down the foundations of Massey University.127
World War II had a huge impact not only on the whole of New Zealand but also on the newly emerging
regional city of Palmerston North. The Great Depression of the 1930s had left a large number of men
unemployed, but by the outbreak of the war, labour was shifted to essential occupations and women
were being involved as well. It greatly changed the social and economic landscape of Palmerston
North. Significantly, Ohākea airbase was permanently established in 1938 with Linton Military Camp
following soon after in 1942. Both military bases contributed to a lasting military community in
Palmerston North with the ending of WWII highlighting community integration with a number of
victory parades being held in The Square.
Palmerston North flourished alongside the rest of New Zealand from the late 1940s up to the
1970s. In those three decades the population of Palmerston North more than doubled from 25,277 in
1945 to 57,931 in 1976.128 Suburbs expanded with considerable housing developments, the
122 Ian Matheson, Council and Community: 125 Years of Local Government in Palmerston North 1877-2002
(Palmerston North City Library (for the Palmerston North City Council), 2003) p. 7.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., p. 11.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., p. 31.
128 Ibid., p. 38.
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manufacturing sector was able to grow substantially due to the large amounts of nearby farmland
needing service industries, and government research centres were also established.129 Manawatu was
significant in its contribution of agricultural production during the period of 1950-1970 supplying wool,
meat and dairy for overseas trade. The Longburn Freezing Works and a Dairy processing complex
helped facilitate such production. Palmerston North established the Massey Agricultural College in
1927-1928 and developed it into a fully-fledged university, making Palmerston North a renowned
university city with one-eighth of the population in 1976 being tertiary students.130 By 1956 a teacher-
training college had been established and Massey University became amalgamated with a Victoria
University outpost to become solely Massey University of Manawatu in 1964.131 With the steady rise
of Palmerston North’s population, new primary and secondary schools were opened and by 1970
Palmerston North had 12,000 children attending 29 schools.132 The deviation on the railway line
through Palmerston North city centre meant that the PNCC had a blank canvas to develop further
businesses.
By 1976 the Māori population of Palmerston North reached 4,564 which accounted for 7.1% of the
total population.133  This reflected a trend of urbanisation.134 The majority of Māori living in Palmerston
North were not tangata whenua of the Rangitāne tribe but were migrants from other parts of New
Zealand, namely the East Coast, Taranaki and Whanganui.135 This urban shift indicated that Māori were
taking up employment with large Palmerston North based companies such as the Longburn Freezing
Works, Public Works and Railway Departments.136 In 1964, Adelaide Poananga, a 20th-century leader
of the Rangitāne tribe insisted on the construction of the Māori Battalion Hall or Te Rau Aroha
(emblem of gratitude) as a tribute to the 28th Māori Battalion and also as a community centre for
Māori. The 28th Māori Battalion had formed and trained not far from where the hall was
constructed.137 The PNCC also reflected change during the 1960s with Māori and women being
reflected in its composition. In 1962 two ‘firsts’ occurred with the first woman elected Julia Wallace
and the first Māori councillor Sam Mihaere who was a welfare officer in the city.138 The urban shift in
Palmerston North meant that Māori were becoming more visible in the community. This meant that
129 Ibid., p. 38.
130 Ibid., p. 43.
131 Ibid.
132 G. C. Petersen and Norman Whatman, Palmerston North: A Centennial History, (Reed, 1973)., p. 229.
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during the 1960s Māori were becoming more aware of their cultural identity and with
intergenerational protest emerging, Māori activism was also asserted.
The Development of Massey University
Massey University began as an agricultural college in 1927-1928 but by 1959 the PNCC proactively
sought for a university level institution and the following year developed an outpost campus of
Wellington’s Victoria University at Hokowhitu lagoon.139 This outpost became affiliated with the
Massey Agricultural College in 1963 and went on to become Massey University of Manawatu in 1964
and lastly, Massey University in 1966.140 Massey University had become New Zealand’s fifth university
and also was a probable world first in providing technology to farming practices.141 Palmerston North
rapidly became a student city with student numbers increasing from 500 in 1960 to 4,683 in 1977.142
The university was vital for the Palmerston North community as it injected highly qualified
professionals into the community. The culture of the university changed the community not only
through interactions with education but also through sport and cultural customs. By the late 1960s
the emerging scene of student rebellion was pronounced with the 1969 capping magazine Masskerade
that showcased that students were far from their parent’s traditional outlook. Capping stunts during
the 1960s were also a common occurrence and in 1966 one such stunt was ‘borrowing’ an army truck
from Linton Military Camp.143 The Masskerade 69 magazine, which featured racially offensive content
along with the capping stunts took a toll on the Massey University administration who were trying to
advertise the university as a respected place to study.144 Students argued that the community was
blocking free speech and were “wowsers and killjoys”.145 Although things calmed down with
Masskerade in the 1970s, the tensions between students and administration would remain a
microcosm for wider society.146
139 Ibid., p. 43.
140 Ibid.
141 Petersen and Whatman, p. 230.
142 Matheson, Council and Community, p. 43.
143 Belgrave, From Empire’s Servant to Global Citizen, p. 281.
144 Ibid., p. 282. Belgrave suggests that the Masskerade 69 magazine was meant to outrage the reader with its
humour, cartoons, satirical writing and nudity. Contrast with the conservative era, the magazine was
borderline offensive., see pp. 276-281.
145 Ibid.
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The rehabilitation of soldiers was a problematic issue, with WWI showcasing a range of issues and
difficulties especially with the land settlement scheme.147 Learning from this, there was a desire to
offer much more support for the veterans of WWII. Massey Agricultural College, aware of the need to
support returning soldiers had offered courses that would set up soldiers for a post-war career.148
Geoffrey Peren the principal of the Massey Agricultural College, was himself a veteran of WWI and
involved in WWII, understood the failings towards soldiers during the interwar years. 149 Peren sought
to establish short courses in agriculture and horticulture as there was a demand for soldiers to be
placed onto farms quickly.150
This chapter has contextualised the background to New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam. In
departing from Britain and gaining independence, New Zealand looked towards the U.S. as a
protectorate of the Pacific region. In doing so, New Zealand based its foreign policy on forward
defence reflecting the U.S. adoption of the Domino Theory, to combat the spread of communism. New
Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam was reluctant and only limited troops were supplied to maintain
regional alliances. Although the New Zealand government provided the U.S. with minimal support,
there was widespread backlash against the Vietnam War, which New Zealand also experienced.
Protest against the Vietnam War was during a period of contentious and shifting societal norms and
values which influenced politics not only in New Zealand but for the West. This chapter has also
established that the Palmerston North community provides a case study to look at how the community
responses reflect wider societal responses nationally and internationally.
147 See Ashley Nevil Gould, “Proof of Gratitude? Soldier Land Settlement in New Zealand After World War I”
(PhD, diss., Massey University, 1992), for a comprehensive look at land settlement schemes for WWI soldiers.
148 Belgrave, From Empire’s Servant to Global Citizen, p. 156.
149 Ibid., p. 157, Peren had established the Manawatu Mounted Rifles in preparation of war breaking out with
Massey becoming an army staff training college during WWII.




New Zealand’s historiography on the Vietnam War is in large part dominated by the soldier’s
perspective. The soldier’s experience is understandably important due to their controversial
involvement in Vietnam. In following the aim of this thesis, this chapter seeks to explain the experience
of the Palmerston North community during the Vietnam War from the perspective of the soldiers. This
chapter will also explore the wider issues to do with the national narrative of the Vietnam War. This
chapter utilizes five original interviews conducted with soldiers living in Palmerston North about their
experiences of the Vietnam War and the links to the community of Palmerston North. Two of the
interviewees were born into or grew up in the Palmerston North community, whereas, the other three
participants were either involved in the Palmerston North community during their time in the military
or after, when they had settled down in the city. Regardless, these soldiers offer insights into the
meaning of community and are interconnected today through their present connections in
Palmerston North. Patrick Nolan was born in Marton but did most of his growing up in Bunnythorpe.151
His father was a railway man and fought in the Second World War. At the age of fourteen, Patrick was
expelled from school and joined the Regular Force Cadet School. It was here that he earned an
apprenticeship and after four years in Waiouru decided to volunteer for Vietnam as a regular soldier.
Clifford Parker was born in Christchurch and raised in Canterbury. His father was a World War II
veteran. Clifford was called up to do his Compulsory Military Training (CMT) and decided to stay in the
army as an engineer. Clifford was part of the first military contingent to Vietnam and was a member
of NEWZAD. During his military career, Clifford had been assigned to various military bases and bought
his house in Palmerston North in 1958. It was after the Vietnam War that Clifford settled permanently
in Palmerston North. Rangi Fitzgerald was born and raised in Palmerston North. His father was a key
figure in the Māori community of Palmerston North. Rangi volunteered to go to Vietnam when fellow
co-workers at his current job of building pylons in New Plymouth suggested they were joining up.
Rangi was a gunner in 161 Battery. At nineteen years, he was one of the youngest soldiers to volunteer
to go to Vietnam. Dave Hayward was born and raised in Christchurch. Dave joined the army in 1954
and had been involved in two military conflicts, Malaya and Borneo before Vietnam came around.
Dave moved to Palmerston North in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although Dave was not a part of
the Palmerston North community during the Vietnam War, he nevertheless provided a deeper insight
151 Marton and Bunnythorpe are small rural towns near Palmerston North. Marton is situated 40 kilometres
northwest of Palmerston North, while Bunnythorpe is closer, only 10 kilometres from Palmerston North.
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into the workings of the military community. Mike Oliver was born in Te Awamutu and was based in
Christchurch during the Vietnam War. He spent the odd weekend in Palmerston North and by 1965
had moved to Palmerston North. Mike was attached to NEWZAD as an engineer and was in one of the
first detachments to Vietnam. Mike provided valuable insight on the Vietnam War in general. Even
though he was not part of the Palmerston North community until after his service in Vietnam, he
emphasized and contextualised his memory and perspective of the war in the framework of the
Palmerston North community.
Palmerston North has a variety of social groups that contribute to its dynamic population. The
military bases Ohākea and Linton Military Camp helped establish a degree of integration between
soldiers’ and the wider community. Both military bases contributed to a lasting military community in
Palmerston North. This continued sense of military integration was held throughout the following
decades leading up to involvement in South East Asia. WWII had encompassed all levels of society, in
large part due to a full-scale societal effort to support the war, and a strong sense of military tradition
ensued. National Military Service was reintroduced in 1961 and like previous forms of compulsory
military service was designed to ensure that the population could be mobilised in the instance of war
breaking out.152 There were lingering fears that conflict could break out during the Cold War era. The
presence of the military was a communal aspect of Palmerston North life due to its direct links to
military personnel from Linton Military Camp and Ohākea Airbase, an aspect shared with only a few
other NZ communities such as Auckland, Waiouru, Blenheim and Christchurch.153 Linton Military Camp
and Ohākea Airbase are self-sustained, and therefore, could be considered as having their own
community. Being a soldier also engendered strong bonds of comradeship, with soldiers not only
considering their colleagues in a professional capacity, but also as good mates. This is not to say that
the military community of Palmerston North were completely separate to the wider community.
Soldiers’ in Palmerston North were often connected with the local civilian populace as they lived in
town, had family and friends that were part of the wider community and enjoyed hobbies that
integrated people from all social classes or cliques. There was therefore a degree of integration
between the wider community and the military community in Palmerston North.
152 Compulsory military training was seen during the periods of 1909-1932, 1940-1958 and 1962-1972. Each
period was due to a concern of not having enough military volunteers. Claire Hall notes that the Korean War
had been New Zealand’s last use of citizen-soldiers, with compulsory military training having been abolished in
1958 and rebranded as National Service in 1962 by the Holyoake government. Despite this, Holyoake refused
to use conscription soldiers in the Vietnam War. Hall, No Front Line, p. 18.
153 For locations of New Zealand’s military forces refer to, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/about-us/forces-and-
locations.htm. Also see, Matthew Tso, “Camp and Town – Trentham Military Base and the City that has grown
around it,” March 12, 2019, https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/111061935/camp-and-town--
trentham-military-base-and-the-city-that-has-grown-around-it., for an examination of the relationship
between Trentham Military Camp in the Upper Hutt, near Wellington and the local civilian community.
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From the soldier’s perspective, however, the military community of Palmerston North was in itself
its own community, irrespective of where the military personnel were housed. Professional bonds
between soldiers more than likely developed into a close comradeship due to the nature of their
profession. These bonds created a distinct community, one that is still established today. When asked
whether the military community insulated itself, Patrick Nolan noted that it’s more of a conscious
choice and suggested that the Returned Services Association (RSA) engendered such a community, as
soldiers are understood in such an environment. As he recalled:
My god my best man, and I see him every three months. And I know what he’s thinking
without thinking. You know if he walked in here, he would say “Oh, hello I’m Alan, has he told
you we used to sleep together?” And he would. You know, okay we spent a couple of nights
sleeping in a fox hole during Tet sixty-eight [1968], it wasn’t much fun, and we didn’t do much
sleeping. Yeah, we got our own sense of humour. Its black. Its black humour, it’s got to be I
suppose.154
For Patrick, the military was its own environment. Having parents and in-laws that were involved
in WWII and having been based in Waiouru and in Palmerston North, Patrick believed that you ended
up living in your own world. When it came to Vietnam, Patrick volunteered to go as a regular soldier,
seeing Vietnam as “an opportunity for me to go and see if I was as good a soldier as I thought I was”.155
Rangi Fitzgerald’s father was the head of the Ngati Hineaute Rangitāne people and was key to the
development of Māori and Pākehā relations in the Palmerston North community.156 Rangi himself,
was not widely involved in the Palmerston North community in the same manner as his father was. As
one of the youngest soldiers to have served in Vietnam, Rangi was more involved with his own social
scene:
I had a good social group, well when I say I had a good social group I had a good association
with a lot of my friends back then, either started bands cause of the flower power. And
another thing is that I used to make money selling pinecones off the Palmerston North golf
course back in those days. And out of all my friends which I had in my teenage years; I was the
only one that joined the army.157
154 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 20:10
155 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 3:30.
156 Refer to J.M. McEwen, Rangitāne: A Tribal History (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 1986) and Mason Durie and
Meihana Durie, 'Rangitāne - The origins of Rangitāne', Te Ara - the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand,
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/rangitane/page-1 (updated 3 March 2017) to establish a background on the
Rangitāne tribe.
157 Interview with Rangi Fitzgerald, March 14, 2018, audio, 4:40.
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When Rangi was working at New Plymouth building pylons, he was inspired by fellow worker
Richard Epiha Potaka who stated that he was leaving to go join the army. Three months later Rangi
joined too. At the time Rangi was also hearing about Vietnam through the 6 o’clock news on television,
“I thought no this is great I want to go too. Yeah, and that was it”.158
When speaking on the community of Palmerston North, Patrick Nolan emphasized that there was
a distinction between the military community and the wider community, in particular with the student
community (known colloquially as ‘Scarfies’) of Palmerston North:
Every year we would fix bayonets and break out the flags and swords drawn and bands
playing, and we would march through the town and the town would stop and give us a clap
and then there would be a whole mob of scarfies down there by the corner on Fitzherbert
avenue giving us the raspberry. And we would pointedly ignore it. And that would be it. And
when they had their capping parade we would get around and [blows a raspberry]. Bloody
scarfies! You know it was just, you took the piss out of each other because it was required to
do that. It very, very seldom came to anything, anything more than that. Palmerston is
Palmerston, it’s bloody dead.159
Nolan also noted that this separation occurred on the social scene with students and soldiers
drinking at different pubs; “scarfies drank in the Fitz pub and the soldiers drank in the Café de Paris or
the Leopard pub, up the top end of Rangitikei street. Yes, so you had your own watering holes, you
didn’t interact, I don’t think, that much”.160 Patrick also claimed that the Palmerston North community
was more involved with Massey University than with the military community. He suggested that it’s
because Palmerston North was more of a ‘scarfie’ town. Patrick dubbed the relationship between
Massey University and Linton Camp as one of “you had the girls; we had the boys and we shared the
bikes”.161
Each soldier’s commitment to Vietnam began differently. Their understanding of the conflict in
Vietnam was scarce and limited, with information largely stemming from the media or internal
knowledge from the military community, as they were told they were being sent to Vietnam. Each
soldier ‘volunteered’ for Vietnam, although the military community and the civilian community differ
in terms of what volunteering for Vietnam meant. For the soldiers, they understood their commitment
158 Interview with Rangi Fitzgerald, March 14, 2018, audio, 3:30
159 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 21:00
160 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 19:20, ‘The Fitz’ was a popular student pub located in
the centre of the city near the corner of Ferguson Street and Fitzherbert Avenue. The Café de Paris was located
near the Square on Pioneer Highway.
161 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 24:00
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to Vietnam as a part of their job of being professional soldiers, a task they volunteered for when they
signed up to join the military. New Zealand did not have military conscription, an important distinction
to make in terms of conscription for the U.S. and Australian troops and for New Zealand’s history with
CMT. The soldiers understanding of Vietnam was limited with New Zealand troops only experience
with jungle warfare coming from New Zealand’s engagement in Malaya and Borneo. The Vietnam War
was borne from the fear of communism spreading and was significantly underscored by the larger
Cold War political framework. The majority of soldiers understood this in basic terms from what was
known in amongst society around that time.
For Rangi Fitzgerald, his understanding of Vietnam was largely from watching the news on
television. He understood the political climate in terms of the Cold War, stating that he was aware of
the tensions from when he heard about the Cuba Missile Crisis in the papers as a ‘young fella’.162 At a
young age Rangi was aware of the threat the Cold War presented. Patrick Nolan’s understanding of
the Vietnam War was also based on the Domino Theory, a view which he read in the newspapers at
the time. Patrick observed that he still believes in the Domino Theory and that involvement in Vietnam
did in fact stop communism from spreading any further.163 Clifford Parker did not know anything about
Vietnam until he was told he was being deployed as an engineer for NEWZAD. Although he had fought
in Korea, he still did not know where Vietnam was. He began to understand the situation when he
looked for Vietnam on a map. Clifford Parker also understood involvement in Vietnam in terms of the
Domino Theory as it was well publicised at the time, and so had a background knowledge on the
political climate.164 Mike Oliver had a similar experience to Clifford Parker. He was told he was going
to Vietnam in 1964 and at that stage had heard nothing about Vietnam. He understood the dynamics
of the Cold War and had heard of the Domino Theory and the fact that it was an American way of
thinking that New Zealand was following, but none of this seemingly concerned Vietnam.165 Dave
Hayward did not learn about New Zealand’s commitment to Vietnam through the media but rather
through the battalion that was militarily involved in Malaya. As he recalled, some information came
through the media, but the majority of feedback came from the embassy in Saigon, as the Malayan
battalion was aware that if there was to be any involvement in Vietnam it was likely that troops would
come from Malaya.166 Dave Hayward had felt like he was quite aware of the situation in Vietnam due
to his commitment in Malaya and Borneo, and grasped the general understanding that his
162 Interview with Rangi Fitzgerald, March 14, 2018, audio, 3:45
163 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 7:20
164 Interview with Clifford Parker, March 12, 2018, audio, 4:00
165 Interview with Mike Oliver, March 13, 2018, audio, 2:00
166 Interview with Dave Hayward, March 2, 2018, audio, 3:00
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engagement in Southeast Asia was on the basis of the Domino Theory. When speaking on his
understanding of the Vietnam War, he stated:
I sort of agreed with the domino theory. That communism was the big threat to the free
world, if you like. And it would appear that the dominoes of South East Asia could very well
fall one after the other and we had already been and still were in Malaya, the New Zealand
army still had troops in Malaya. So, it was quite conceivable that the domino theory would
have worked. We now know that it actually didn’t happen, but that’s with the benefit of
hindsight. At the time and I still believe that none of our politicians would have committed us
to Vietnam without very good reason unless they felt that it was the right thing to do. It turns
out that it might not have been the right thing to do. But you have to make a call at the time.
So, yeah, I thought that it was the right thing to do.167
Linton Military Camp functioned largely on its own in terms of a structured community. Patrick
Nolan regarded soldiers as being separate from the wider community, stipulating that, “soldiers have
their own community, regardless of where you are. Soldiers all sort of dress the same, think the
same”.168 Such a community is designed to be exported as a deployable force. This was seen
particularly in Malaya where New Zealand battalions settled into the 28th Commonwealth Brigade
Camp in Terendak. This camp was the first-time soldiers took their families with them.169 It was
remarkably different compared to married quarters in New Zealand barracks, with families having to
adjust to the climate and culture of a South East Asian country.170 New Zealand’s commitment in
Malaya and Borneo had given the troops ten years of invaluable jungle warfare experience, something
that was heavily relied on when it came to be committed to Vietnam. In a newspaper interview in
1969, a young Corporal, Junior Manihera stated in the Waikato Times that although Vietnam was his
third tour overseas, he much preferred to be in Malaya as his family was based in Terendak Camp.171
The military provided soldiers with a home away from home but for some troops nothing could really
replace the comforts of home. Morale was a huge factor for the military in terms of taking care of its
soldiers, and so having a functional community was important. When it came to Vietnam, soldiers
without family in Malaya had to rely on parcels and mail to feel connected with local community back
167 Interview with Dave Hayward, March 2, 2018, audio, 1:45
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home. The RSA helped facilitate this and, along with communities such as Raglan, sent Christmas
parcels to the troops.172
Dave Hayward was supported in Vietnam by having contact with his family. His wife and children
were based in Malaya while he served in Vietnam and returned as a family unit to New Zealand when
his deployment to Vietnam was completed. During his tenure in Vietnam, Dave Hayward was also
connected as his mother was a good letter writer and kept him informed of what was happening in
New Zealand. On his return, his parents and his in-laws went out of their way to welcome the family
home, which Dave soon found out was in contrast to the controversy surrounding the soldiers
return.173 For Patrick Nolan, communication from home was largely through letters with telegrams
used for urgent matters, which he suggested were not the most reliable means of hearing from family.
He emphasized the fact that Vietnam was the first war that was televised, and therefore at times the
public misconceived the ongoing New Zealand commitment as the television predominantly aired the
U.S. narrative. He pointed out that “there’s a terrible story of an American woman seeing her son
killed and it was three days before she got a telegram” as an example.174 But more personally, Patrick’s
son was born during the Tet Offensive of 1968. He did not find out that his new-born baby was a boy
until three weeks after, when he was out of the jungle. Patrick opted out of receiving any telegrams
before he went out on an operation as he needed his mind on the job as he reasoned “If something
happened at home would you want to know? I preferred not to know [about receiving news from
home], because there was absolutely nothing you could do about it”.175
The Vietnam War was the first televised war and broadcasted the realities of war to the general
public back home.176 As former journalist Robin Day suggested, television depended on stimulating
visual imagery to captivate the audience and strike emotions rather than intellect.177 And for TV
journalism this meant “an increasing concentration on action (usually violent and bloody) rather than
on thought, on happenings rather than on issues, on shock rather than explanation, on personalities
rather than on ideas”.178 The television would focus almost solely on showcasing the bloody images of
war and did not ask the important questions of why is this happening? Who is responsible? And are
there any alternatives?179 The television became a medium that presented a limited and one-sided
argument of the Vietnam War; an inherent bias. It is far easier for the television to critique the
172 J. C. Graham, “Vietnam Battery Morale at Highest Level”, New Zealand Herald, December 19, 1966
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inequalities of a free society rather than a totalitarian society.180 As Day argued, “by reason of its own
operational needs, TV cannot give fair and balanced reporting of a very large part of the world”.181
And that the “sight of a dead child, a burning home, a dying citizen-soldier, all these may have a much
more powerful impact than abstract concepts like ‘liberty’ or ‘collective security’”.182 Mike Oliver
confirmed that television was a significant medium in broadcasting the situation in Vietnam:
I think with people having TV and having the war on TV, people saw what war was like and
when it was happening and as it happened. And I mean it was the first time they had cameras
at the front line and broadcast, you’re seeing it as it happened. And of course, reporters were
right up there with it. And it was the first time I think, from memory that, I mean the previous
one for that was Malaysia from our point of view, or Malaya in those days. And then before
that was Korea. Suddenly on the TV was Vietnam, particularly in 66 onwards, 65 onwards
when it really got going. And it was in people’s faces, night after night after night on the TV
screen. So, they became very aware of it. But up until about the time we went, people really
weren’t aware of Vietnam to any great degree.183
Patrick Nolan contended that television was becoming significant but still attained information
from his peers who could be more reliable than the media. He remembered there being a TV in the
soldier’s bar.
The introduction of the Vietnam War on television presented a significant change to how the
civilian audience perceived war and the actions of their government. Television tended to provide only
a snapshot of events and did not always contextualize these events or provide detail of the whole
picture. But most importantly, the advent of the television should be viewed in its infancy and that
there was a degree of “mythologizing of the mass audience”.184 Caroline Page examines the use of
propaganda during the Vietnam War. She suggests that propaganda is a necessary tool of the state
and instead of being viewed negatively could be considered as ‘positive necessities’ – in other words,
to gain and convince the public to support a war during peacetime that may not present as a physical
threat to the home front 185. The U.S. failed to convince the wider public through propagandic means
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essentially shifted public opinion from support towards the war effort to go against the U.S.
government. Page suggests otherwise and stipulates that there are three reasons that showcase that
the charge of U.S. media opposing the war is inaccurate. Page cites that public opinion polls
throughout the Vietnam War showed support for President Johnson, which he interpreted incorrectly
as support for the war as a whole.186 Secondly, that the most important newspapers in the U.S.
supported the goals the U.S. government were pursuing in Vietnam.187 However when the means to
the end were in question, this is what the newspapers covered – specifically, the counterproductive
nature the U.S. military used to achieve such goals and the emerging credibility gap from the U.S.
administration which can be contributed to the official U.S. propaganda policy, not the media.188
Thirdly, media support was often too broad in terms of U.S. policy aims.189 Page cites the Tet Offensive
as such an example, where the media reported on such a shocking event, and the supporters criticized
such coverage as sensational.190 When placed in the larger political climate of the time, the Tet
Offensive contradicted statements from the U.S. administration that predicated the American side
was winning.191 This further enhanced the credibility gap.
The U.S. propaganda efforts were the basis of the overarching propaganda rationale that New
Zealand held.192 Such propaganda was to justify not only American but New Zealand involvement in
Vietnam, and wider foreign policy issues.193 Page asserts that the New Zealand government upheld an
official propaganda campaign by closely monitoring New Zealand’s print media, television and radio
on an almost daily basis.194 New Zealand’s propaganda campaign ensured that it followed the broader
U.S. propaganda framework that was in place, namely that Vietnam was a legitimate conflict in the
fight against communism and was not a civil war.195 New Zealand thus implemented the parameters
that provided the narrative as to why its intervention was needed; and that any New Zealand military
commitment would be viewed as independent of the U.S. and Australian forces.196 This was done to
ensure that New Zealand met its ANZUS commitments which, notably, was one of the main reasons
as to why New Zealand was involved in Vietnam.197 And lastly, that New Zealand, while showcasing its
186 Ibid., p. 185.
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support for American intervention in Vietnam, would not be perceived as falling slavishly in line to
American foreign policy.198
Unlike New Zealand’s previous commitments, troops who served in Vietnam came home at the
end of their tour of duty rather than at the end of the war. This meant that troop withdrawal for New
Zealand began in 1970, with all troops being gradually withdrawn with the last Royal New Zealand Air
Force (RNZAF) flight in April of 1975.199 As there was a trickle system designed to evenly withdraw
New Zealand troops from Vietnam, it was seen as logistically incapable to hold an official welcome
home parade for all of the troops.200 Although New Zealand has a military history of not having
welcome home parades in terms of the World Wars and the Korean War, New Zealand did not have
an unpopular involvement in previous military engagements, quite unlike the Vietnam experience.201
Soldiers also had the expectation of having recognition of their military involvement, but with Vietnam
considered as a ‘far-away place’ and which didn’t affect every day New Zealanders’, soldiers only had
limited validation from the wider community. Clifford Parker who had combat experience in both
Korea and Vietnam, suggested that the lack of a warm reception may have been from the Vietnam
War not being officially sanctioned: “Yeah. Not that we were feted much when we came back from
Korea, [but] we hadn’t done anything wrong you see. Cause the big difference I guess is that we, Korea,
was United Nations and you couldn’t really argue with the United Nations, but Vietnam was different.
It wasn’t United Nations, whatever it was.”202 Even though protesters against New Zealand
involvement in Vietnam were a small minority, returning soldiers felt like outsiders from the wider
community. Soldiers who stayed on in the military possibly had a better time at rehabilitation as the
military was a supportive community in itself. Those who did not stay on often found it difficult to
adjust to the outside world and service in Vietnam was often felt as better not mentioned.
Anti-war sentiment in the collective military recollections of the Vietnam War have been expressed
largely through soldiers remembering bitter memories such as being abused during the Auckland
parade or being advised not to wear uniform upon their return. Returning soldiers were delivered at
night-time via Whenuapai airbase and were in many cases placed straight on leave. While, when
Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War, who discusses New Zealand’s decision making when it came to
Vietnam.
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viewed historically, the night-time arrival can be attributed to flight schedules and the stop overs made
at Melbourne to deliver Australian troops on the way home – a fact that has been verified in
McGibbon’s history – to the soldiers this felt very much like being snuck back in. 203  This, along with
advice not to wear their military uniforms and the prevailing anti-militarist mood they encountered
when they returned to their communities, created a lasting impression for the veterans, and is
something that continues to irk in the present day. Dave Hayward expressed his sentiments on the
dissent surrounding the issue:
Yeah, it was a bit of a shock. I think the big shock was the fact that we were smuggled into
the country if you like on the way back and told to wear civilian clothes and go on leave. And
that was a shock, the fact that to wear uniform in public could be dangerous. That really was
a shock.204
Mike Oliver also remembered the anti-war sentiment around the issue of wearing uniform: “Put it
this way, later in the mid-60s, about 66, I can remember being told not to go into town in uniform,
that we would be you know stigmatised and that sort of thing. Some of the blokes coped a bit of abuse,
but it wasn’t so bad.”205 The issue of wearing uniform in public – a form of pride for soldiers – continues
as a theme among the soldiers interviewed.
The disparagement towards Vietnam veterans surrounding their service has also lingered in
veterans’ memories. Soldiers were frequently left shocked that they were the target for anti-war
sentiment when they were doing their job as soldiers. Vietnam veterans readily agree that they
volunteered for service and naturally thought that fellow New Zealanders’ would support them
because of this. Many soldiers could not understand why they were targeted rather than the
politicians who were behind the machinations to do with Vietnam. As Dave Hayward explained:
I don’t have a problem with them protesting, right. This is a democracy. It’s one of the
reasons that we fought, right. To preserve our democracy. But they targeted the wrong
people. Why target soldiers? They’re the ones that sent the soldiers. The soldiers had no
choice. We were told to go. If we didn’t go, we would have been court martialed, alright. So,
yeah, they picked the wrong target I believe. And to shout baby killers and things like that.
203 McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, p. 524., the return home and how this has been remembered by
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That really was annoying. But because the military is a disciplined force, they did not
retaliate.206
Patrick Nolan reasoned that New Zealand’s reception was more to do with a minority of the
population rather than the majority of everyday people.
I believe that ninety nine percent of the New Zealand population quite frankly couldn’t
care less, after all we were signatories to ANZUS. The upset and protest were done by people
who wanted to make their mark rather than write a thesis. To join the mob and cause civil
unrest and who knows might get on TV! News reporters go to ‘action’, rather than reasoned
argument. Turbulence is more exciting. I don’t think the majority of New Zealanders’ were
that interested – we were tarred as rapists (My Lai massacre) and murderers, still are. 207
When asked if he believed the majority of New Zealanders’ got on with their lives Patrick Nolan
responded “yeah, most couldn’t give a bugger”.208
In literature as well as in popular memory, the soldiers return from Vietnam to New Zealand
received little to no fanfare. The wider community was largely apathetic to their return, probably due
to limited interest in the war as a whole and it was only a minority of the population that demonstrably
protested the soldiers return.209 These protests, however, such as the acts held at the welcome home
parade in Auckland have become dominant in the memories of many soldiers.210  Rangi Fitzgerald
indicated how the protest actions from the Auckland parade has affected the soldiers and their
memories:
I mean one of our and biggest main thing against the Vietnam war was Helen Clark herself
and she admits it. But she apologized to us but not for her actions but for the people of New
Zealand. But she can’t apologize for the eggs, the tomatoes, the all that, that was happening
in Queen Street at that time. So, no there was a, we sheltered ourselves, we sheltered
ourselves in amongst ourselves. Yeah.211
Even though only a minority of the populace ever showed any dissent towards the soldiers return,
such limited actions left a scarring imprint on veterans’ memories and has inevitably created a shared
recollection which fits into a larger collective memory encompassing both Australia and America’s
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treatment of their soldiers. New Zealand was left relatively unscathed in terms of civilian backlash due
to limited involvement in the Vietnam War and the lack of conscription, but still the abiding
recollection is one of betrayal.212
The Vietnam War held lessons for all involved. When answering whether he thought the Vietnam
War changed people’s attitudes permanently Dave Hayward responded:
Yes, I do. It was the first media war. So, I think for the very first time the general public
were getting direct views of what war was all about. Yeah, I think it did definitely. Today, the
First World War, we were, the whole country the whole nation was for it, right. And everybody
rushed off and very patriotic, lots of jingo and so on and so on. To a certain extent it would
carry on into the Second War. Where there was a clear reason to go. And people volunteered.
That would not happen today. People would not volunteer, in droves to go. And whether
that’s a direct result of the Vietnam War or other things that have gone on, I don’t know. But
yeah, I guess from the Vietnam War and since there’s been a change in people’s perceptions.
Yup, it’s no longer a big adventure, [like] then it was.213
This chapter has explored the Palmerston North community from the soldiers perspective and has
discussed a range of issues pertaining to the themes of before, during and after their experience in
Vietnam. The soldiers interviewed showcased a range of views on the Vietnam War and this chapter
sought to contextualize certain aspects of their experiences. The research has found that although the
soldiers had their own community, they were also connected to the wider community through family,
friends and their hobbies. It was not until after the Vietnam War that soldiers fell back upon their
military community to insulate themselves from the backlash the Vietnam War created. Most of the
soldiers interviewed had a limited understanding of the Vietnam War with most finding out about
Vietnam when New Zealand troops were committed. Most of the soldiers understood the political
climate in terms of the Domino Theory and how it fitted into the broader context of the Cold War. Of
the soldiers interviewed, most identified their return home from the Vietnam War as an upsetting
experience with some referencing the Auckland parade as an example of mistreatment. These issues
will be examined in the discussion chapter. The discussion chapter will further address the issues of
the media, in regard to reporting, bias and its role on TV. It will also address what the people in
Palmerton North were told versus what people in New Zealand were being told. And finally, the
discussion chapter will also discuss the collective memory of betrayal in more depth.
212 This is further explored in the discussion chapter.




The historiography of the Vietnam War is in large part dominated by the narrative of protest culture.
Vietnam is often viewed as the catalyst for a countercultural movement in society. The anti-war
protests in New Zealand were heavily intertwined with similar movements in Australia and the U.S.
The U.S. anti-war movement was interlinked with more complex issues on the home front. Many
young Americans felt disenfranchised with the ‘establishment’ and believed that the resources that
were fighting an obscure threat overseas would be better spent fixing issues at home.214 These
protests were reflected worldwide as many Western nations challenged the predetermined beliefs
held by their capitalist governments.215 New Zealand was one of these nations, as we had a nominal
amount of troops in Vietnam but supported American aims and foreign policy. This chapter will
explore the Vietnam War from the protesters experience. This chapter will use five interviews, four
original to this thesis with the fifth having been conducted in 1994 for a Vietnam exhibition at Te
Manawa museum. Alan Millar unfortunately could not conduct an interview when asked but
recommended that I should use the interview done by Suzy Hawes for Te Manawa.216 Alan Millar was
in Wellington from 1963 – 1964 and came to Palmerston North where he was one of a few full-time
union officials. By 1967 – 1968, Alan joined Massey University part-time where he established a new
student club called the New Left Society (NLS). While in Palmerston North, Alan was still heavily
involved in the Wellington trade unions. Roger Middlemass was born in Dunedin and raised in
Invercargill. During the Vietnam War he was based in Palmerston North and worked at the freezing
works in Longburn until 1974. From then on, he worked as a fulltime union organiser. Michael Turner
was born and raised in Palmerston North and attended Massey University during the Vietnam War.
His family have been based in Palmerston North from the early 1940’s. Michael Turner’s involvement
in Palmerston North during this time was strongly linked to the student community at Massey. He was
a part of Millar’s New Left Society. Don Swan’s parents were both in the British armed forces during
World War II, his father was a prisoner of war. Don’s father was a carpenter and the family moved to
New Zealand in 1958. Don attended high school in Hamilton and went on to study at Massey and
Canterbury University.  He was based in Palmerston North during the Vietnam War. It was during this
time that Don was inspired to become a political activist, where he chaired the Committee on Vietnam
214 LaFeber, The Deadly Bet, p. 8.
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and organised demonstrations. While he attended Massey University, he was also the President of the
Massey University Student Association (MUSA). Ian Boddy was born in England and when he was four
his family emigrated to New Zealand. Ian’s father joined the New Zealand army as a cook, and they
lived for five years at Linton Military Camp. Ian grew up in and around Palmerston North and attended
Massey University, becoming a primary school teacher. Church was always a part of Ian’s upbringing,
but he shifted his membership from Anglican to Methodist in his last year of high school, later
becoming a Methodist minister.
The Vietnam War is well known due to the large-scale anti-war protests that effectively changed
American foreign policy and shifted societal views and norms. In the U.S., the Vietnam War was
considered incredibly unpopular, but the anti-war movement was far more than a struggle against the
government to withdraw troops from Vietnam. Rather, the Vietnam War was one aspect that was the
catalyst for a change in society that was deeply polarized. The Vietnam War was caught up in the
movements of civil rights, class struggle, and equality to name a few. The home-front became a
warzone where an unresponsive Johnson and Nixon administration fought a public battle against the
anti-war movement to win political opinion.217 The White House did not win, but neither did the anti-
war movement, and it can be considered that there was no clear conclusion to the aftermath of the
war.218 For New Zealand, the Vietnam War protests were significant as countercultural revolution
brought an age of political mobilisation that outlasted the issue of Vietnam. The Vietnam War was not
as relevant to New Zealand as it was to the U.S. because of our limited involvement but also because
of our cultural outlook.219 Nationally, the Vietnam War proved to be an issue with roots caught up in
the anti-war movement internationally. Locally, Palmerston North saw its share of political protest
during the Vietnam War. For the protesters, their aim was to educate and facilitate protest activities
that highlighted the atrocities of war. Although protesters were a minority of society, they were made
up of a range of people who were pro-active on unpopular issues such as Vietnam. It is fair to say
however, that protest culture did attract a constituency among youth, students, academia and trade
unionists.
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Alan Millar had been actively involved in the trade unions since the early 1960s when the question
of New Zealand sending troops to Vietnam became an issue.220 He suggested that the reason people
became involved in the protest movement was because Vietnam “became a political issue – those
who believed in peace were anti-colonialism and pro self-determination. They believed in the United
Nations. This included religious groups which did not support post-colonial wars. They were anti
colonialist and believed in the rights of indigenous peoples and human rights”.221 According to Alan,
anti-Vietnam groups were formed when it became clear pressure from the U.S. was being put on the
government to commit troops to Vietnam. Alan claimed that “when it was clear that there was a
possibility that New Zealand would send troops, the Committee on Vietnam was established in
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.”222 He also suggested that “many people had been involved
in the peace movement. The communist party were involved but not in a major way. There were only
small groups at first”223 and that, “many trade unionists were involved in the movement. The first
committee was small.”224 Alan’s first meeting that he attended was in Kihikihi in the Waikato in 1962-
1963, where only 4-5 people attended.225 The local Member of Parliament (MP) was also the Minister
of Defence at the time. Alan admitted that “most people did not know about Vietnam or where it
was.”226 Alan’s understanding of the war was that it was an imperialist war that was originally a war
of independence that shifted to a civil war. He believed that America should have left Vietnam to their
own war and that “American intervention was a colonialist exercise”.227 It was only in 1967-1968 that
Alan attended Massey University228 part time and ended up forming the group the New Left Society
as a student club.229 An article in the Chaff explained what the ‘New Left’ was, explaining that the
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movement was an ill-defined group of intellectuals that wanted to revolutionise society.230  More
explicitly, the New Left was comprised of liberal leaning, middle-class student based, who have been
alienated by bureaucracy and deviate from the ‘old left’ due to different approaches.231 The New Left
was evident at Massey through the Massey New Left Society who created a political awareness among
students but wished to further promote political interest and hold subsequent educational lectures.232
According to Alan, the NLS were influenced by the hippies and Hoffman in the U.S., rather than being
sectarian or Marxist.233 The NLS were people who got together as activists but were also there to have
a good time. Inevitably, there were members who took it more seriously. The NLS were legitimate
Alan asserted, and were involved in a number of internal campaigns such as advocating for mixed-sex
hostels, and got students involved in university committees.234 Alan observed that the real surge in
protest did not happen until 1965 with the Omega project which Alan insisted was more pro-New
Zealand rather than anti-American.235 From then on, Vietnam protest shifted from ‘no troops to
Vietnam’ to ‘bring the boys home’ once troops had been committed.236
Roger Middlemass felt like he understood the political climate quite well. He cited that there were
intergenerational tensions that coincided with the Vietnam War protests. Roger argued that the
Palmerston North populace would have been predominantly pro-war or neutral. The RSA was still a
political force. He believed that the protest movement was pitted against conservative views and that
“the ‘baby-boomers’ and the war provided a catalyst and focus for rebellion”.237
Michael Turner’s understanding of the Vietnam War was set on broad terms that he suggested
were clearer than they appear now. He argued that, “there was the very current Domino Theory which
had been sort of pushed down the throats of many of our senior politicians”.238 He suggested that the
Domino Theory was quite popular and that American figures had come down to New Zealand to talk
about the Domino Theory. It was this theory claimed Michael that was one of the major reasons that
international involvement was sought and the justification for involvement in Vietnam. Michael
narrative. Chaff by default has argued that right-wing feedback is welcome as it is in essence, a student
newspaper. However, there was only a small amount of letters being received from the right-wing perspective,
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claimed that “I don’t think in many ways that the Americans were that worried about the numbers
but of countries - the numbers that each country were sending. They were more concerned about
getting the broader support. So, therefore as long as countries were involved it was more important
to them than actually numbers were being involved, because they always had the numbers.”239
Michael himself was sceptical about the Domino Theory and had cited a veteran’s book he had read
and suggested that it was superficial and a sort of propaganda. Michael, being a student at Massey,
was a part of the student club NLS which he deemed as a sort of progressive political organisation.
Ian Boddy was aware of the Vietnam War from the Kennedy era. John F. Kennedy was assassinated
while Ian lived out near Massey area, and reasoned that “I think everybody in New Zealand sort of
liked Kennedy, thought it was part of a new thing and everything needed to be new after the war
[WWII]”.240 Ian suggested that Kennedy and early Vietnam War involvement would have been in the
news hence how he learned about it. Ian recalled when a workmate of his father’s came to their house
to talk about the Vietnam War. It was Ian’s first exposure to someone who was against the war, who
stated that “he was the first person I met who didn’t like the Kennedys”.241 The reasoning behind this
workmate’s disagreement with being involved in Vietnam was because he believed the Kennedy’s
were only getting involved in the war because they were Catholic. Ian observed that growing up in the
aftermath of WWII, the new generation were more inclined to disagree with the conservative side. He
observed “I think people wanted to change, that they wanted something new”.242 Ian suggested that
the Vietnam War was generational with people realizing “that things weren’t quite right”. Ian
remembered that in high school he watched a documentary on the atomic bomb that changed his
view on what was happening in society. By the 5th form he became a Labour Party supporter as he
could see from studying history the past policies that worked best for New Zealand. Ian can remember
a lot of debates about the Vietnam War in high school; “and I can remember the conservative side
winning because of the Domino effect argument. All the teachers in those days were conservative and
anti-communist, but once I had seen that documentary my mind changed”.243
Don Swan 244 was actively involved in the Vietnam protest movement but also in the Springbok tour
protests. His understanding of the Vietnam war was that, “it was really motivated by self-
239 Interview with Michael Turner, May 5, 2018, audio, 5:30
240 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 4:10
241 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 13:40
242 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 16:00
243 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 14:30
244 Don Swan was the President of MUSA while at Massey University, and was mentioned in the student
magazine Chaff, see William D. Muirhead, The Wheat From the Chaff: (Almost) 80 Years As Seen Through the
Pages of Massey’s Student Newspaper (Palmerston North: Massey University Foundation, 2013, pp., 85, 88,
89. Also refer to Chaff, July 14, 1971, p. 2.
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determination and that flowed on into the anti-apartheid movement, which I was heavily involved in.
And so that was the real drive. I remember we used to have Vietnamese come and address rallies and
attend things, so it was a real act of time”.245 When asked if he believed the Domino Theory at the
time, Don insisted, “well it was garbage. Gulf of Tonkin, fabrication from Johnson. I mean the Gulf of
Tonkin incident didn’t happen and that’s what started the American involvement. And that was proven
subsequently to be a fairy-tale. That was a pretext”.246 Don believed that the Vietnam protest
movement was intrinsic to the Springbok Tour protest movement. He recalled that:
It overlapped itself. I joined the HART national council… you know led by Trevor Richards.
And Mike Law247 was the Deputy Chairman of the Vietnam Committee and he became the
Deputy Chair of HART (Halt All Racist Tours). So, I joined the HART national council in 1969
and stayed on until we won the Springbok tour [1981]. And that was the same motivation.
The anti-apartheid movement sort of formed after the Vietnam movement. Or was sort of
winding down, as the anti-apartheid movement was gearing up. So, I was president, I was the
central district organiser for Halt All Racist Tours. Until I moved away and became the trade
union organiser for HART. And the same sorts of people were involved in both movements.248
Don’s understanding of the Vietnam war was largely influenced by fellow mates who were ex-
communists or socialists. Alan Millar and Jackson Smith249 were radical influences and were involved
in the political scene at the time. Pat Kelly250 and his daughter Helen Kelly251 were involved in the
driver’s union and were mentors to Don’s more socialist leanings. The political climate at the time was
conducive to youth activism. Don suggested that such activism was not just inherent with youth but
affected all levels of society:
The important thing was that the Vietnam War and the Springbok tour, it sort of unified all
sorts of members of society. Members of the Catholic church played an excellent role, and I
had a lot of friends that were monks and priests on the one hand and communists and ex-
245 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 6:30
246 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 12:40
247 Michael G. Law was on the Wellington Committee on Vietnam. Is mentioned in the Victoria University
student newspaper the Salient. In reference to Vietnam anti-war protest: Michael G. Law, “Kirk Continues to
Aid Thieu,” Salient, May 1, 1973, http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Salient36091973-t1-body-d11-
d1.html and Michael G. Law, “Indochina Today,” Salient, May 23, 1973,
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Salient36101973-t1-body-d20.html
248 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 7:30
249 Jackson Smith was the secretary of the Wellington Drivers Union.
250 Pat Kelly was a prominent unionist and was a former official for the Drivers Union, secretary of the Cleaners
Union and President of the Wellington Trades Council. Also involved in wider social issues such as the anti-
Vietnam war movement, anti-apartheid protests, anti-nuclear campaigns and the peace movement.
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communists on the other hand. It sort of transcended over the whole of society. I remember
one anti-apartheid march in Wellington, I was marching alongside Sir Ron Trotter who was
then chairman of Fletcher company, marching arm and arm. Major capitalist of New Zealand,
and it sort of transcended all those different social groupings, which was great.252
Universities were seen as ground zero for a counter-cultural revolution where baby boomers were
setting themselves apart from their parents’ generation. Michael Belgrave characterises the Massey
student capping magazine Masskerade as a visual example of where shared values were being
questioned.253 The Masskerade issues of 1968 and 1969 had some Vietnam references where Prime
Minister Keith Holyoake and opposition leader Norman Kirk were mentioned, but it was Robert
Muldoon who was more targeted for humorous purposes.254 MUSA was largely unaware of any antics
from Masskerade or of the capping stunts, and was defensive of its students, regardless of the
unpopular attention it received from the general populace. Although students were the vanguard of
a cultural revolution, the voices that were being heard through student newspapers such as
Masskerade and the Chaff on issues such as the Vietnam War, were not wholly representative of the
of the student body which were more conservative, Christian and agriculturally based.255 Some
capping stunts referenced the Vietnam War. In one instance a student ‘borrowed’ an army truck form
Linton Military Camp.256 There was a strong reaction from both city officials and police over this
stunt.257
The relationship between soldiers and protesters was one of limited contact but, as noted in the
chapter on military perspectives, there were also instances of friendly rivalry. Michael Turner was not
aware of any rivalry between students and soldiers and conceded that there may have been informal
contact but that there was little relationship between the two communities. Don Swan did not know
of any relationship between Linton Military Camp and Massey University. Ian Boddy’s recollection of
the relationship between soldiers and students was based on their haircuts suggesting that “they stuck
out like a sore thumb because they had short hair”.258 He also added that “everybody at Massey in the
early seventies had long hair, the lecturers had long hair, the students had long hair, the girls had
252 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 11:30
253 Belgrave, From Empire Servant to Global Citizens, p. 274.
254 Ibid. p. 278.
255 Ibid. p. 299.
256 Dollery, “Fools Abroad” p. 58. See also Helen Dollery’s reference to newspaper clippings: “Took truck as
capping escapade”, Dominion, 4 May 1965 and “Action nothing short of criminal”, Manawatu Evening
Standard, 3 May 1965.
257 Ibid., p. 58. Also see Chaff article “God Defend New Zealand (The Army Can’t)” Volume XVI, No. 6, April
1965.
258 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 34:40
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longer hair. So, when army people came you knew they were army.”259 Roger Middlemass stated that
he was only aware of the protester side of events, but noted that there were the two military bases,
Ohākea and Linton. Alan Millar had met with soldiers in Wellington and had worked with a sergeant
who had been to Vietnam. In his interview, Alan said that he went to the pub with the sergeant but
then had to leave as he was going to a demonstration but had invited the soldier to participate. The
soldier was leaving to go on another tour of duty, and they departed as good friends. Speaking on the
troops serving in Vietnam, Alan argued that “they weren’t committed to the Vietnam War – sent to
do their work. If they had a choice most would have preferred not to go.”260 Judy Millar, Alan’s wife,
interjected and suggested that “they chose to go – they were volunteers”, with Alan adding,  “they
were professional soldiers – not a big issue between them and us”. 261 In Chaff, Stuart Loudon reported
that Alan Millar among other “left-wing Massey radicals pressed their attack home to the enemy
recently when they wined and dined at the Linton Officers’ Mess”.262 The affair began at the Majestic
Public Bar where Massey members and Territorials clashed over the issues of Vietnam and
apartheid.263 The resulting disagreement turned physical, before an officer invited the radicals out to
Linton for further discussion.264 It was at the mess hall that the Massey radicals learnt that Vietnam
veterans were working in a public fashion and it was therefore the government that should be blamed
for Vietnam.265
President Lyndon B. Johnson visited New Zealand on 19 October 1966, to shore up support for the
Vietnam War.  Johnson landed at Ohākea air base to a welcoming crowd, being greeted like royalty as
Johnson was the first United States president to visit New Zealand.266 Alan Millar remembered
Johnson’s visit, and had observed that there was a considerable demonstration outside Ohākea air
base. In her Honours Research Exercise, Ellen Somerton suggests that the reason that the anti-war
demonstrations took place outside of Ohākea air base and not on base was due to security reasons.267
Anti-war sentiment in Palmerston North was evident during Johnson’s visit, with Somerton arguing
that there as an unnamed anti-war group telling Johnson that he was not welcome and that there was
259 Interview with Ian Boddy, September 21, 2018, audio, 34:40
260 Judy and Alan Millar, interview by Suzy Hawes, 16 February, 1994, audio, MMSOL(V) 15a Tape 1 of 2, 7:38
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also a march around the city square that took place a few days earlier.268 The more prominent anti-
war protest was held in Wellington. Upon landing at Rongotai airport in Wellington and his arrival at
parliament grounds, Johnson was greeted with cheering crowds but also by demonstrators. Alan
recalled attending the Wellington protest, “the assemblage of people was huge by New Zealand
standards, one of the biggest demonstrations ever. It was to be a peaceful protest – there was not a
huge police presence… lined the front of the crowd with school children. No-one was going to stamp
over them to get to President Johnson… this is New Zealand”.269 Alan mentioned that the crowd
overall was good-natured and friendly despite being a mixture of supporters and opponents. He
described that “there was security police on the roofs with guns and walkie talkies” and that this came
across as sinister. Alan observed that a range of people gave speeches and that when Johnson stepped
out of his limousine, the crowd booed. There were also people lining the streets en route to the
airport, Alan was in front of the presidential cavalcade. Although supporters of Johnson outnumbered
protesters, there was evidence of anti-war sentiment in Palmerston North and also throughout New
Zealand. There is also evidence to suggest that even if protest activities in centres and towns were
uncoordinated, they generally followed the same message due to the vast networking locally and
nationally and at times internationally.
Capping stunts during the late 1960s and early 1970s took a political turn, showcasing that the
baby boomers were having a generational change rather than expressing a radical challenge to
mainstream politics.270 One such notorious stunt was when Massey students staged a protest against
involvement in Vietnam. The students bathed themselves in pigs’ blood and held signs that
condemned New Zealand troops in Vietnam and also a sign that encouraged participation in the
national mobilization march.271 Don Swan remembered this particular demonstration “I remember I
got some blood from Longburn freezing works and poured it over myself and walked down the main
street of Palmerston North. It was a big rally, went right up to Broadway to the town square, there
were quite a few hundred participators. It was fairly smelly I can tell you”.272 Local media covered the
event in an article stating, “students bathed in blood, from the Long-burn freezing works, created a
stark, sombre picture as they marched at the end of the Massey University student procession through
the square today”.273 This article also suggested that by chance there was another float that may have
268 Ibid., p. 8. Also see Somerton’s reference to People’s Voice, 2 November 1966.
269 Judy and Alan Millar, interview by Suzy Hawes, 16 February, 1994, audio, MMSOL(V) 15a Tape 1 of 2, 6:03
270 Belgrave, From Empire Servant to Global Citizens, p. 299.
271 National mobilisation march was to be held on April 30th, 1971 at 7pm.
272 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 4:40
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been opposed to the Vietnam War protesters, aptly named ‘Dad’s Army’ which had a cannon at the
back which blasted onto the marchers.274 A column on Massey University by John Harvey also
discussed the protest, saying that “the bloodstained protesters who formed the tail-end of the student
procession on Thursday must have made up one of the most effective protests seen in New Zealand
against the Vietnam War”.275 Notably, the photographs that were published of the protesters were to
provide a ‘stark’ sight and to provide further discussion of New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam.276
A point that Belgrave touches upon is that by the time of this march, students were certainly set apart
from their parent’s generation through not only how they dressed but by their political rhetoric.277
One of the most notable anti-war protests was the April 30th national mobilisation march in 1971.278
An anti-war conference in Wellington on the 13 and 14 of March was held to help organise the
demonstration and set up a National Mobilisation Committee.279 Michael Uhl and Patti Iiyama, two
prominent American anti-war activists were touring New Zealand and would also be attending the
National Antiwar Conference.280 The anti-war conference attracted 600 people from a variety of
organisations across New Zealand. The National Liaison Committee adopted plans for how to
coordinate and advertise the march.281 A newsletter was sent out that discussed the plans and ideas
274 Ibid.
275 John Harvey, “Massey Column”, Evening Standard, date unknown.
276 Another article had photographs of the protest with the accompanying caption, “these students (above),
with their clothing soaked in sheep’s blood, and one (below), with his body similarly smeared created a stark
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that each centre had decided upon, with the overall emphasis on the national sentiment regarding
Vietnam.282 This was to coincide with the Australian mobilisation that was also taking place and any
other overseas groups that were also organising mass mobilisations in late April. In the lead up to the
mobilisation, ANZAC day was commemorated by the anti-war protesters. Michael Turner vividly
remembered how this occurred in Palmerston North. He explained that the protesters decided that
they would put a wreath on the cenotaph, narrowly avoiding problems with the RSA as a female
student volunteered to place it.283 Alan and Judy Millar also remembered using ANZAC day as a forum
for protest. Judy admitted that “on ANZAC days we would go down and say, ‘we are here for all those
who died in the Vietnam War’ [and] initially they were throwing people out and they had the police
there”. 284 Alan further stated that “we would wait until they had finished and have our own
ceremonies – put wreaths on.”285 With Judy adding that this ended up being an “accepted part of
ANZAC day”.286 Various groups such as churches and trade unions were opposed to the Vietnam War.
At the anti-war conference, churches held a workshop to consider their difficult position of Vietnam.287
As was pointed out, “what can we do about Vietnam when the church will not state unequivocally
that war is wrong; we cannot take for granted that most Christians are anti-war”.288 Trade unionists
were encouraged to join the mobilisation which Roger Middlemass recalled having a special shed
meeting in Longburn where he estimates that 400 or so people attended.289 This meeting was directed
donations to help with the publicity of the national mobilization march. Lindsay G. Wright, “New Zealand
Antiwar Mobilisation”, National Liaison Committee, 3 April 1971.
282 “All Out April 30!”, New Zealand Antiwar Mobilisation, March 6, 1971, Number 2 [this date seems to be
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of the march that the New Zealand troops who had been killed in combat would have their names read out,
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by one of the lead organisers, Alan Millar. Roger observed that the motion to support the mobilization
demonstration was lost, but not by a big majority.290
By April 30, 1971, the mobilisation was heralded as an impressive success. Approximately, 35,000
people throughout New Zealand attended the mobilisation march. In Palmerston North that number
was close to 2600 protesters, with 100 in Feilding.291 The mobilisation was all inclusive with many
organisations participating. The Quakers gave their support by marching under a suitable Quakers
banner.292 Alan Millar partook in the march and remembered the mobilisation to be well organised
and disciplined. Marshals wore armbands and liaised with police and Alan noted, “a senior policeman
had been stressed… [but] had congratulated us on how it had been done”.293 The mobilisation march
was massive according to Alan, who declared that, “people kept coming and joining in… marched
down Church street, left into Princess street, left into Broadway Avenue and turned left around the
Square. It was so large it was turning on itself… turning onto the clock tower”.294 It was a silent march
and because it was on a Friday night the march ended up being the climax of the week. Judy Millar
confirmed that a lot of planning went into the march, “march posters, people going out at night and
pasting up posters. 295 All over town people were informed word of mouth – not radio – not like now.
Talking – care put into planning, using marshals, width of march, half of the road and 6 wide”.296
Mainstream media coverage of the march was, Chaff argued, selective. An article in the Chaff
contended that figures in newspapers were underreported, and that the New Zealand Broadcasting
Corporation had deliberately blocked advertising for the march.297 Momentum for anti-war protests
was further carried on with mobilisations on May 30 and July 30, 1971.
290 Interview with Roger Middlemass, September 19, 2018, audio, 6:25
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New Zealand’s withdrawal from Vietnam officially ended in 1975, with soldiers returning home
from 1970 onwards in a trickle system. Although the New Zealand protest movement followed
American themes, the result was not the same. The American anti-war movement was very successful
in ending United States involvement in the war because it was the main political issue that faced
American voters. The New Zealand government was reluctantly involved in Vietnam, their prime
motivation for involvement being to maintain relations and keep its ANZUS alliance obligations to the
United States. This meant that New Zealand quite unlike the United States government, only provided
minimal troops and did not introduce conscription. The Vietnam War was not a central feature in New
Zealand politics, as seen from the civilian perspective. However, the anti-war movement in New
Zealand can be seen as successful, but it does not measure on the same scale as the American anti-
war movement. This is something that Alan Millar touched on; he expressed that the protests did “not
[have] the same emotion as in America where they had a conscript army. In New Zealand there were
small groups of people and they had a choice. There was never the same enthusiasm for the war here.
‘Send the boys – send the boys.’ Even the conservative politicians didn’t want to do it as records show
– forced into it because of the alliance.”298 Don Swan believed that as a result of the Vietnam War,
people became involved in other protest activity such as the Springbok tour. His view on Vietnam was
that the protesters won and continued to do so with the Springbok tour. For Don, this is validated by
the fact that the South Vietnamese achieved self-determination as did the South Africans.299 Michael
Turner’s view has not changed from his belief that there should not have been any military
involvement in Vietnam. He did add that:
I sort of felt that the anti-war movement in Palmerston North was sort of wider if you like
than just Massey. There were people from the Palmerston North community involved as well.
It’s very hard to find any information about the old committees on Vietnam because there
was very little in the way of paper or anything like that. People had meetings, agreed to do
certain things or participate in certain things and that’s where it stopped. No one ever wrote
any minutes, no one ever did anything. No one said, ‘well why are you the spokesperson’. I
mean people were allowed to participate at the level at which they felt best. And so, we had
things like the Palmerston North Trades Council was involved. Some of the churches were
involved. I know there were some attempts at involving secondary schools, which I didn’t have
very much to do with, but there were efforts300.
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299 Interview with Don Swan, September 12, 2018, audio, 30:30
300 Interview with Michael Turner, May 5, 2018, audio, 23:00
59
Ian Boddy suggested that there may have been lessons from the Vietnam War, but no one has
learned them. He contended that he doesn’t support ANZAC day and that there should not be any
sympathy for the war. He did agree that the Vietnam War impacted the next generation by having an
overflow affect seen with New Zealand’s adoption of an anti-nuclear stance during the 1980s and the
controversy over the Rainbow Warrior. He observed that the protest movement seemed to get played
down, as he remembered that his Methodist youth group regularly participated in anti-war protesting,
largely through music. Overall, his view has not changed on the Vietnam War, he still believed that it
was the civilians’ that suffered. Roger Middlemass admited that his view on the war has hardened
over time. The large amount of death associated with Vietnam has been trivialised and comes across
as “all for nothing.”301 Roger suggested that in his view, “the anti-apartheid protests from the 1960s
culminating in the 1981 Springbok rugby tour, had a more profound and lasting impact on New
Zealand society than the war.”
This chapter has discussed the perspective of protesters and explored their activities within the
Palmerston North community during the Vietnam War. In following the themes of before, during and
after, this chapter has discovered the protests against the Vietnam War were varied, well connected
and ultimately successful. Many organisations were involved in protesting, and interconnected local
centres to make a national movement that followed the broader themes internationally. Because the
protest movement was successful, the narrative has a more positive outlook and can even have victory
connotations attached. Protesters’ did bring the issue of New Zealand’s involvement to the forefront
of societal and political discourse and were validated with New Zealand’s withdrawal and the United
States’ eventual demise in Vietnam. Students from Massey University such as the NLS were a visual
template for the anti-war movement. But although highly visible, these radical students would not
have been representative of the majority of students at Massey.302 The anti-war movement in
Palmerston North was multi-faceted with an assortment of organisations involved and also, the more
liberal minded civilians. The anti-war movement fundamentally created a momentum for future
protest against divisive political issues such as sporting contacts with South Africa. This is in large part
due to a generational shift in society on which the Vietnam War was the catalyst.
301 Correspondence with Roger Middlemass, April 4, 2018
302 As Cherrie Smith exclaims in the Chaff on the 30 April 1970 demonstration, “to the 2400 – odd students
who weren’t there: If you do support the Vietnam War, fair enough, but surely more than 300 oppose it. Most
of the students marching were town dwellers… the whole idea of a demonstration is that people are standing
up for their views as individuals; on Friday, the marchers ranged from a mother with a pushchair to groups of
schoolboys. Surely more Massey students, who haven’t a headmaster’s wrath to consider, could have made




The historiography on the Vietnam War often showcases the differing views of the soldiers and the
protesters. These vocal minorities often overshadow the ‘silent majority’303 of the civilian populace.
Many New Zealand citizens went about their everyday lives with the Vietnam War only a removed
reality that didn’t really touch their lives other than being played out on the television or reported in
the newspapers. There were some civilians who were closely connected with the Vietnam War, as
family members, significant others or friends of protesters or soldiers. But for many others, the
Vietnam War paled in significance to their everyday lives.  This chapter will explore the Palmerston
North community from the civilian perspective. This chapter will use five original interviews to
showcase the civilian narrative and whether the Vietnam War was significant and warranted
responses from the civilian populace. Of the five interviewees, one was born and raised in Palmerston
North and another interviewee has lived in Palmerston North since she arrived as a child. The other
three interviewees settled in Palmerston North as adults, with two before the Vietnam War and one
during. All five interviewees were connected to the Palmerston North community through their own
networks and therefore provide relevant evidence on the civilian community’s response to the
Vietnam War. Donald MacDonald was born in Hamilton in 1941 and moved to Palmerston North in
1942. He has lived in Palmerston North since then and worked as a control room supervisor in the
power industry. Donald was closely associated with his local community being a part of the union
movement in the Public Service Association and working at the theatre. Heather Millar (no relation to
Allan Millar in the previous chapter) was born in Christchurch, moving to Wellington before settling
down in Palmerston North. During the height of the Vietnam War, Heather was newly married and
was also working as a teacher. Heather largely socialized within her teaching community but also with
her husband’s sporting clubs as he was an avid rugby player. Dawn Nolan was born in Otahu and raised
in Papakura. She met her husband Patrick Nolan, a soldier, while she was serving in the air force. Dawn
retired from the air force as she was not allowed to remain as a married woman. While Patrick was
serving in Vietnam, Dawn was living with her parents expecting her first child. Dawn was not involved
in the Palmerston North community until Patrick returned from Vietnam and was subsequently based
in Linton Military Camp. However, Dawn provides a unique perspective on the Palmerston North
community. As her husband was a soldier who served in Vietnam and with her own service, Dawn can
303 Richard Nixon makes a speech to the ‘silent majority’ who supposedly supported the war over a vocal
minority; Richard Nixon, “Silent Majority,” C-Span, November 3, 1969, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?153819-1/president-nixons-silent-majority-speech-vietnam-war
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provide insight from a military and civilian perspective, as a wife and mother who saw first-hand the
effects of Vietnam on her family and can also show the aftermath of the Vietnam War from these
perspectives. Participant 1 was closely connected and active in the Palmerston North community at
the time and has expressed that their focus was on their family. Joyce Ray was born in Oxford, England
and came to New Zealand in 1958. Her father was a baker and came from a family of bakers. Joyce
began her family in 1964 and during this period also worked part time. Joyce lived across from
Participant 1 whom she became close friends with. Her community ties were predominantly to do
with kindergarten, and she was secretary of the kindergarten association for four years.
The civilian community is an understudied aspect of the Vietnam War. The ‘silent majority’ of the
New Zealand population were neither vocal opponents of the war or professional soldiers. The
majority of civilians were so involved in their day to day lives, that the Vietnam War was a distant issue
that never really affected them. Apart from the soldiers’ families, most civilians lived regular lives with
the Vietnam War only having an impact in the aftermath of the War. The civilian community during
the Vietnam War were largely networked through their social lives. This occurred through work,
hobbies or neighbourly interactions. These interconnecting groups were often formed on shared
values. Networks were also interpreted by shifting times. The baby boomer generation304 came of age
at an uncertain time. With the recent past filled with two World Wars, and the future overshadowed
by the threat of atomic warfare, teens desired a better world. Social change in New Zealand was
largely influenced by overseas movements, particularly from Britain and the United States. This new
‘modern’305 society that emerged was often at odds with the traditional social norms that were in
place. The issue of the Vietnam War was set in these shifting times and became a contentious point
for youth culture. And as international subcultures influenced New Zealand’s restless generation, so
did the Vietnam War and youth counterculture inevitably turned into protest activity. Civilians’ were
caught up in amongst such progressive change. It is difficult to measure just how much the Vietnam
304 Chris Brickell suggests two waves of baby boomers that demographically had a profound affect on New
Zealand’s social dynamics. The first wave is considered to be parents with children born during the 1930s. With
the second and more significant wave defined as children born from 1943 onwards whose teenage years
spread into the 1950s and 1960s. Brickell, Teenagers: The Rise of Youth Culture in New Zealand, p. 252. Also
refer to James, The Quiet Revolution, where he talks of a generational shift predominantly due to the ‘Vietnam
generation’ of the mid-1970s, p. 68.
305 Along with the bodgies and widgies, hippies, yippies, rockers, teddy boy, and milk-bar cowboy were the
mods. Mods is a subculture that emerged from Britain and was used by the media to suggest anything
fashionable, new or modern. These were characterizations of teenage culture at the time. Teenagers tended
to belong to groups and were classified as such. Although these groups were teenagers who struggled with
post-war conformity and traditional mindsets who challenged social conventions in a quest to find social
independence, the older generation and media depicted these groups as juvenile delinquency (see Chris
Brickell, Teenagers, p. 264-271). These groups were largely influenced by international subcultures and helped
define a new era of social change.
63
War did impact the baby boomer generation. But it is safe to say that social transitions took time and
such overseas influences were more of a flow on affect from much larger counterparts in the West.
Civilians’ understanding of the Vietnam War was largely from the media. Vietnam was
predominantly seen as a faraway place and initially had very little bearing on average New Zealanders’.
The Cold War with the threat of atomic warfare was posed as an everyday fact. And the justification
that New Zealand was involved in Vietnam due to the Domino Theory as the official line from the
Government, was absorbed by civilians. For Heather Millar her understanding of the Vietnam War
stemmed from the newspaper and the TV.306 She suggested that she may have heard about Vietnam
through word of mouth as she had a friend who was dating a returned soldier from Vietnam, however
she did not recall Vietnam as being large enough of an issue that it was discussed in staff rooms at the
school where she worked.307 When asked about protest culture in New Zealand, Heather remembered
the Springbok tour protests far more vividly than the Vietnam War protests. She suggested it could
have been because she worked at a different school at the time, and recalled how a staff member
gave her a small softball bat that had Minto written on it, referring to it as her John Minto bar.308
Heather stated that: “So, I remember more things about that sort of thing and being more violent than
I do about the Vietnam War. Maybe that was just at that stage of my life, I don’t know”.309 Heather
noted that Vietnam may not have been talked about due to the lingering perception of war from her
parents’ generation.310 Donald MacDonald’s understanding of the Vietnam War was that it was initially
“just another Asian war”.311 Donald understood the perceived threat of the Domino Theory and that
there were communist rebel groups in Malaya and Borneo. Joyce Ray did not understand the political
climate in terms of the Domino Theory but instead believed that New Zealand’s involvement in the
Vietnam War was solely due to the United States. Joyce stated that: “I don’t think we were very happy
with our troops going there. You know it wasn’t… I don’t know, we just sort of thought we got pushed
in by the Americans sort of thing”.312
Dawn Nolan was aware that the Cold War was a distant overseas phenomenon. She also wondered
why New Zealand was involved in Vietnam, besides being invited by the United States. She attributed
this to being in her teens, “it wasn’t a worry, it was something that might happen but might not too”.313
When it came to Patrick serving in Vietnam, Dawn suggested she took war for granted, “it was
306 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 2:20
307 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 2:20
308 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 9:25
309 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 10:05
310 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 6:00
311 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 26:40
312 Interview with Joyce Ray, September 13, 2018, audio, 3:40
313 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 7:50
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something you did as a soldier and New Zealand had declared itself into the war, so it was natural that
Patrick went to it. And he had volunteered for it”.314 She continued, “but, I just took it for granted that
that was what he will do. The war, it was the first televised war. And it didn’t really make a lot of sense
to me it was just warfare. And most of the coverage in New Zealand was American. So, I never had
any doubts he [would] come back”.315 Dawn also reasoned that she held this view because most of
the male members in her family had experienced warfare in the Boer war, WWI, and WWII. For
Participant 1, they understood the Vietnam War but didn’t see how it linked up to the Cold War. And
when it came to the Domino Theory, Participant 1 queried its validity: “That one thing led to another?
Well that covers a lot of things doesn’t it? To how the government wanted the army to go. What they
felt was right with politics, it’s so many things that you can’t make a decision on what you read in the
paper on what was really going on. And unless you studied it yourself, you don’t know what’s really
happening.”316
Civilians’ were largely uninvolved in the events surrounding the Vietnam War. Evidence indicates
that although civilians were aware of the Vietnam War through the media, they were often quite
removed from the realities that other groups such as soldiers experienced. One group of civilians that
were connected to the Vietnam War and were therefore caught between two worlds, were army
wives. Historians Claire Loftus Nelson, Laurie Barber and Claire Hall, have discussed how army wives
were involved and impacted by the Vietnam War.317 Army wives provide a unique insight to the
experiences of the Vietnam War. Connected through their partners who were serving soldiers, they
were also in their own right apart of the larger community. This is something that is touched upon in
Nelson and Barber’s Long Time Passing, where Margaret Russel Van Rooyen former wife of Harry
Russell, asserted that army wives, “were constantly aware of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War.
But regular Army people are never popular in peacetime anyway”.318 She also argued that it impacted
everyday family life, and had claimed that, “it was so hard on the children. The television was avoided
by my two if they saw the news coming and life was not easy at High School for Army children. It didn’t
pay to think about the morality of it – we came under two laws – the military as well as the civil. Men
served their country wherever they were sent, women waited – a pattern as old as time”.319 According
to historian Claire Hall, army wives themselves lived a “solo tour of duty” and relied on close familial
networks for support under the threat of anti-war activity and the challenges the military brought to
314 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 1:50
315 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 2:20
316 Interview with Participant 1, August 29, audio, 8:40
317 See Nelson and Barber, Long Time Passing, pp. 48-52., and Hall, “While He’s Away: Managing Alone,” in No
Front Line, pp. 251-267.
318 Nelson and Barber, Long Time Passing, p. 52.
319 Ibid.
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an army wife.320 Hall suggests that there was no “unified home front backing” for the Vietnam War
and this affected the wives of the soldiers who often felt isolated from the wider community.321
Adrienne Lichtwark who was based at Burnham Military Camp was angry at the limited support
she received from the military, having only been visited twice in the ten months her husband was
away.322 Sandy Hayes also had a similar experience while based in Waiōuru, who claimed that the
military didn’t really ever think about the families and it was often left to the individual units to look
after the families of the soldiers who served in that unit.323 Hall reasons that having a familial network
was to some wives a trusted link to the outside world.324 Dawn Nolan strongly relied on her parents
for support when Patrick was away. Dawn was pregnant with their first child and lived with her parents
throughout her pregnancy, with Patrick returning six weeks after the baby was born.325 In some
circumstance’s army wives formed their own community. Margaret Russel Van Rooyen experienced
this by creating a support group the Papakura Army Wives Club. “We had a choral group and we fund
raised with various functions for the Ben Loi Orphanage in Saigon. We minded our homes and families,
played golf, some wives went out to work”.326 There were some army wives who felt the impact of
isolation keenly as they did not have close familial connections. Colleen Foster was caring for three
children and pregnant with her fourth as her husband Peter Foster was sent overseas with NEWZAD
in 1964.327 Based at Linton Military Camp, Colleen had to rely on friends as her family lived in
Auckland.328 To Colleen’s relief her husband was withdrawn from Vietnam when NEWZAD was
replaced by combat troops.329
Donald MacDonald claimed that the Vietnam War was only a small part of the tensions between
generations overall. He insisted that they were moderate especially in light of the Springbok tour
protests:
You see, the Vietnam war was the height of the hippie movement. And the hippie
movement was a situation where particularly teenagers were rebelling you know we’re
getting it from TV, that the normal behaviour for a teenager was to rebel against your parents.
And, there was definitely social change in the same time as the Vietnam war. But I believe that
320 Hall, No Front Line, p. 251-252.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid., p. 256.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid., p. 251.
325 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 1:20
326 Nelson and Barber, Long Time Passing, p. 52.




social change, the hippie type change that would have happened in spite of the Vietnam war,
it was nothing to do with the Vietnam war. I think the parents were trying to deal with
teenagers rebelling overall that’s the simplest way I can put it. It’s a generalization of course
and it’s not, it may not be particularly accurate for everybody.330
Donald considered that the tensions surrounding sporting contacts with South Africa were far more
extreme than the tensions relating to the Vietnam War. And in retrospect he suggested that the
Vietnam War was more of a passing thing than of lingering importance.331 When asked if the Vietnam
War was a stepping-stone for protest culture in New Zealand such as the Springbok tour, Donald
agreed, and suggested that it may have been a lesson, “and when the big issue came like the Springbok
tour there were a lot more people prepared to get out and say and do things”.332 Dawn Nolan
perceived that there were mainly tensions to do with students and their protesting activism. With
regard to what the wider community thought of Vietnam, Dawn thought that the “student fraternity
thought it was wrong and most of the civilians weren’t fussed one way or the other”.333 And when
commenting on the relationship between Massey University and Linton Military Camp, she contended
that they shared a bad relationship and were rather separate to each other. Heather Millar does not
recall any protesting as she was focused on her work and can only assume that relations between
Linton Military Camp and Massey University were on good terms. She remembered the tensions
around apartheid more than she can on the Vietnam War.334 Participant 1 observed that they didn’t
live their life wondering what was going to happen with the Vietnam War as there was nothing that
they could do about it, so they “just got on with it”.335 Donald MacDonald suggested that the divide
with the Vietnam War could be comparable with the divide between political parties. He believed
that:
If you’re looking at numbers, in the earlier days of the Vietnam war there were the regular
protesters, the professional protesters. As time went on… there were more people from the
mainstream in the protest movement than there was at the start and at the finish there was
a lot more people. So, opinion changed in the course of the Vietnam war. No one was really
disappointed when the Americans pulled out.336
330 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 25:30
331 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 28:40
332 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 29:30
333 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 12:45
334 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 8:50
335 Interview with Participant 1, August 29, audio, 12:30
336 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 23:20
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During the Vietnam War the civilian community was seen as the silent majority. It is therefore
difficult to measure exactly how civilians reacted to the Vietnam War, especially on a community level.
An ongoing issue that seemingly concerned civilians was the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.
Prime Minister Keith Holyoake reluctantly committed troops to Vietnam and throughout his time in
office attempted to minimise the number of troops committed to Vietnam.337 This was not known
publicly until 1975 when Saigon fell to Communist forces and the Vietnam War was over.338 There is
debate as to whether the Vietnam War was significant enough to make a difference in the 1966 and
1969 national election. Austin Mitchell argues that the 1966 election was a non-election, that it was
not a landmark for political change but rather that the National party policies suited the economic
climate at the time.339 On the topic of the Vietnam War, Mitchell explains that from the outset the
commitment of troops for Vietnam was backed and that even Labour voters were supportive of the
government’s decision.340 The 1967 by-election in Palmerston North solidified Nationals policy on
Vietnam but overall the largest change was the Social Credit gaining seats. Mitchell also notes that a
postal survey carried out in Palmerston North revealed that support for troops in Vietnam had
declined from 74 percent in a 1966 survey to 59 percent.341 Barry Gustafson also argues that sending
troops to Vietnam was supported by the public, going as far as suggesting that the “Vietnam issue
helped National win the 1966 and 1969 elections”.342
M.W Hancock argues that the Vietnam War become an issue in the 1966 general election.343 The
Labour party held the position that they would withdraw from Vietnam, while the National party relied
337 In Holyoake’s words, “I’m certainly not a ‘hawk’ nor a ‘dove’, perhaps somewhere in-between”., which
Barry Gustafson exclaims is one of the reasons why Holyoake was reluctant to commit troops to Vietnam.
Record of Conversation between NZ Prime Minister and PM Sato, 7 July 1970, 40/12/1, cit. Trotter in
McKinnon 1991, 9.222., in Gustafson, Kiwi Keith, p. 225.
338 Gustafson, Kiwi Keith, p. 266.
339 Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1969)., p.
143.
340 Ibid., p. 146-147. See the polls that Mitchell refers to: July 1965, 41% agreed with number of troops
committed to Vietnam, 23% thought it was too much, 29% too little, 7% were undecided., Christchurch Star,
August 11, 1965. Compared to 533 people interviewed in Christchurch in August of 1966, 56% supported
troops in Vietnam, 26% supported withdrawal, remainder were of no opinion.
341 Evening Post, February 17, 1968., Mitchell, Politics and People, see footnote.
342 Gustafson, Kiwi Keith, p. 267. Both Mitchell and Gustafson’s positions are backed up by an observer who
sent a letter to the editor of the Evening Post, expressing that:
I regained my confidence in New Zealanders at an election meeting in Normandale on Monday night. The
three candidates for the Western Hutt electorate were present, and some 300 people attended to hear their
views. It would be true to say that the audience was a good representation of the voters in New Zealand, and
this was born out by the questioning and lively interjections. The inevitable question arose on troop
withdrawal from Vietnam. Mr Ogier (National) replied first to receive a standing ovation from the audience
who were 100 per cent behind his policy. The Labour and Social Credit candidates, who advocated immediate
withdrawal, received no support and much criticism. Surely then, if this is the reaction of the average New
Zealander why do the Labour and Social Credit parties insist on a policy clearly in defiance of the New Zealand
people., Food for Thought, “Troop Withdrawal”, Evening Post, November 14, 1969.
343 Hancock, The First Sixteen Members, p. 389.
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on the Domino Theory as its main strand for foreign policy. Bill Brown held the Palmerston North seat
from 1960-1967. His position on Vietnam was in defence of the Government in sending troops. In 1966
he emphasized that:
We will continue to honour to the full our obligations and promises to the people of South
Vietnam. We have no intention of deserting our allies at this critical stage. I can think of
nothing worse than that we should withdraw our battery from Vietnam, I can think of nothing
that would ruin the good name of New Zealand more than if we do just that. I am quite content
to fight the election in Palmerston North on that issue.344
Hancock suggests that the Vietnam War was the lightning rod for the profound social changes that
were happening to New Zealand.345 The legitimacy for New Zealand’s involvement was being
questioned by the wider community and “community divisions were pointedly compared to the unity
of the community during World War II”.346 In 1966 the Evening Standard was present at the YMCA hall
to hear Bill Brown and Joe Walding’s arguments.347 Walding, who stood for Labour, brought up the
withdrawal from Vietnam.348 There were other contentious debates being held over New Zealand, but
not in Palmerston North.349 The 1966 election was widely believed to be held on the issue of Vietnam
which the National party considered to be an important strand of its foreign policy and therefore
representing the needs of the majority of New Zealander’s.350 The Vietnam War was again a political
issue in the by-election of 1967. W. H. Brown had passed unexpectedly, and Vietnam was viewed as a
politically divisive issue. Joe Walding was elected MP for Palmerston North. The Vietnam War
heightened tensions in the 1969 general election with Prime Minister Holyoake’s meetings being
disrupted, especially in Auckland where demonstrators stormed the stage.351 Robert Muldoon utilised
the media against Norman Kirk, which effectively lost Labour the election.352
Participant 1 confirmed that they learned about the Vietnam War through the radio, television and
from reading the newspapers. Participant 1 stated that the media was a big influence:
[Be]cause in those days you believed everything that was written you know. You didn’t
question what you were being told. And I didn’t have any friends that were as I said that were
344 NZPD 1966, vol 346, p. 274, see in Hancock, The First Sixteen Members, p. 389.
345 Ibid., p. 389.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid., p. 390.
349 Ibid.
350 Nigel S. Roberts, ed., “The Politics of Discontent,” vol 7, part 100, of New Zealand’s Heritage (Wellington:
Paul Hamlyn Limited, 1973), p. 2862.
351 Hancock, The First Sixteen Members, p. 417.
352 Ibid.
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involved in protesting and that. So, I didn’t get any information that way. Because we were so
busy doing our stuff at that time. And it was only afterwards when all the other things came
out that you really, you know that we talked about it. So, it was very basic.353
When asked how different perspectives were received in Palmerston North, Participant 1 observed
that, “well, I talked to my friends a little. That particular war I felt was a very bad thing and I think
there were quite a few like that, but as I said that’s as far as my involvement went. You know the men
would talk about it more, the women would just, got on with [it]”.354 Donald MacDonald’s
understanding of the Vietnam War was largely from mainstream media, and commented that, “most
of the knowledge I got from the Vietnam war would have been through television. A little bit from
newspapers, but at that time television was taking over as the dominant form of media for most
people”.355 When questioned further Donald offered an observation of the media at the time,
suggesting that the media was “slanted towards the things that were coming out in America at the
time”.356 When asked whether the media favoured the New Zealand Government or tried to give a
measured view, Donald responded with:
In some areas the media followed the American line and they did branch away at other
times, depends a lot on I suspect on who was controlling the media, who was the editor. Who
was doing the editing at the time? Editorials in newspapers were a bit more New Zealand
orientated or not quite following the American line as much as the TV was. The editorials were
probably a little bit more independent, when I think about it.357
Donald recalled that the Public Service Association (PSA) had a magazine that stipulated anti-
Vietnam involvement and in particular conscription.
There was a fear brought out by particularly newspapers that we would introduce
conscription the same as Australia had done. One of the things that was coming out of that
conscription issue was TV information that illustrated the situation of what was called the
draft dodges in the USA and it was quite common knowledge in New Zealand here, that the
draft dodgers were running over the border into Canada to dodge the conscription in the USA.
That was common knowledge in fact it probably influenced people. I can remember working
with a guy and he had a teenage son. And I remember the father telling me at work one day
that he told his son to go and do a trip around Europe before they start introducing
353 Interview with Participant 1, August 29, audio, 6:40
354 Interview with Participant 1, August 29, audio, 12:50
355 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 17:50
356 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 19:30
357 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 19:50
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conscription. There was a form of draft dodging in New Zealand to a degree, but that was one
opinion that I do remember. This guy had been to the Second World War as a soldier. And he
didn’t want his son being conscripted at all, he was very much against it.358
Dawn Nolan was acutely aware of the Vietnam War being presented in the media, only showing
true interest when Patrick was involved in Vietnam.
Well, it was something that was there in the media. It was when I met Patrick that I really
paid any attention to it. And of course, it was on TV but it was black and white TV in those
days and it was just another news thing we were involved, soldiers were going from New
Zealand. But until Patrick and his friends came on the scene it wasn’t connected with home.
And it was someone at the air force, at times there would be a flight go with a couple of the
air women as sort of staff on board, crew. But they’d take them over, turn around and come
back. There wasn’t any immediacy about it.359
Heather Millar was not sure about how she learned about the Vietnam War. She attributed to
learning about the Vietnam War possibly through watching the news on the television. But she did
not recall an instance where it was stated; “well we’re at war or we’ve joined the Americans in this
war’, I don’t recall any of that, no”.360 Joyce Ray recalled that although Vietnam was being discussed
through mainstream media, there was still a feeling of disconnect with the troops that were serving
in Vietnam and the civilian populace at home. She claimed that:
I don’t think it was discussed very much. I think it was something that the Americans got
us in too. And it was something that came up on the television. There was a lot about the bad
treatment of the Viet Cong to the Americans. I don’t remember many New Zealanders’ being
tortured or whatever. I think it was weird really cause you sort of see it on TV but it wasn’t
really part of you whereas like I went through the Second World War so, that I was a part of
that. But you sort of were not exactly involved although the troops were over there.361
New Zealand’s withdrawal from Vietnam meant an ease with the tensions that had been sharply
escalating with continued involvement in an unpopular conflict. While protesters’ would have felt like
they succeeded at pressuring withdrawal from an already inevitable departure, and soldiers
experienced a perceived unwelcome home, it is the civilians’ that provide an interesting counterpoint
with the end of the Vietnam War. Donald reasoned that it was interesting that the Vietnam veterans
358 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 21:20
359 Interview with Dawn Nolan, April 4, 2018, audio, 6:20
360 Interview with Heather Millar, April 17, 2018, audio, 3:45
361 Interview with Joyce Ray, September 13, 2018, audio, 4:20
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were not welcomed home as heroes and got parades like the troops did in the First and Second World
Wars.362 Donald alleged that he had spoken to the veterans who said that they were told they had to
wear their civilian clothes and to not talk about the Vietnam War.363 Donald admitted that, “it’s a
situation that I actually didn’t subscribe to and I personally didn’t whatever that’s worth. I felt that the
guys had been to war, they went there with good intentions, although mislead. They shouldn’t be
shunned.”364 Heather Millar was concerned with the horrors of warfare that are often discussed in
parallel with the Vietnam War and the continuing tensions; “well it went on for such a long time it was
just always there wasn’t it? And then, I think the aftermath of the war, the horror and all those things,
deforestation and everything else were the things that continued”.365 Dawn Nolan suggested that
television had a large part to play when it came to the unpopularity of the war:
It was the first televised war. Now if World War II had been on TV it would have finished a
lot, lot quicker because there was that ‘oh, someone’s been killed we can’t have that’. We’ve
seen the coffins on TV being taken back to America and that raised the emotional level of it.
It was brought it home closer to people, that actually people were dying. There’s a difference
between a long list of casualty names in the paper like there was [in] World War I and II. Or,
you see on TV, America’s just taken home thirty bodies. And that, it has to have an effect on
people. I mean it’s not just printed [on] fish and chip paper [the] next day, its… you’ve seen it
happen. It was… I think if it hadn’t been on TV it would have gone on a lot longer, but the
public protest aroused had a definite effect on everything.366
When asked if they noticed the tensions more with the Springbok tour than with the Vietnam War,
Participant 1 said they did not as her priority was their family at that time. Participant 1 concluded
that they had hoped that there were lessons learnt from the Vietnam War and that, “I hope I never
see another Vietnam War that’s for sure”.367 When asked if tensions ended when the soldiers’
returned, Joyce Ray replied “no, I think… I don’t think it was really good after because of the way that
people were treated. Like they came back and instead of coming back as a hero sort of thing they
came back and were derided for actually going there. So, I think it left a nasty taste in people’s mouths,
but I didn’t know anyone personally who had been there”. Adding that, “I just think the government
was a bit more wary with what we got involved with, you know”.368
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368 Interview with Joyce Ray, September 13, 2018, audio, 8:50
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This chapter has examined the Palmerston North civilian community and its response to the
Vietnam War, while also contrasting the wider civilian community response. By looking at how the
civilian community was made aware of the Vietnam War, the responses to the conflict, the tensions
of the community and the influence of the media, this chapter has provided a complex and critical
account of an unexplored group of society. Most of the civilians interviewed learned of the Vietnam
War through the media but had an understanding and an awareness of the Cold War. Most of the
civilians found that they recalled the tensions to do with sporting contacts with South Africa more
memorable than that of the Vietnam War. Army wives provided a unique insight as they were the
bridge between the military community and the wider community. The civilians interviewed
expressed that they have mainly learned about the Vietnam War in a retrospective manner. This is
largely due to the Vietnam War not impacting civilians and their daily lives. This suggests that the
narrative of protesters and soldiers have been overemphasized by historiography. The civilian




This thesis has looked at three distinct groups of society in order to evaluate the extent to which the
Palmerston North community’s response reflected New Zealand’s response to what was largely an
international issue. New Zealand’s historiography on the Vietnam War can be found lacking as the
subject is understudied and what writing there is has been specifically focussed on either protester
activity or soldier involvement. There has been a limited amount of research exploring the civilian
perspective. My research has therefore been largely based on original interviews conducted which
may share insight into the everyday lives of civilians. In exploring the civilian narrative, my research
achieves a balance, as New Zealand’s historiography has focussed on the soldier and protester
narrative and may therefore overstate the significance and impact the Vietnam War had on society.
Civilians’ can assess whether an issue is prominent in regard to whether it affected everyday life. This
is due to civilians being considered as the silent majority – and it’s this group that politicians aim to
sway369 when it comes to political issues. In terms of the Vietnam War, from the research I have
conducted, civilians did not think that the Vietnam War was significant as it did not affect their day to
day lives and did not feature as prominently as it has in soldiers and protesters memories. In
contrasting soldiers, protesters and civilians this thesis has explored that there are differing narratives
in place that have been reinforced over time as a memorative practice.
This thesis will now address whether Palmerston North was a fair representative of broader society
during the Vietnam War. Palmerston North is a unique example when examining representation. This
is due to becoming an important agricultural centre, a city that has a university and a military base in
close proximity, and that the capital city Wellington is relatively close by. Students at Massey
University and soldiers at Linton Military Camp had very little interaction and any interaction was often
held in good humour. Palmerston North has made a good case study for exploring whether the
community was reactive to the Vietnam War because this provincial city is more representative than
expected due to conservative rural elements, civilians and soldiers living as a community, and having
a growing student populace. Palmerston North could be expected to have a reactive environment due
to these conducive elements. But it can be safe to say that the majority of the Palmerston North
369 See Hancock, The First Sixteen Members, pp 410 & 417 for insight on the 1967 by-election and 1969
election where the Vietnam War was presented as an issue in the political scene.
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populace whether that be soldiers, protesters or civilians ‘got on with their lives’ – a phrase that
frequently comes up in my original interviews.
Due to the lack of historiography on Vietnam, New Zealand has subsequently adopted a popular
narrative to do with the extent of our involvement and the resultant aftermath. This thesis has
discovered that each group of the Palmerston North community has a retrospective narrative that has
evolved over time with our national collective memory to do with the Vietnam War. Each group has
in some way adapted their memories to suit the national narrative. And the national collective
memory that New Zealand emulates, borrows elements from our international counterparts such as
Australia and the United States. Whether this has grown inadvertently or deliberately can be
interpreted by individual experiences. These narratives are often constructed retrospectively to justify
the individuals view and to garner an emotional connection to the wider legacy of the Vietnam War.
New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam was limited, but the associated collective memories and
narration has tried to be empathetic with the American story and has also attempted to attach itself
to the ANZAC connotations that New Zealand commemorates as a nation.
Intergenerational divide was apparent during the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was seen as a
catalyst for youth counterculture and became a visual example of shifting times. Palmerton North
experienced intergenerational upheaval from the three distinct groups of soldiers, protesters and
civilians. This thesis has evaluated that soldiers, protesters and civilians have built upon and
exacerbated this divide through their experiences of the Vietnam War. Soldiers saw Vietnam as a
contingency of their professional careers, and that their experiences would be equivalent to past
generational service that is a part of their family history. This was not to be, as the Vietnam War proved
to be largely unpopular and upon return soldiers insulated themselves from the wider community.
Retrospectively, because soldiers were not welcomed home by the wider community, it sowed the
seeds for further divide. Protesters saw Vietnam as a symptom of societal changes and protested what
they believed to be the right side of history. For them, Vietnam was a fleeting political event that did
not feature as prominently as the Springbok Tour. Vietnam provided the basis for future protest
culture and solidified itself as a steppingstone for rebelling against conservative norms. Civilians being
the majority but largely uninvolved in the Vietnam War from both sides, sought to stabilize themselves
through family, career, owning a home, and so forth as had their parents. Civilians were also building
upon their family history by trying to strive ahead in their own ways. Palmerston North’s experience
appears to reflect the national experience as expressed in historical literature. Overall, any
generational divide can be regarded as being inevitable with the Vietnam War as an outlet for breaking
established conservative customs.
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Community Responses Before the Vietnam War
Before the Vietnam War the three groups of civilians, soldiers and protesters each had their own
distinct communities within Palmerston North. Soldiers’ were either based at Linton Military Camp or
lived in town. There was a degree of interaction with the wider community as soldiers had family and
friends that were outside of the military community. The military environment provided a structure
that enabled cohesion between soldiers. This comradeship was not only formulated in a professional
manner but became a lasting bond between mates. The soldiers that were interviewed considered
that the military had its own community. Having a family history of serving members also helped to
engender bonds within the military. Protesters in Palmerston North were predominantly made up of
students from Massey University. There were also youth from other areas such as churches and trade
union workers. The plethora of protester material also suggest that there may have been civilians that
joined protests at the height of the protest movement.370 Protesters were therefore a degree
separated from the wider community. Civilians’ are considered to be the wider community of
Palmerston North. Civilians were separated from soldiers and protesters as far as their individual
interests went. Civilian networks were based on family, friends and neighbours and their interests and
hobbies reflected this.
Relationships between these three groups were mutually amicable. Soldiers’ were seen in a
professional capacity by both protesters and civilians. And civilians were seen as everyday people who
may have been a bit too conservative for the student populace of Palmerston North.371 It was perhaps
the protesters who may have been seen as troublemakers by the soldiers and the wider community.
Capping stunts were targeted at both the civilians and at times soldiers.372 Apart from the rare
instances of strain as seen with capping stunts which were generally held in good jest, there was
limited involvement between each of the three groups. As Patrick Nolan stated in the soldier’s chapter,
soldiers and students tended to drink at different pubs. Palmerston North was seen as a ‘scarfie’ town
but any tensions seldom came to anything.373
Most of the participants interviewed from all three groups, were not aware of the existence of
Vietnam as a point of tension until New Zealand’s involvement. There was only a basic level of
370 Cherrie Smith, “Demo,” Chaff, May 6, 1970.
371 See Brickell, “Milk-Bar Cowboys and Rock ’n’ Roll,” in The Rise of Youth Culture. Also, Belgrave “Becoming
Dangerous,” in From Empire’s Servant to Global Citizen., who expands on the controversy Massey students
caused to the more conservative elements of society as they pushed against boundaries.
372 Helen Dollery in her thesis “Fool’s Abroad,” mentions the wide array of capping stunts students participated
in. This ranged from taking an army truck to convincing unsuspecting private citizens to send in samples to
measure salmonella with local wildfowl. See Dollery, “Clever Hoaxes and Criminal Escapades; Stunts 1960-
1973,” in “Fools Abroad,” p. 55-62.
373 Interview with Patrick Nolan, March 27, 2018, audio, 21:00.
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awareness towards the geopolitical situation in South East Asia. For the soldiers, the Domino Theory
did play in their minds but only in so far as to the threat of the Cold War and the spread of communism.
The soldiers learned about the political climate through mainstream media and also through the
military community. However, the issue of Vietnam was not learned until it was announced that New
Zealand would be militarily involved. The soldiers learned of Vietnam when they were volunteered to
tour, with most not knowing where Vietnam was on a map. The soldiers that had previous service in
South East Asia could appreciate the Cold War dynamics more so than younger or first serving soldiers.
From the soldiers I have interviewed, it can be said that they were no more aware of the political
intricacies of Vietnam than civilians and protesters were. All the soldiers I interviewed agree that they
volunteered for their service in Vietnam since they were professional soldiers and it was therefore
their job. This is a view that has been upheld despite the unpopularity of the war and since then the
retrospective analysis by both individual and community.
The civilians like the soldiers interviewed, were aware of the Cold War and to some degree the
Domino Theory through mainstream media. New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam was seen as
distant and rather unimportant to everyday New Zealander’s. As Donald MacDonald had exclaimed;
“it was just another Asian war”.374 A notable reason for this is that New Zealand’s involvement in
Vietnam was limited. The nature of warfare and therefore New Zealand’s stakes had changed during
this period. The legacy of WWII was quite pervasive, as it was an all-encompassing war that had
involved in some form all the interviewees parents and other older generations. And it is this
generation – the baby boomers – who lived under the shadow of the atomic bomb and the perceived
expansion of communism. Due to the atomic bomb, warfare changed from conventional to
asymmetric and so did the arena of where New Zealand soldiers were sent. Alliances and strategies
shifted so that New Zealand was soon following the policy of forward defence and the United States
power play in South East Asia. And because none of this directly impacted the New Zealand home
front, civilians were comfortable reading from a distance the New Zealand governments justification
for contributing troops to Vietnam. Besides Dawn Nolan who is the wife of Patrick Nolan, one of the
soldiers sent to Vietnam - the majority of civilians did not discuss Vietnam to a large degree. Although
for Dawn, she may not have understood the reasons for her husband’s commitment to Vietnam, she
was more acutely aware as an army wife.
Protesters’ were also relatively unaware of Vietnam until New Zealand became involved. As Alan
Millar noted, people protested Vietnam because it became a political issue.375 The protesters
374 Interview with Don MacDonald, March 20, 2018, audio, 26:40
375 Judy and Alan Millar, interview by Suzy Hawes, 16 February, 1994, audio, MMSOL(V) 15a Tape 1 of 2, 0:49.
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interviewed felt like they understood the Domino Theory and were against such a notion and
questioned its validity early on. It was during this period that youth counterculture was rife, and that
Vietnam became part of a much wider issue for the protesters. Vietnam became a generational issue
for youth and was a catalyst that pitted conservative values against societal changes. Don Swan
admitted in his interview that the Springbok tour protest of 1981 echoed the Vietnam war as they
shared protest characteristics. And Alan Millar also suggested that his involvement was a part of a
peace movement, referring to how he protested many more issues besides Vietnam. The Protesters
interviewed suggest that initially their information about Vietnam came from mainstream media, but
further branched out their sources as they found New Zealand media to be biased towards
governmental aims in Vietnam. Protesters were critical of what they read and were rather intuitive
and curious of the situation abroad, forming groups to discuss and protest Vietnam.376 These groups
developed early on and changed strategies as the situation in Vietnam deepened. Alan Millar attests
that protesters were pro-New Zealand and not anti-American.377
Community Responses During the Vietnam War
All three groups interviewed can attest that the media played a significant role during the Vietnam
War. The Vietnam War can aptly be described as the “first TV war or living-room war”.378 The advent
of television meant that the average New Zealander was informed visually of the warfare in
Vietnam.379 Television exposed the realities of war, a far cry from what mass media had hoped to do
which was to highlight the hegemony of the United States and instead inadvertently divided a
376 Examples of such groups were the Massey University group the New Left Society, and the various national
Committee on Vietnam (COV) groups that followed the central Wellington COV. Wellington COV was formed in
1965 when New Zealand’s first combat troops were sent to Vietnam after NEWZAD withdrawal. See
https://natlib.govt.nz/records/23136224 which holds Wellington COV records.
377 Judy and Alan Millar, interview by Suzy Hawes, 16 February, 1994, audio, MMSOL(V) 15a Tape 1 of 2, 4:05
378 Hoskins, Televising War, p. 13. See Hoskins chapter “From Vietnam to the Gulf – re-visions of war” for a
critical analysis of media influence during the Vietnam War and how memory has been shaped by it.
379 See https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/tv-history/news for a timeline for New Zealand’s adoption of
television. The 1960s proved to be an experimental time for New Zealand television as the NZBC sought to
establish national news coverage. This timeline shows that the 1960s news coverage was predominantly
internationally based and would have covered the Vietnam War. As to what degree this was covered and
impacted New Zealand society is difficult to measure. Based on participant memories and newspaper articles
at the time, the Vietnam War was regularly covered as an issue.
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nation.380 The justification381 for the war in Vietnam was based on Cold War values – the divide
between the East and the West and the spread of communism. Mass media especially television, was
meant to facilitate support but instead ended up creating a credibility gap between rhetoric and
reality.382 New Zealand experienced the realities of the wider controversy of the war through the
television.383 Protesters were facilitating other aspects of learning about the Vietnam War by creating
their own print media and had contacts with other protesters internationally.384 Soldiers serving in
Vietnam were aware to some degree of the unpopularity of the war, but not to the extent that was
presented upon their return. Dave Hayward understood the situation at home as his mother updated
him through letters. Soldiers had access to telegrams and newspapers although these would have
been delayed. The media may have created a false sense of security for the soldiers as most televised
media was of the United States involvement and New Zealand print media did not widely report of
protest movement in New Zealand.385 Nonetheless, any unpopularity was attributed to New Zealand’s
limited involvement, the opposite could be said for both the United States and Australia. Civilians were
aware of the television and how it shaped mainstream media. Their views on Vietnam would have
largely developed from the consumption of mainstream media through the mediums of television and
newspapers. It is difficult to measure whether protester material was read.
380 See Roselle, Media and the Politics of Failure, for an assessment on the use of media as a tool to wage war,
albeit not always successfully. Her three chapters “Political Communication and Policy Legitimacy: Explaining
Failure”, “War Waging and Reassessment: Vietnam” and “Withdrawal and Aftermath: Vietnam” are
particularly notable.
381 See Nicholas Cull’s chapter for an explanation into how the U.S. justified their involvement in Vietnam and
how the media pertained to this; Nicholas J. Cull, “Justifying Vietnam: The United States Information Agency’s
Vietnam Campaign for International Audiences”, in Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age,
ed. David Welch and Jo Fox (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
382 Herring, America’s Longest War, p. 174.
383 A large amount of mainstream newspaper articles that have been collected for this thesis showcase a
continued concern for New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam and for New Zealand’s withdrawal. This could be
due to civilians being exposed to the reality of war. From as early as 1967 there was newspaper coverage of a
New Zealand withdrawal, which was then ratcheted up particularly in 1969, before concluding in 1972 when
New Zealand’s last troops were withdrawn. See “Medical Teams, Not Troops, For Vietnam?”, Evening Post, 20
July 1967 and “NZ military role ends in Vietnam as troops fly out”, The Auckland Star, December 13, 1972 for
an indication of when withdrawal was questioned. Newspapers were one medium for information on Vietnam,
the other officially being television. Contrasting newspaper coverage could show the pervasive nature of
television as the images depicted of combat in Vietnam were predominantly of American troops, and
therefore questions the validity of New Zealand’s engagement.
384 See Chris Wheeler, “The Story Behind the War”, Wellington Committee on Vietnam, date unknown., Lynn
Arnold, Tony Dalton, Graham Jensen, Michael Hamel-Green, Hòa Bình: The Third Force and The Struggle for
Peace in Vietnam”, Aquarius Editorial Committee of Melbourne University War Resisters’ International for the
Federal Pacifist Council, date unknown., “New Zealand in South-East Asia” Wellington Committee on Vietnam,
date unknown., are some examples of protester material that are to educate the populace. This is in contrast
to the government material such as R.E. Owen, “Vietnam: Questions and Answers”, Government Printer,
Wellington, October 1966.
385 See Locke, Peace People., who throughout their discussion on the Vietnam War, disclosed that there was a
media bias that newspapers had towards protesters. In particular Locke’s chapter “Visitors Not So Welcome.,”
pp. 204-212.
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Wives of serving soldiers provide a unique narrative as they intersect both the communities of
soldiers and the wider community of civilians. Wives of soldiers often felt isolated because of a divide
between the two communities. Wives created their own communities, connecting with other wives
of soldiers or kept to themselves and immediate family members.386 Civilians on the other hand were
relatively uninvolved when it came to the Vietnam War. They were aware due to the media, but
because they were not directly impacted by the war, they went about their everyday lives. This is a
point that was consistent in all five civilian interviews. The civilians interviewed were also not impacted
by any protests to do with Vietnam. In fact, when asked civilians highlight that they recollect the
Springbok Tour protests more so than any Vietnam War protests. Any subsequent recollections of the
Vietnam War tended to be a retrospective focus that has developed as civilian interest increased after
the ending of the war.
Civilians and protesters both address that the Vietnam War was a foundation for future protest
movements. Civilians acknowledge that during the Vietnam War, protests were found during a time
of social rebellion by the younger generation. Both protesters and civilians agree that the sporting
contacts with South Africa and in particular the Springbok Tour of 1981, were more significant in their
memories as it directly impacted them more than the Vietnam War did. This is a point that Roger
Middlemass touches upon in the Protesters Chapter and also Heather Millar in the Civilian Chapter.
Protesters during this time found themselves as part of a generation that questioned the official
government line. They disagreed with the New Zealand government following the U.S. and their
foreign policy, with involvement in Vietnam not making much sense. Protesters constituency had
expanded, and Vietnam served as not only an issue in mainstream but local politics. The 1966 general
election and the Palmerston North seat was met with political discourse. And although National
candidate member Walding Brown won the seat, the perception of community divisions remained
pointedly opposite to the community unity during WWII.387 Protesters were not necessarily against
the soldiers, with Alan Millar having identified his involvement as that of a peace movement. This also
signifies that the issue of Vietnam was only one aspect of a wider protest culture, with emphasis being
placed on protests being peaceful as it was the best way to convey their messaging. The protesters
aim was to convince the wider community of the atrocities of Vietnam and how New Zealand should
withdraw troops. This was often at odds with the more conservative nature of the Palmerston North
community.
386 Hall, No Front Line, provides a great account on Vietnam. Her chapter “While He’s Away: Managing Alone,”
pp. 251-267., addresses the wives of soldiers and their experiences.
387 Hancock, The First Sixteen Members, p. 389.
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Community Responses After the Vietnam War
New Zealand troops were rotated throughout their commitment in Vietnam. This meant that any
official homecoming celebrations were difficult to organise as each troop company had differing
return dates. New Zealand’s troop withdrawal was staggered but began at the end of 1970 and
throughout 1971. New Zealand still contributed minimal support to Vietnam with training teams and
the New Zealand civilian surgical team still involved after combat troops were withdrawn, with New
Zealand ending all support in 1975 with the demise of South Vietnam. New Zealand’s withdrawal from
Vietnam features prominently in soldiers, civilians and protesters memories. It was the homecoming
of New Zealand troops that collectivised the memory of the Vietnam War. Up until this point, each
group had had separate but shared experiences of Vietnam. The return of New Zealand troops
provided a visual example of the unpopularity of the war and has been solidified into the national
narrative. And it’s this narrative that has become the dominant symbol of New Zealand’s involvement
in Vietnam.
In contrast to the United States, New Zealand troops returned home without the perception that
their service was discredited by the New Zealand government. The wider community were mostly
indifferent to New Zealand troops returning home and any protest was caused by a small minority of
protesters. However, the troops returned home feeling ostracised and perceived themselves to be
outsiders from the wider community. Soldiers arriving home did not receive an official welcome home.
Rather, soldiers arrived at Whenuapai airport in the middle of the night, not because of anti-war
protesters but due to flight schedules.388 Soldiers were advised to not dress in their uniform but to
wear civilian clothes. This in conjunction with the late-night arrival was seen as a rejection by the
soldiers, and as an attempt by the government to sneak the troops back into New Zealand in order to
avoid protesters.389 The day after their return, 161 Battery who were the only V Force element to
return in a sizeable group, accompanied by 4 Troop NZSAS, were given a civic parade in Auckland
City.390 The march was disrupted by anti-Vietnam War protesters who shouted abuse, dressed in red
paint to symbolise blood, and threw objects such as firecrackers, red paint bombs and tomatoes.391
388 McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, pp. 524-526.
389 Ibid. As McGibbon explains, “most flights into Whenuapai were routine operations, and RNZAF aircraft
brought back formed units from Vietnam only in 1965, 1971 and 1972, there was nothing specific to connect
such flights with Vietnam, and little likelihood of protesters appearing, let alone causing problems at an air
force base where they could easily be excluded”.
390 Ibid., p. 522.
391 Hall, No Front Line, pp. 274-275.
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The soldiers who attended the parade felt humiliated and such an event solidified their bitterness at
the protesters. The soldiers that were interviewed for this thesis touched upon both of these events.
For the soldiers, they had felt that their service in Vietnam was the job of a professional soldier. It was
felt that any protest should have been directed at the government. And although the soldiers I
interviewed were not a part of the Auckland parade they felt that their experiences were synonymous
with the soldiers that participated. Often referring to arriving in darkness, the direction to not wear
uniform, and the throwing of tomatoes are just some of the more popular memorative symbols
utilised in this collective memory.
As witnessed in the United States, protests continued to gain traction until the promise of
withdrawal. New Zealand experienced a similar pattern, albeit to a lesser degree. Nevertheless,
protesters felt that they had succeeded in their principals of ending the war when troops were
withdrawn. New Zealand’s withdrawal from Vietnam was signalled when U.S. forces began
withdrawal. Although protesters highlighted the unpopularity of the war, it would be a stretch to say
that they succeeded in ending New Zealand’s involvement. The United States’ experience was one of
a cultural shock as the Vietnam War incited a wave of political, social and cultural issues, New
Zealand’s experience does not compare in this regard. This also meant that the Vietnam War was more
of an issue to the everyday US citizen than it ever was to an average New Zealander. The Vietnam War
did succeed in laying the groundwork for future protest culture in New Zealand, most prominently
seen with the Springbok Tour. Even here, it could be argued that the protesters did succeed with
ending the Springbok Tour because the everyday New Zealander was invested in the outcome,
whether they were pro-rugby or not.
For civilians’, the ending of the Vietnam War was not the welcome relief that was encountered in
the United States. This was in large part because of the lack of conscription and therefore engagement
of the wider community with the outcome of the war. Many civilians throughout New Zealand’s
engagement in Vietnam were not actively concerned of New Zealand’s involvement. The civilians
interviewed for this thesis retrospectively feel sympathetic towards the soldiers especially with their
return to New Zealand. The soldiers that were interviewed noted that they felt detached from the
wider community; it is difficult to ascertain the reasoning behind this view other than the perception
that protesters spoke for the majority of the wider community. But by all accounts, the wider
community were not actively discriminatory towards soldiers and were if anything apathetic and
oblivious, their focus on their own lives.
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History and Memory
One of the most important findings in this thesis has been the relationship between history and
memory concerning the Vietnam War. In interviewing a range of perspectives from the three
groupings of soldiers, protesters and civilians it has become readily apparent the diverse nature of
how an individual through their experiences recounts the Vietnam War. Each individual through their
narrative has contributed to a collective memory of the Vietnam War. Narrative is a natural adoption
of storytelling of memories. An individual often frames their memory in a way that suits them in order
to understand it, notably seen with traumatic memories. What can be seen with all three groups that
were interviewed is a retrospective reassertion of memory on a larger scale. In order to better
collectivise their memories, interviewees have embraced overseas experiences to engender
understanding of their own narrative. Even though New Zealand’s contribution to the Vietnam War
was minimal, all three groups have inflated their narrative to reflect a more universal contribution.
Compared to New Zealand, the United States have attached their memory of the Vietnam War as
solely an American tragedy.392 This is a far cry from the commemoration of WWI and WWII which is
celebrated as good triumphing over evil. 393 This in itself is an issue. In utilizing selective instances of
392 Christian Appy argues that America as a nation has wilfully ignored its own history in an attempt to rewrite
what was an incredibly unpopular war. In trying to forget the tragic nature of the Vietnam War, Americans
focussed on the American narrative forgetting the Vietnamese narrative entirely. Projecting onto Vietnam
veterans, Americans were able to regain their sense of pride and patriotism under a new rallying cry of
‘Vietnam’ by highlighting the heroism of veterans and disregarding the atrocities that occurred in Vietnam.
Commemoration of the Vietnam War is now solely focussed on the veteran and their hardships, in particular
on their return and their subsequent disconnect from society. The anti-war protesters are used as a scapegoat
in this narrative, with the implication that anti-war protesters were heavily against soldiers. As Appy explains
this is a myth and if anything, anti-war protesters were on the side of the soldiers with millions protesting for
their return home. Appy further suggests that it is the U.S. government who is to blame for the commitment of
troops to Vietnam and their ill treatment home and abroad, most importantly on their return and
reintegration into society. Appy, “What Really Happened in Vietnam?”
393 Rikke Schubart and Anne Gjelsvik, ed., Eastwood’s Iwo Jima: Critical Engagements with Flags of Our Fathers
and Letters from Iwo Jima, (New York: Wallflower Press, 2013), compares and contrasts Clint Eastwood’s WWII
films Flags of our Fathers and Iwo Jima; both films on the American and Japanese perspectives of the battle of
Iwo Jima. What is interesting is Hollywood’s interpretation of war and also the historical narrative and how
that plays into conflicts such as Vietnam. Vibeke Schou Tjalve’s chapter To Sell A War: Flags Lies, and Tragedy,
discusses the mythological raising of the flag, the concept of ‘good wars and noble lies’ – referring to the
political propaganda surrounding the raising of the American flag on Iwo Jima.  Tjalve suggests that “history is
ransacked for ‘good wars’ that will serve as prisms through which to advance war as a simple solution to
complicated problems”. This could be interpreted as sounding true in regard to WWII which on a propagandic
level can be reduced to good vs evil. The same cannot be said for the Vietnam War. There was no easy
propagandic justification for the Vietnam War and in an attempt to rectify the American frontier image, the
Vietnam War is remembered as a tragedy but one that had ‘noble’ roots. Tjalve compares the WWII memorial
with Maya Lin’s Vietnam memorial – a portrayal of victory and the other a profound display of loss that calls
for self-reflection., Vibeke Schou Tjalve’s “To Sell A War: Flags Lies, and Tragedy” in Rikke Schubart and Anne
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WWII, WWII was seen as a moral backdrop for involvement in Vietnam. Alongside the frontier
mythology,394 this misguided confidence was a myth, due to propaganda and the fact that war cannot
be simplified as a heroic or glorified deed. Vietnam was therefore misrepresented to the young
soldiers involved and the tragic nature of warfare was exposed publicly on television. Commemoration
has since attempted to reflect this, so much so that a ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ has emerged.395 As Herring
explains, “the Vietnam War, as perhaps nothing else in U.S. history, caused Americans to confront a
set of beliefs that formed a basic part of the national character: the idea that in their dealings with
other peoples they had generally acted nobly and benevolently and the belief that  they could do
anything they set their minds to.”396 The Vietnam War was not just an international conflict but rather
a catalyst for the American people to confront uncomfortable truths at home.397 The Vietnam
Syndrome created an aversion to militarily intervene abroad, with foreign policy reflecting a certain
self-interest in an attempt to insulate the nation from further division.398 This Vietnam Syndrome as
Herring claims, resulted in a type of revisionist history emerging from the conservative and
neoconservative political and intellectual elite in order to reassert global leadership.399 Ronald Reagan
suggested during the 1980 presidential campaign that the American effort in the Vietnam War was of
a ‘noble cause’.400 Conservatives went even further, arguing that the American failure in Vietnam was
largely self-inflicted and therefore potentially could have been won if it was supported domestically.401
The successful military campaign in the Persian Gulf War had temporarily vanquished the Vietnam
Gjelsvik, ed., Eastwood’s Iwo Jima: Critical Engagements with Flags of Our Fathers and Letters from Iwo Jima,
(New York: Wallflower Press, 2013), pp. 247-259.
394 Refer to Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Annual Report of
the American Historical Association for the Year 1893 (Washington, D.C.: GPO and American Historical
Association, 1894), 199-227.
395 Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome”, p. 409. Herring suggests that the Vietnam Syndrome was first expressed
in the late 1970s but was used initially in 1971 as a way to describe symptoms that afflicted veterans from
Vietnam. However, the political meaning appeared in 1978 and was used to describe “an unwillingness to
commit [U.S. troops] to an unwinnable conflict”. Also see Doyle, “Bringing Whose War Home?”., pp. 99-110,
for an interpretation of American commitment and the ‘forgive-and-forget’ mentality
396 Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome”, p. 411.
397 Ibid., Herring suggests that the American people were asking themselves important questions that led to a
set of attitudes and values that has thus instilled the influence and memory of the Vietnam War. These
questions such as: “Was it a good war or a bad war, a noble cause or essentially immoral? Was it necessary in
terms of the national security or basically needless and senseless, the wrong war at the wrong place, at the
wrong time, with the wrong enemy? Was it a good war waged poorly? Was it a war that could and indeed
should have been won, a war lost only by the timidity and stupidity of those who waged it? Or was it a war
that could not have been won at a price we were willing to pay?”, are just one aspect of the implications of the
Vietnam Syndrome.
398 Isolationism was again in vogue.
399 Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” pp. 412, 413.
400 Quoted in Howell Raines, “Reagan Calls Arms Race Essential to Avoid a ‘Surrender’ or ‘Defeat,’” New York
Times, August 19, 1980., in Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” p. 413.
401 Ibid., revisionism ushered in a popular belief that the media especially the television was at fault for
America losing the war. “The hostile media and the near treacherous anti-war movement”., p. 413.
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Syndrome. But it was 9/11 that truly solidified American patriotism with foreign policy shifting to a
pre-emptive doctrine. It was not Afghanistan, but Iraq that revived the Vietnam Syndrome, with
comparisons being drawn between the two conflicts.402 The Vietnam War is a generational war, but I
agree with Herring that the legitimate concerns raised by the Vietnam War will not die out with the
‘Vietnam generation’, but rather lessons will remain to be learnt.403
While the U.S. attempted to revive their military culture through ‘reconciliation and rehabilitation’,
for Australia, collectively remembering Vietnam has been rewritten into the ANZAC mythology with
such overtures not made until the late 1980s and early 1990s.404 Jeff Doyle claims that Australia has
appropriated imagery representative of the American experience, in particular the media
interpretation of the Vietnam war.405 This combined with the ANZAC mythology has served to create
a new sense of nationalism for Australia. In placing the Vietnam War within the ANZAC mythology, it
demonstrates the interpretation of protecting the underdog and fighting an immoral force.406 This
therefore provides justification and also a space to reassert a collective memory. It also for the
veterans, establishes an emotional connection that they were otherwise denied. Welcome Home
parades such as the 1987 march, were used as an attempt to resituate the veteran into society.
Vietnam veterans felt that they were denied a welcome home and were vilified by the wider
community.407 Popular imagery such as the splattering of red paint against the commanding officer of
1 RAR, has often been used as evidence of a wider connotation of anti-war protesters and the local
community of actively being hostile.408 This incident was rather unique and if anything overemphasizes
the narrative of a minority of citizens. Since then, the collective memory of the protest movement has
been marginalised. Situating the collective memory of the Vietnam War with ANZAC mythology is a
reassertion of not only individual identity but of national identity.
The New Zealand collective memory on the Vietnam War is both similar in nature to the Australian
and the U.S. experience but offers an incongruent narrative. In large part this is due to New Zealand’s
limited involvement in Vietnam and also the nature of engagement; New Zealand did not have
conscription. Protesters may argue that the CMT was a form of conscription, but the soldiers involved
disagree, insisting that as professional soldiers they signed up to any military posting. The New Zealand
402 Ibid., pp. 421-426., herring provides a good discussion on the actions taken by the neoconservative elite to
eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome, but instead revived such concerns with involvement in the Middle East.
403 Ibid., p. 426.
404 See Doyle, “Bringing Whose War Home?,” p. 98. Also see Thomson, “Postscript: Anzac Post-memory,”
Thomson explains how the ‘popular memory’ theory is utilized when examining WWII memories - how an
individual remembers and how this has interconnected with public memory.
405 Doyle, “Bringing Whose War Home?,” p. 101
406 Ibid., p. 112.
407 Ibid., p. 136.
408 Ibid., pp. 136, 137.
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collective memory has borrowed memorative practices such as media imagery and the ANZAC
mythology. The reason for this, is that due to New Zealand’s limited involvement and the unpopularity
of the war, the Vietnam War had no place to be collectively remembered. It was not until the late
1990’s that the New Zealand government made overtures to the veterans for their service. But
attaching the Vietnam War to ANZAC mythology is problematic as seen with the Australian narrative.
The tone has shifted to celebration rather than mourning while neglecting the civilian and protester
narrative and potentially overemphasizing the soldier perspective. Arguably, the U.S. and Australia
have made more of an effort to commemorate the Vietnam veteran more so than New Zealand has.
It has become readily apparent from the interviews I have conducted that there is a collective
memory of betrayal from the Vietnam veterans. This collective memory has in part been reinforced
by the uneventful homecoming, the disruption of the Auckland civic parade and the lacklustre
treatment from the government. For the soldiers’, it is understandable how they have collectivised
their memory under this sense of betrayal. New Zealand society had in a way set-up the soldiers. WWI
and WWII had been selectively remembered as a glorious and necessary war that was all
encompassing which included the home front.409 Even the Korean War - as participant Clifford Parker
has expressed - was received more warmly by the wider community than the Vietnam War, as it was
not an unpopular engagement. 410 This belief alongside the confidence that as a professional soldier
they were following the government directive, led the soldiers’ to regard their service as part of a
larger scheme of New Zealand’s military service.
There was some awareness of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War as media portrayals, contact
with family and friends and staggered rotations of units would have meant some basic understanding
that New Zealand’s involvement was contested. However, such notions of unpopularity were not
made apparent until the soldiers’ returned to New Zealand. The misunderstanding of their arrival at
night with the orders for civilian clothes to be worn alongside the perception of a general disinterest
from the wider community, coalesced in a feeling of being unwelcome. It was natural for the soldiers
409 Ibid., p. 136., Doyle discusses John Schumann’s song ‘(I was) only 19’ that emphasizes the ANZAC myth with
the lyric “the Anzac legend didn’t mention blood and mud and fear”.
410 See Clifford Parker interview. Also, personal correspondence: “It may have been a prudent political decision
by the then NZ Govt to support South Korea in 1950. As it happened, we were the first of the "Third World"
countries to lend support to them. To this day, Koreans in general support those NZ soldiers who they regard
us as having saved their country. Here in P Nth, we receive a Christmas cake from a Korean postmaster, have
been offered scholarships for grandchildren, return subsidized holidays in South K, and many other nice
touches. Just recently the Korean Ambassador and staff came from Wellington to shout us lunch (and attend
the cultural festivities). As a tribute to the fallen at the Otaki primary school, the whole school choir sang Po
Kari Kari Ana, in Korean (language) We are heroes. By contrast, NZ contribution to South Vietnam war was at
the specific pressure from USA to the NZ Govt. The populace was not impressed. We were not on the winning
side either. Our little NEWZAD group was an initial token as the best offering from a compliant nation. Then it
grew somewhat!”
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to fall back upon their bonds of camaraderie and insulate themselves within their own military
community. The Auckland civic parade was an official attempt at welcoming the troops home and
although only a minority briefly disrupted the parade, the ‘abuse’ and the throwing of ‘tomatoes’
solidified itself as a mainstay of collective memory for Vietnam veterans. Of the soldiers interviewed
for this thesis, none were involved in the Auckland civic parade and yet the pervasive nature of
collective memory had affected my participants until they themselves had felt personally victimised.
Upon return to New Zealand, soldiers felt unwelcome not only by the wider community but by
older veterans. The ‘RSA’ generation of WWII seemed to feel that the Vietnam veterans did not fight
in a ‘real war’.411 There is a tradition held by WWI and WWII veterans that belittles the subsequent
generations experience, however Vietnam veterans were judged especially harshly in light of this.412
Shifting times did in the end benefit the Vietnam veterans as they were in the end passed the baton
and are now fully integrated into the RSA.
The New Zealand government had also contributed to the soldiers feeling of betrayal. Veterans felt
that they did not get the official recognition they felt they deserved for their service in Vietnam. The
long-term effects of Agent Orange and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) were not adequately
addressed, with a settlement package negotiated in 2006 after many years of dispute.413 Part of this
settlement was an apology from the government for the inadequate conduct of dealing with veteran
concerns.414 This apology was issued in 2008 by Prime Minister Helen Clark and was accompanied by
an official ‘welcome home’ parade alongside an oral history project and digital archive.415
The protesters that were interviewed for this thesis, did not situate the Vietnam War as
significantly in their memories as the soldiers interviewed have. The protesters viewed the Vietnam
War as a catalyst for larger and broader protest causes. These causes ranged from women’s rights to
disputing sporting contacts with South Africa, with the Vietnam War overlapping or providing the basis
for such movements. Protest culture in New Zealand was strongly influenced by the U.S. and Australia.
From borrowing protest strategies to co-ordinating national mobilisation marches with marches in the
U.S. and Australia, New Zealand protesters could be forgiven for having U.S. derivation. New Zealand
gained momentum from U.S. actions, but the results were not the same.416 New Zealand’s domestic
debate shifted alliance based collective security to independence from foreign policy, with particular
411 Stephen Clarke, After the War: The RSA in New Zealand, (Auckland: Penguin Random House, 2016)., p. 191.
412 Ibid.
413 Hall, No Front Line, p. 287.
414 'The Vietnam War', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/vietnam-war, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage),
updated 8-Dec-2016
415 www.vietnamwar.govt.nz
416 Rabel, p. 260.
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focus on regional security. In the U.S. suffering from the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ focussed their efforts
closer to home and shifted blame onto domestic elements such as anti-war protesters. In experiencing
such scarring aftermath, both the left and the right agreed with the notion that North Vietnam won
the American War:417 the left, as it justified and reinforced the belief that they ended the war through
protest, while the right as it allowed blame to be allocated for a war that otherwise would have been
won.418 Although convenient for the U.S., this did not happen politically in New Zealand. Rather the
Vietnam War set a precedent of public distrust in politicians and set the course for Norman Kirk’s more
‘moral’ and ‘independent’ direction for New Zealand’s diplomacy.419
There was no visible suggestion that the Vietnam War affected the 1972 election where the Labour
Party won with a landslide.420 The aftermath of the Vietnam War validated the protest movement and
protesters in general, and in doing so created a ‘victory narrative’ in the collective memories of
protesters. Most of the protesters interviewed suggested that the movement was successful in
withdrawing New Zealand from the Vietnam War. New Zealand’s withdrawal from Vietnam, affirmed
and solidified future protest movements most notably, the Springbok Tour. The Vietnam War was
considered as motivation for an intergenerational change that protesters were visually associated
with. In questioning the validity of the Domino Theory, protesters brought to the forefront the issue
of the New Zealand government committing troops to the Vietnam War and following the U.S. based
strategy, which with the fall of Saigon was shown to be wrong. The media, especially with television
reporting, effectively showcased not only images of the Vietnam War but also the protest movement,
to civilians at home. This was largely seen more with the U.S. narrative and would have been more
effective due to conscription and the broader domestic issues.421 Retrospectively, the protesters
417 Marilyn Young, “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, Ho Chi Minh Is Gonna Win”, in Why the North Won The Vietnam War,
ed., Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002)., p. 219.
418 Ibid., see reference; Young suggests that there may have been another position in which the U.S. actually
won the war, a belief spurred by General Westmoreland and Noam Chomsky., see Edward S. Herman and
Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon,
1988), 246-247. See also Chomsky, “Visions of Righteousness,” Cultural Critique 3 (1986): 30.
419 Rabel. P. 326.
420 Rabel. P. 326., Young also suggests a similar point, stating that the U.S. anti-war movement may have not
made much of an impact and may have on fact been overemphasized by the left and the right: “There is no
way to know whether the anti-war movement prolonged, shortened, or was irrelevant to the length of the
war”., p. 219., see Young’s chapter to further understand her argument., Young, “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh.”
421 As Lloyd Gardner claims, “the Vietnam War was really many wars, but only one that finally counted for the
Vietnamese. Its victims were primarily Vietnamese, and its victors were the Vietnamese. Fifty years on,
historians will look at the Cold War and wonder why the Americans did not understand better the folly of their
attempt at nation-building.” Gardner also stipulates that “the reality of Vietnam was as elusive to American
policymakers as the enemy forces were to the men they sent to this hall of mirrors. They saw only their
reflections, multiplied over and over”., Lloyd Gardner, “Hall of Mirrors”, in Why the North Won The Vietnam
War, ed., Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002)., p. 240
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believe that they were on the ‘right side of history’ which was further justified not only by New
Zealand’s withdrawal but by the U.S. failure to win the war.
The civilian narrative of the Vietnam War is predominantly retrospective compared to the soldier’s
and protester’s narratives. This is in large part due to civilians being incognizant during the Vietnam
War, and it is only after that civilians have been able to view and learn about the Vietnam War. When
interviewed, civilians were somewhat aware of the Cold War, with few knowing the Domino Theory,
but with most not involved or holding any interest in the Vietnam War at the time. Most remembered
the Springbok Tour more vividly than the Vietnam War. The civilian participants associate the Vietnam
War with tragic and negative connotations, and although not supportive of New Zealand’s
commitment to Vietnam, civilian participants did not deride the soldiers and instead have indicated
that the New Zealand government holds responsibility. Most if not all of the civilian participants,
portray an empathetic understanding towards the soldiers and their return home.
Civilian collective memory has been shaped by key images of the Vietnam War. These images have
been viewed retrospectively with media revisiting the Vietnam War in an attempt to explain the
complexities of the war and its legacies. When expressing their horror about the Vietnam War, the
civilian participants associated defining images such as – ‘Vietnam Napalm’ by Nick Ut (1972) and ‘The
Execution’ by Eddie Adams (1968) – as part of their understanding and remembering of the Vietnam
War. What is interesting about this finding is that these images do not have any bearing on the New
Zealand narrative of the Vietnam War and are in fact closely intertwined with the U.S. narrative. It
indicates a strong borrowing of U.S. memorative imagery on part of New Zealand civilians and the
pervasiveness of the U.S. narrative in collective memory largely due to mass media ‘remediating’ the
Vietnam experience.422 Andrew Hoskins argues that this is due to the media recycling ‘indelible’
imagery on a disproportionate level in popular media such as art and documentaries as it was
considered memorable.423 Hoskins therefore suggests that it is in fact photographic material rather
than the television that is emphasized more in ‘new’ memory and that these images are only
snapshots and are reworked into an individual’s memory to have meaning in the present.424
422 Hoskins, Televising War, p. 21., Hoskins suggests that “Nick Ut’s photograph is recognizable to audiences
today (some of whom were not born when it was taken) because of its remediation on television, in print and
on the internet”.
423 Ibid., p. 18-19.
424 Ibid., p. 19.
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Historiography
This thesis has established that the experiences of the Vietnam War from soldiers, protesters and
civilians that were based in the Palmerston North community, were reasonably consistent with the
national narrative. The historiography of the Vietnam War has largely focused on protester and
soldiers’ experience and in this regard has overemphasized their role and legacy. In exploring the
civilian narrative, this thesis aimed to balance out the existing scholarship by exploring the ‘silent
majority’. This thesis has found that on the whole, experiences and memories of participants from all
three groupings, are relatively parallel with the printed sources at the time and are therefore
reasonably accurate. In utilizing oral interviews, evidence suggests that individual narratives have in a
way been retrospectively constructed, and in order to understand and contextualize their experiences
have been collectivized in an attempt to find a space to commemorate. What has also been explored
in this thesis, is the intergenerational divide that still persists today, between the three groups.
Soldiers’ were invested in building upon past generational service, whereas protesters’ were
protesting the Vietnam War as a symptom of societal change, and civilians’ were more concerned with
their daily lives and have become more aware of the Vietnam War as the topic is explored
retrospectively. This thesis has highlighted that there are topics that can be further researched, with
some participants indicating a desire to further record their experiences. Exploring the consistency of
the local narrative compared to the national narrative and how this is influenced by a broader
international narrative could be further discussed. This in turn would involve the research of
individuals experiences and how they have collectivized their memories. The medium of television and
mass media in general could also be explored further in order to measure responses during the
Vietnam War. The aftermath of the war and whether legacies and the perceptions of ‘lessons’ that




On April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to communist forces and signaled the end of a contentious and tragic
conflict that spanned over twenty years. The Vietnam War was the United States’ longest war and
ended in military defeat. For the United States, the Vietnam War was a microcosm for the societal
issues at home. To view the Vietnam War as a tragic and costly war is viewing the Vietnam War
retrospectively. At the time, the Vietnam War was not a series of errors but was based in logical and
inevitable foreign policy conjecture. The overemphasis of the threat of communism and the lack of
questioning the basic premises of foreign policy, led to a steady escalation of forces that outgrew the
containment policy of communism. The credibility of the United States government was questioned
by the public as there were inconsistencies with the rhetoric and the reality of the war shown by the
media. Referred to as the ‘television war’ mass media enabled the public at home to see the tragic
nature of warfare. Fueled by the problematic nature of conscription, the public grew increasing
disillusioned with the government and pushed back against perceived inadequacies with society. The
Vietnam War facilitated a reevaluation of American exceptionalism and strategic outlook. The
Vietnam War left a lasting legacy that should not be discredited.
New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War was minimal, with troops committed to Vietnam
under the guise of upholding alliance obligations. Due to limited involvement and lack of conscription,
New Zealand did not experience the same domestic discourse as the United States and Australia had.
New Zealand had elicited its own unique response. This thesis has utilized Palmerston North as a case
study in order to measure community responses to the Vietnam War. Historiography has focused on
representing the protester and soldier narrative and has neglected to evaluate the position of civilians
and their response to the Vietnam War. In ascertaining civilian responses, this thesis has provided a
balanced outlook to the Vietnam War and suggests that Palmerston North was representative of
broader society. In conducting oral interviews, this thesis has established that there remains to be
unresolved tensions mostly in regard to soldiers. In evaluating their memories, it has become apparent
that many soldiers’ felt betrayed and this perception still lingers. The withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam and the subsequent failure of the United States, validated protesters’ and their argument
that New Zealand should not have militarily intervened in Vietnam. The Vietnam War provided a
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stepping-stone for further protest culture in New Zealand as seen with sporting contacts with South
Africa. Civilians as the silent majority, provide a medium to evaluate whether the Vietnam War was
impactful on New Zealand society. Civilians were mostly unaffected by the Vietnam War as they
focused on their daily lives. They have since viewed the Vietnam War retrospectively.
As New Zealand moves on there are lessons to be learned from Vietnam, with reflection less on
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 The aim of this thesis, is to study how the reactions in Palmerston North towards the Vietnam
War reflected the wider social issues in New Zealand at the time. With the range of services
and institutions located here the project will provide a representative view of both the anti-war
protesters and a more conservative view of the Vietnam War. Palmerston North is a relevant
spatial location due to the close proximity of Massey University and the Linton military camp,
therefore likely to provide an interesting contrast between two differing opinions on the
Vietnam war. It offers a unique perspective as a small provincial town with the combination of
such groups. As such it may offer a micro-study for intensified or distillation of responses
elsewhere.
The principal research question is; in what ways do responses to the Vietnam War in Palmerston
North c.1965-72 reflect on wider social issues in New Zealand, including national identity for this
period'.
As semi-structured sessions, the interviews will proceed along the following broad framework as
follows.
Part 2: Contextualization of Participants:
 Ask participants about their general situation during the war, where they were. Gather their
general understanding of the war at that time.
 Establish the participant’s degree of involvement in Palmerston North - How involved were the
participants in the community before/after the Vietnam war?
 How did the participants learn about the war, who and where did they got their information
from - did the participants have access to television?
Part 3: The Political Climate
 Did the participants at the time understand the political climate – the broader context of the
Cold War – who and where – influence and information.
 How aligned was the participants to other groups around them?
 How did they view the position of youth, did they feel that the youth were aware of the broader
politics?
 What was their involvement? (only need basic information i.e. protest movement).
Part 4: Contextualization of Palmerston North:
 How did the participants think the war was perceived in Palmerston North?
 What did they perceive was the general feeling around Palmerston North, were there tensions
regarding the war or a lack thereof? If so, where did they think these lay?
 How were different perspectives perceived?
 How was the relationship between the services? (i.e. Linton Military Camp and Massey
University). Where did people in Palmerston North get their information from?
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 How important was Palmerston North’s proximity to Wellington? Was there any relevancy with
regard to protest groups and/or government.
 To what extent did participants believe the situation in Palmerston North was unique?
 To what extent was it representative?
Part 5: The long-term impact of the Vietnam war
Ongoing impact of Vietnam period on Palmerston North.
 Did it change people’s attitudes – permanent change?
 How were relations with the community of Palmerston North? Relationship between the
services? Was there social stigma for their participation?
 If tensions – how were they resolved? Were tensions resolved with the ending of the war, or
did they continue?
 Was there long-term impact to the participant’s familial relations?
 Was there an intergenerational impact on the community? Did it effect the next generation?
Were there lessons learnt for the next generation?
Part 6: Conclusion:
 Anything else they would like to say
 Thank the participants for their participation
 Remind them of the conditions of the interview which will be presented on the consent form.
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My name is Suhaila Katavich and I am a Master of Arts candidate in History in the College of
Humanities at Massey University. I am researching Palmerston North’s response to the Vietnam war
in the form of an oral interview. The purpose of the interview is to access knowledge from a member
of the public to contribute towards a community overview of the Vietnam War. I intend to interview
three to eight participants from a variety of different backgrounds, but focusing on Vietnam Veterans,
Anti-war protestors and other community organizations such as Churches. In having a range of
perspectives, I hope to have a balanced assessment that can contribute and benefit New Zealand’s
history. I think it is important to conduct these interviews for future generations to remember your
experiences. The interview will be used as evidence for my Master of Arts thesis.
Project Description and Invitation
Palmerston North provides a dynamic case study in studying the public’s reactions to the Vietnam
War. This is in part due to the spatial proximity of the Linton Military camp and the Massey University
Campus. Palmerston North during the Vietnam War was also a provincial town, and displayed a
strong community background. History depicts that the Vietnam War was an unpopular war with the
New Zealand public. But this may have been inflated due to America’s involvement and the anti-war
movement. There is indication that due to New Zealand’s limited military involvement that there was
wide spread support for New Zealand to have a contribution in the Vietnam war. To gain a better
understanding of Palmerston North’s response to the Vietnam war, my research hopes to use first
hand experiences to highlight whether there were differing opinions towards the Vietnam war. I
thereby extend an invitation for your participation in an oral interview.
Participant Identification and Recruitment
The oral interview will involve you having knowledge or participated in the context of the Vietnam War.
There is preference that evidence will be used that relates directly to Palmerston North, but overall
involvement in that period will also be explored. There is little risk involved in the conduct of the oral
interview. However, if questions may cause discomfort, you may at any given time discontinue the
interview. You will be given a copy of the interview and transcript and once finished, a copy of the
thesis. If you feel uncomfortable with your answers in the interview or transcript you may change or
redo portions of the interview at my discretion. Your answers will not be published in my thesis without
your permission. You may also be presented as an anonymous contributor to my thesis if desired.
Project Procedures
The interview will be recorded. The interview is to be conducted over a 1 hour period. In the event that
harm is attained by you or me, the interview will be ended by the wishes of either party. If harm is




As the interview will be recorded, the resulting data will be stored on a laptop and a hard drive as
back-up. The data will only be used for this assignment. A copy of the recording will be given to you. If
you would like to remain anonymous, then the presentation of the data will reflect this decision.
Participant’s Rights
You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:
 decline to answer any question;
 withdraw from the study (at any time);
 ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;
 provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give
permission to the researcher;
 be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.
 have the right to ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview.
Project Contacts





Phone: +64 (06) 356 9099 ext. 83591
Email: R.E.Bell@massey.ac.nz
Contact Details if in Distress:
If you feel distressed by any questions, you should contact the following services:
Lifeline – 0800 543 354 (0800 LIFELINE)
Seniorline – 0800 725 463 A free information service for older people
Samaritans – 0800 726 666
Compulsory Statements
MUHEC APPLICATIONS
The following statement is compulsory and MUST be included:
Committee Approval Statement
This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics
Committee: Southern B, Application 17/36.  If you have any concerns about the conduct of
this research, please contact Dr Rochelle Stewart-Withers, Chair, Massey University Human




Location: Level 3, Sir Geoffrey Peren Building,
Manawatū campus, Palmerston North
Postal address: College of Humanities and
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Reactions to the Vietnam War: A Case Study of
Palmerston North
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM - INDIVIDUAL
I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me.  My
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions
at any time.
I agree/do not agree to the interview being sound recorded.
I wish/do not wish to have my recordings returned to me.
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet.
Signature: Date:
Full Name - printed
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Interview Questions:
Q1. What is your full name?
Q2. Where were you born and raised?
Q3. Briefly describe your family and background
Q4. What was your general situation during the War? Where were you based?
Q5. What was your general understanding of the War at that time?
Q6. How involved were you in Palmerston North? What was your degree of involvement in the
Palmerston North community before and after the Vietnam War?
Q7. How did you learn about the Vietnam War? Was it through the media such as television? How
much of an influence was the media?
Q8. Did you understand the political climate back then? (In terms of the Cold War and geopolitics).
Q9. How aligned were you to social groups around you at the time?
Q10. How did you view the position of youth? Did you feel that the youth were aware of the broader
politics? Was there tension between generations?
Q11. How did you think the war was perceived in Palmerston North?
Q12. What did you perceive was the general feeling around Palmerston North? Were there tensions
regarding the war or a lack thereof? If so, where do you think these lay?
Q13. How were different perspectives perceived by the wider community?
Q14. How was the relationship between the services? (i.e. Linton Military Camp and Massey
University). Where did people in Palmerston North get their information from?
Q15. How important was Palmerston North’s proximity to Wellington? Was there any relevancy with
regard to military/protest groups and/or government?
Q16. To what extent did you believe the situation in Palmerston North was unique? Do you think it
followed the broader national response that New Zealand experienced?
Q17. Do you think that the Vietnam War changed people’s attitudes permanently?
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Q18. How were your relations with the community of Palmerston North? Relationship between the
services? (i.e. Massey University and Linton Military Camp). Was there social stigma for your
participation?
Q19. Were there tensions? If so, how were they resolved? Were they resolved with the ending of
the war, or did they continue?
Q20. Was there long-term impact with your familial relations (support/non-support)?
Q21. Do you think there was an intergenerational impact on the community? Did it effect the next
generation? Were there lessons for the next generation?
Q22. Has your view on the War developed or changed since your involvement?
Q23. Is there anything else you would like to add?
